University of New Orleans

ScholarWorks@UNO
University of New Orleans Theses and
Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

Spring 5-18-2012

Two Essays in Islamic Finance and Investment
Hesham J. Merdad
University of New Orleans, hjmerdad@uno.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Merdad, Hesham J., "Two Essays in Islamic Finance and Investment" (2012). University of New Orleans
Theses and Dissertations. 1467.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1467

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu.

Two Essays in Islamic Finance and Investment

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Financial Economics

by
Hesham Jamil Mahmoud Mohamed Merdad
B.S. Kind Saud University, 2003
M.S. Rochester Institute of Technology, 2006
M.S. University of New Orleans, 2009

May, 2012

Copyright 2012, Hesham Merdad
ii

Dedication
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Eiman Sadiq Fadel, and to my
father, Jamil Mahmoud Merdad, for their boundless love and support throughout my entire
life. It is because of them, after Allah Almighty, that I became the person I am today. I can
never thank them enough and words are never adequate to express my sincere appreciation,
gratitude, and respect. But, I will always ask Allah Almighty to reward them for me because I
have no doubt in both my heart and mind that he is the best one to do so.

iii

Acknowledgment
I am sincerely thankful to Allah, may he be glorified and exalted, for all the blessings
and abundance in my life including the opportunity, ability, health, and strength to
complete my academic journey and conduct this research. Indeed, it was only because of
his Almighty’s help that this research has reached this point.
After Allah Almighty, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude and appreciation
to many people that have supported and assisted me during my study. I would like to start
with the chair of my dissertation committee, Professor Mohammad Kabir Hassan. I truly
owe him a great deal of thanks and I am deeply indebted to him because the inspiration and
the development of this dissertation were due to his guidance, patience, encouragement,
openness, and deep knowledge of the subject matter. Furthermore, I would like to express
my gratitude to my dissertation committee: Professor Hesham Abdel-Rahman, Professor
Tarun Mukherjee, Professor Gerald Whitney, and Professor James Ronnie Davis. They
provided me with excellent advice, insightful commentary, and valuable suggestions that
enriched my dissertation and I am deeply indebted to them as well.
Also, I would like to extend my appreciation to Professor Walter Lane, the Chair of
the Department of Economics and Finance, for his continued support, advice, and guidance.
Additionally, I would like to extend my thanks to all faculty members of the Department of
Economics and Finance in the University of New Orleans. I would like to also thank all
students and alumni of the Financial Economics PhD program for all support and good
times we spent together.
Most importantly, special thanks and deep gratitude go to my parents, my greatest
supports of all. Without their help, encouragement, and insistence, my academic journey
would never have been possible. Also, I would like to thank my brother Mahmoud and both
my sisters Huida and Hana because they were always there for me.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my beloved wife, Masheal Alkahtani. She lived with
this dissertation word by word and supported me with all possible means from fostering a
family environment to offering a shoulder to lean on after a long day of writing. Also,
special thanks from my bottom of my heart to my four-year-old daughter, Diala, and my
two-month-old son, Abdulmalik, and hope to compensate them for all the time we did not
spent together.

iv

Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................viii
Abstract............................................................................................................................................ ix
Preface............................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Islamic Finance ......................................................................................................... 3
1.

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 3

2.

Prohibitions in Islamic Finance ............................................................................................. 5
2.1. The Prohibition of Riba ........................................................................................................ 5
2.1.1. Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance ............................................................... 8
2.2. The Prohibition of Gharar and Maysir ......................................................................... 10
2.3. The Prohibition of “Haram” Trade................................................................................ 11

3.

Permissions in Islamic Finance .......................................................................................... 11
3.1. Profit-Loss-Sharing Financing Concept ...................................................................... 12
3.2. Trade-Based Financing Concept .................................................................................... 13
3.3. Asset-Based Financing Concept ..................................................................................... 14

4.

Equity Investing in Islamic Finance .................................................................................. 15
4.1. Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks .................................................................... 16

5.

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 18

6.

References .................................................................................................................................. 20

Chapter 2: The Islamic Risk Factor ....................................................................................... 21
1.

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 21

2.

Previous Literature ................................................................................................................. 25
2.1. Previous Literature on Shariah-Compliant Investments ..................................... 26
2.1.1. The Islamic-Effect in a Mutual Fund Context .................................................... 26
2.1.2. The Islamic-Effect in a Stock Market Index Context....................................... 29
2.1.3. The Islamic-Effect in a Portfolio Performance Context................................. 32
2.2. Previous Literature on the Cross-Sectional Stock Return ................................... 32

3.

Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market ................................................................... 34

4.

Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................. 39
4.1. Hypothesis I ........................................................................................................................... 39
4.2. Hypothesis II ......................................................................................................................... 40

5.

The Data....................................................................................................................................... 42
5.1. Data Sources .......................................................................................................................... 42
5.2. Preparing the Monthly Time-Series Data................................................................... 43
v

6.

Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 44
6.1. Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect .......................................... 45
6.1.1. The Panel Model ........................................................................................................... 45
6.1.2. Portfolio Performance Analysis ............................................................................. 47
6.1.2.1. Sharpe Ratio ............................................................................................................ 47
6.1.2.2. Treynor Ratio ......................................................................................................... 48
6.1.2.3. Jensen Alpha Index ............................................................................................... 49
6.2. Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor ................................................ 50
6.2.1. The Dependent Variables ......................................................................................... 50
6.2.2. The Explanatory Variables ....................................................................................... 51
6.2.3. The Four-Factor Model .............................................................................................. 53

7.

Empirical Results and Discussion...................................................................................... 54
7.1. Results from Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect................ 54
7.1.1. The Panel Model Results ........................................................................................... 54
7.1.2. The Portfolio Performance Analysis Results..................................................... 55
7.1.3. Interpretation................................................................................................................ 57
7.2. Results from Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor ..................... 58
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics Results .................................................................................. 58
7.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables ............................. 58
7.2.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables ................................. 61
7.2.2. Time-Series Regressions Results ........................................................................... 65

8.

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 72

9.

References .................................................................................................................................. 75

Chapter 3: Islamic Mutual Funds ........................................................................................... 77
1.

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 77

2.

Islamic Mutual Funds ............................................................................................................. 81
2.1. History of Islamic Mutual Funds.................................................................................... 82
2.2. The Shariah Law Effect on Islamic Mutual Funds ................................................... 84

3.

Previous Literature ................................................................................................................. 86
3.1. Previous Literature on Conventional Mutual Funds.............................................. 86
3.2. Previous Literature on Islamic Mutual Funds .......................................................... 88

4.

Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market ................................................................... 92

5.

Saudi Arabia’s Mutual Funds ............................................................................................... 93
vi

6.

The hypothesis .......................................................................................................................... 96

7.

The Data....................................................................................................................................... 98
7.1. Saudi Mutual Fund Data .................................................................................................... 98
7.2. Multifactor Model Data ................................................................................................... 104

8.

Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 104
8.1. Non Risk-Adjusted Returns ........................................................................................... 104
8.2. Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures ....................................................... 106
8.2.1. Sharpe and Modified Sharpe Ratios ................................................................... 106
8.2.2. MM Measure ................................................................................................................ 107
8.2.3. Treynor Ratio .............................................................................................................. 108
8.2.4. TT Index......................................................................................................................... 108
8.3. The Regression Approach .............................................................................................. 109
8.3.1. The Single-Factor Model (CAPM) ........................................................................ 109
8.3.2. The Treynor & Mazuy Model ................................................................................. 110
8.3.3. Multifactor Model ...................................................................................................... 110
8.3.3.1. The Construction of the Four-Factor Model ............................................. 111

9.

Empirical Results ................................................................................................................... 113
9.1. Empirical Results for Locally-Focused Portfolios ................................................. 114
9.2. Empirical Results for Arab-Focused Portfolios ..................................................... 123
9.3. Empirical Results for Internationally-Focused Portfolios ................................. 130

10.

Discussing the Empirical Results ..................................................................................... 138

10.1.

Locally-Focused Fund Portfolios............................................................................. 139

10.2.

Arab-Focused Fund Portfolios ................................................................................. 142

10.3.

Internationally-Focused Fund Portfolios............................................................. 144

10.4.

Final Note ......................................................................................................................... 145

11.

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 148

12.

References ................................................................................................................................ 151

Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 153
Appendix A: The Created 24 Different Types of Portfolios ........................................... 153
Appendix B: Copyright Permissions ...................................................................................... 154
Appendix B1: Permission to Use Certain MSCI Data ................................................... 154
Vita................................................................................................................................................. 156

vii

List of Tables
Chapter 2: The Islamic Risk Factor ............................................................................................... 21
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of All 146 Listed Firms from January 2003 to April 2011 ..... 35
Table 2: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Panel Model ................................................. 55
Table 3: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Portfolio Performance Analysis ........... 56
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables in the Time Series Regressions ......................................................................................................................... 61
Table 5: Single-Factor Model ......................................................................................................................... 66
Table 6: Three-Factor Model ......................................................................................................................... 68
Table 7: Four-Factor Model............................................................................................................................ 70
Chapter 3: Islamic Mutual Funds ................................................................................................... 77
Table 1: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Institutional Managers ............................ 93
Table 2: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Security Type, Geographical Focus, and
Investment Goal ................................................................................................................................ 94
Table 3: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Shariah Compliancy and Investment
Goal ........................................................................................................................................................ 95
Table 4: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Institutional Managers ..................................................... 98
Table 5: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Shariah Compliancy and Investment Goals.............. 99
Table 6: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Geographical Focus, Investment Goal, and Shariah
Compliancy ....................................................................................................................................... 102
Table 7: Results for the Locally-Focused Portfolios ........................................................................... 115
Table 8: Results for the Arab-Focused Portfolios ................................................................................ 124
Table 9: Results for the Internationally-Focused Portfolios ........................................................... 131

viii

Abstract
The main purpose of this dissertation is to lessen the gap in the Islamic finance and
investment literature by providing new answers to the most vital question raised in that
literature: Is the adherence to the Shariah law associated with at any cost?
The first chapter provides a primer on Islamic finance. It discusses several restrictions
and necessary adaptations that must be made to have a Shariah-compliant product. The
takeaway is that Shariah law mandates is related to fundamentals and, thus has a direct
effect on the risk-return profile of all sorts of different products. This is referred to as the
“Islamic-effect.”
The second chapter investigates that Islamic-effect in a cross-sectional stock return
context. This is done in two steps. First, looking at differences in stock returns between Islamic
and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia during the period from January 2003 to April 2011.
Results indicate that there is a negative relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average
returns. This is referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.” Second, examine whether that
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor that
affects cross-sectional expected stock returns. Time-series regressions results indicate that the
Islamic risk factor (CMI) does indeed capture strong common variation in Saudi stock returns
regardless what is included in the model. Also, findings suggest that using a four-factor model
that controls for the Islamic-effect is more appropriate than using a single- or a three-factor
model in Islamic finance applications that require estimates of expected stock returns.
The third chapter investigates the Islamic-effect in a mutual fund context. A unique
sample of 143 Saudi mutual funds (96-Islamic and 47-conventional) is used to assess the
performance and riskiness of Saudi Islamic funds relative to Saudi conventional funds and
relative to different Islamic and conventional indices for the period from July 2004 to January
2010. Findings suggest that there is a benefit (cost) from adhering to the Shariah law when
locally-focused (internationally-focused) fund portfolios are investigated. When Arab-focused
fund portfolios are investigated, findings suggest that there is neither a cost nor a benefit
from adhering to the Shariah law.

Keywords: Shariah law, Islamic finance, Islamic risk factor, Islamic-effect, Islamic firms,
Islamic mutual funds, conventional firms, conventional mutual funds, asset prices, riskreturn profile, Saudi Arabia.
JEL Classification: G01, G11, G12, and G15
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Preface
The main purpose of this dissertation is to lessen the gap in the literature of Islamic
finance and investment by empirically investigating one of most important issues in that
literature. That issue is whether there is any cost associated with the adherence to the
Shariah law or applying Islamic finance mandates.
The first chapter of this dissertation provides an introduction to Islamic finance. It is
worthy to note that the main purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive
survey on Islamic finance, but instead to provide a primer on Islamic finance in order to lay
the foundation stone for chapters two and three.
To elaborate, chapter one discusses the several restrictions and necessary
adaptations mandated by the Shariah law in order to have a Shariah-compliant product.
These restrictions and adaptations, as will be shown in the chapter, are considered issues
directly related and affect fundamentals such as the firm’s primary business activities,
riskiness, operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues, leverage, etc.
Based on this view, it is expected that applying Islamic finance mandates would
have a direct effect on the risk-return profile of all sorts of different products that are
characterized as Shariah-complaint. In this dissertation, that effect is referred to as the
“Islamic-effect.”
Now the purpose of chapters two and three of this dissertation is to investigate that
Islamic-effect in two different contexts in order to find new answers to the most critical
question raised in the Islamic finance and investment literature: Does adhering to the
Shariah law come at any cost?

1

That is, chapter two investigates the Islamic-effect in a cross-sectional stock return
context and chapter three investigates the issue in a mutual fund context.
It is worth mentioning that both empirical studies discussed in chapters two and
three carryout the Islamic-effect investigation to Saudi Arabia because it is considered one
of the few countries that strictly adhere to the Shariah.
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Chapter 1: Islamic Finance
1. Introduction
Islamic finance means that all financial transactions are conducted in accordance
with the Shariah law, which is the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life
both private and public. That legislative framework depends on four main sources: 1) The
Holy Quraan: which is the literal words of Allah (may he be glorified and exalted); 2)
sunnah: which refers to saying, actions, and approvals of the prophet and Allah’s messenger
Mohammad (peace be upon him); 3) ijmah: which refers to the consensus that has been
reached by Islamic scholars on a particular issue throughout the history; and 4) qiyas:
which means analogy and it refers to rulings on issues where there is no explicit guidance
in either the Quraan or the sunnah and, therefore are derived by qualified scholars with
preference to rulings related to similar issues.
Islamic finance is considered the only source of finance for Muslim investors that
want to preserve their Islamic values and morals. This is because Islamic finance provides
these Muslim investors with the opportunity to participate in different capital and financial
markets without the fear that such participation is going be at the cost of their Islamic
religious identity and values. In addition, Islamic finance started to become a vast global
practice and a preferable source of finance for non-Muslim investors as well due to its
ethical nature. That is, non-Muslim investors started to view investing in Shariah-compliant
products as a form of socially responsible investing (SRI).
As a result, the industry of Islamic finance, even though it is still relatively new when
compared to the industry of conventional finance, has been experiencing an excellent and a
rapid growth. According to McKenzie (2011), Shariah-compliant assets grew from USD 150
3

billion in the mid-1990s to around USD 551, 749, 947, and 1041 billion in 2006, 2007,
2008, and 2009, respectively. Furthermore, McKenzie asserts that these Shariah-compliant
assets are expected to sustain a growth rate of 10 to 15 percent per annum over a number
of upcoming years.
This chapter is considered an introduction to Islamic finance and not a
comprehensive survey on Islamic finance. In this chapter, the main opportunities and
challenges that face this relatively new field are highlighted. Furthermore, this chapter
sheds the light on the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations that must be made
to have a Shariah-compliant product. It is worth mentioning that these several restrictions
and necessary adaptations are considered issues directly related to fundamentals such as
the firms’ business activities, riskiness, revenues, leverage, etc. Thus, it is expected that
applying Islamic finance mandates would have a direct effect on the risk-return profile of
Shariah-compliant products such as Islamic stocks, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic bonds,
etc. In this dissertation, such effect is referred to as the “Islamic-effect.”
Also, it is worthy to note that all contracts in Islamic finance are deemed to be
permissible unless violations to the Shariah law principles are present. Thus, the Islamic
finance discussion in this chapter is not going to focus on what should be done to have a
Shariah-compliant contract, but instead the discussion is going to focus on what should be
avoided so contracts are not violating the Shariah law mandates (see section 2:
Prohibitions in Islamic Finance)
In addition, the following Islamic finance discussion will cover different financing
modes that Shariah law views as beneficial and fruitful to society and, thus are considered
alternatives to prohibited financing modes (see section 3: Permissions in Islamic Finance).
4

Finally, the Islamic finance discussion in this chapter will cover the issue of how
equity investing became permissible and what are the Shariah screening filters proposed
by Shariah scholars in order to identify Islamic firms (see section 4: Equity Investing in
Islamic Finance).

2. Prohibitions in Islamic Finance
Every single element in the religion of Islam is based on one basic concept, which is
to promote that which is good and prevent that which is evil. Based on this view, Shariah
law specifies four main things that it believes are classified as “evil”, and thus need to be
prevented. These four things are discussed in the following three subsections: the
prohibition of riba (section 2.1), the prohibition of gharar and maysir (section 2.2), and the
prohibition of “haram” trade (section 2.3).

2.1. The Prohibition of Riba
Riba is the Arabic term for interest rates or usury, and it is refers to a situation
where a predetermined return is guaranteed for just lending money (interest-based
financing). An example for riba is when a lender receives payments in excess of the
principal. Thus, under the concept of riba, the rate of return is considered a function of
money itself. In the religion of Islam, such practice is prohibited and condemned because
the rate of return should not be guaranteed for just lending money. It is also worth
mentioning that it is not only the religion of Islam that condemns and prohibits practices
that deals with riba or usury. According to Cornell (2006), original versions of Christianity
and Judaism also condemn and prohibit such practices. Apparently, the social welfare
decline that results from usury is the primary motive behind these condemnation and
prohibitions.
5

Based on this view, it is legitimate for people not familiar with the Shariah law to
argue that such law prevents profiting from lending money and transfers banks and
financial institutions from commercial entities to a more charitable ones because they will
just be offering financial services without being able to profit from them. However, such
argument can be refuted once the Shariah law perception of interest-based financing is
understood.
Shariah law requires lenders to decide beforehand on the reasons for lending their
money. In other words, lenders should decide whether they want to lend their money
because they want to 1) help other parties that need that money (lending money as a
sympathetic act) or 2) share profits with borrowers. If the former is the case, Shariah law
requires lenders to refrain from claiming any additional amounts in excess of the principal
amount even if these additional amounts are to compensate lenders for an expected
depreciation in the value of money or other factors such as inflation. This is because under
Shariah law, money is considered a medium of exchange and has no value in itself. Thus,
lending money on the basis of helping others should not be recognized as an incomegenerating transaction by requiring interest payments, see Ahmad & Hassan (2006).
However, if the main reason for lending money is to share profits with the borrower,
then according to the Shariah law, lenders can claim a predetermined proportion of the
profit provided that these lenders also share losses or risks with the other party. That is,
the lender and the borrower should come together to form a joint venture whereby both of
them have a joint stake in the business and share its outcome (whether it was a profit or a
loss) on a fair and proportional basis. The main idea of sharing risk and return is to prevent
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all forms of injustices that could face both borrowers and lenders when they resort to an
interest-based financing system.
For example, the interest-based financing system do the borrower no justice in
situations where the lender wants to just guarantee his/her return while leaving the
borrower’s return at the mercy of the actual business outcome. So if the borrower’s
business goes down, then he/she will bear the total loss as well as be responsible for the
interest payments. Also, the interest-based financing system do the lender no justice in
situations where the borrower makes massive return from their businesses, while the
lender is only restricted to a fixed rate of return that could be far less than what is deserved
if the lender was sharing profits and losses with the borrower. It is worthy to note that
such fixed rate of return that the lender receives is related to the market supply and
demand for money and some other factors, but not to the actual business outcome. Under
Shariah law, guaranteeing a lender a positive rate of return that is irrespective of the actual
business outcome is not permitted and is considered one form of riba.
Overall, reasons why Shariah law prohibits riba (interest-based financing) can be
summarized in the following three points. First, riba as one way to create unbalanced
atmosphere and a main reason that could bring injustice to either party: lenders and/or
borrowers. Second riba implies improper appropriation of other people’s property. Khan &
Mirakhor (1987) said that ”interest on money is regarded as representing unjustified
creation of instantaneous property rights: unjustified, because interest is a property right
claimed outside the legitimate framework of recognized property rights; instantaneous,
because as soon as the contract for lending upon interest is concluded, a right to the
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borrower’s property is created for the lender.” Third, riba leads to both society corruption
and social welfare decline which, in turn, diminishes human personality and wealth.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the prohibition of riba has a major implication on
Islamic finance empirical studies. That is, techniques of cash-flow analysis, cost of capital
estimation, and asset valuation models that are very well established in modern
conventional finance have some form of interest rate component embedded in them. So
does this mean that it is inappropriate to use such techniques in Islamic finance empirical
studies? The answer is no, because the interest rate component in all these techniques
could be replaced by a rate of return that is not in the context of interest-based debt. That
is, replace the interest rate component with a rate of return on one of the permissible
alternative financing sources such as Islamic bonds (sukuk).1
2.1.1. Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance
Conventional finance views money as a commodity, and therefore it can be freely
traded (sold, bought, and speculated on). This implies that money has an intrinsic value
and given it up for lending should not be free of charge. Thus, under conventional finance,
lenders require a predetermined return in the form of interest rates to compensate them
for the money’s time value. On the other hand, Islamic finance views money differently.
Money is not considered a commodity, but instead it is considered a mean of exchange, and
therefore does not have any value in itself because it cannot be utilized to directly fulfill
human needs. Money only becomes useful and has an intrinsic value when it is used to
acquire real assets or to buy goods and services.

1

Please see section 3.3: Asset-Based Financing Concept for more information on sukuk.
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This implies two main issues. The first issue is that if money is traded for money,
then time value of money does not exist in Islamic finance or it is not recognized by the
Shariah law. This is because Shariah law views money as a medium of exchange and, thus
has no value in itself. Thus, if money is exchanged for money, such as the case in borrowing
or lending, the payment on both sides must be equal and no predetermined return in the
form of interest (as a compensation for the money’s time value) is permissible. In other
words, Shariah law does not recognize the time value of money when it is based on the
exchange of monetary values, loans, and/or debt.
The second issue is that if money takes another form other than money itself, such
as when money is used to trade assets and commodities, then time value of money does
exist in Islamic finance and it is recognized by the Shariah law. To elaborate, if money is
used to buy an asset today at a certain price, then that same asset in the future is more
likely to be worth more or less than the price at which it was originally bought for; leading
to either a profit or a loss. Since that profit or loss is based on trading goods and not on
trading money itself, it is recognized by the Shariah law. This implicitly assumes that
Shariah law does recognize the time value of money, but it only does so when money is in
another form other than money itself. Based on this view, Shariah law has no problem with,
for example, buying on credit contracts (asset is delivered now and the price is paid some
time later in the future). In these contracts, the agreed upon price that is paid in the future
is usually higher than the asset’s spot price when the contract is made. That difference
between the asset’s spot and future prices can be considered as compensation to the seller
for the money’s time value. In Shariah law, time value of money in that form is permissible
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and recognized because it is not based on money itself, but instead is based on trading that
asset.2

2.2. The Prohibition of Gharar and Maysir
Gharar is the Arabic translation for a situation that involves risk, uncertainty,
ambiguity, and/or deception. For example, selling something that is not owned or that
cannot be described in accurate detail in terms of type, size, and amount, see El-Gamal
(2000). However, because it is impossible to entirely avoid risk and uncertainty, Obaidullah
(2005) argue that Shariah law allows for some (i.e. at the minimal) risk and uncertainty to
be presented. What the Shariah law forbids and thus needs to be avoided are conditions
where there exist excessive amount of risk and high level of uncertainty.
Gharar, for example, can be observed in derivative transactions (such as forwards,
futures, and options), short-selling, and conventional insurance activities (life insurance for
example). Visser (2009) points out three main conditions that must be met in any financial
contract in order to avoid engaging in gharar. First, both the subject and the price must
exist and the other party has the ability to deliver it. Second, all characteristics and
amounts of the counter-value must be specified. Third, quantity, quality, and date of future
delivery must be defined beforehand. The main motives behind banning gharar can be
summarized in the following three points: to promote transparency and fairness, prevent
situations where potential injustice or deception to any party might occur, and avoid
excessive risk and high level uncertainty.

Please see Obaidullah (2005) and Ahmad & Hassan (2006) for more discussion on the existence of the time
value of money in Islamic finance.
2
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Maysir is the Arabic translation for gambling or game of chance (lottery) and both
are forbidden according to the Shariah law. Furthermore, Shariah law forbids investing in
any business that is related to either gambling and/or game of chance.

2.3. The Prohibition of “Haram” Trade
Haram is the Arabic translation of impermissible or forbidden. There are some
businesses and industries that Shariah law condemn and prohibit producing, consuming,
distributing, and investing in because it believes that they are harmful and unfruitful to
society. Examples for businesses and industries are, but not limited to, non-medical alcohol,
pork production, illegal and intoxicating drugs, gambling, adult entertainment, tobacco and
all other unethical businesses.

3. Permissions in Islamic Finance
Shariah law does not permit interest-based financing (riba), but it permits other
financing modes because they apply one or more of the following three financing concepts
that Shariah law believes would create and add real value to the economy, increase social
welfare, minimize potential injustice, and enhance public good.
The first concept is the profit-loss-sharing financing concept which can be
represented by two financing modes: musharakah and mudarabah. The second concept is
the trade-based financing concept which can be represented by four financing modes:
murabahah, bay’mu’ajjal, salam, and ijarah. The third concept is the asset-based financing
concept which can be represented by sukuk.

11

3.1. Profit-Loss-Sharing Financing Concept
Musharakah is the Arabic translation of partnership. It refers to a situation where
capital is raised by all parties of a contract. Thus, profits and losses are pro rata distributed
and each partner has the right to participate in the decision making of the enterprise.
Mudarabah is a special kind of musharakah where the party that has the investment
capital and the party that has the expertise and management skills get together to
undertake an investment project or to form a business venture. The generated profits are
shared between parities according to a predetermined ratio that is agreed upon
beforehand.
However, unlike in musharakah, in mudarabah losses are only borne by the
financier, i.e. the capital provider. As a result, the agency problem between the capital
provider (as the principal) and the manager (as the agent) is more aggravated in
mudarabah than in musharakah. One way to lessen the effect of this problem is to make
managers fully liable when negligence, deliberate mismanagement, and/or clear violations
are committed. Another way is to provide managers with more incentives to encourage
positive behavior when they achieve specified targets or meet predefined performance
criteria.
Finally, there is one more condition that must be satisfied in order for both financing
modes (musharakah and mudarabah) be Islamically acceptable. This condition is that the
financier party cannot be guaranteed by the party being financed a positive return that is
irrespective of the actual outcome of the project or business venture. Under Shariah law,
guaranteeing a positive rate of return that is irrespective of the actual outcome is not
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permitted and is considered one form of riba. Based on this view, preferred stocks are not
permitted under Islamic finance because they guarantee the amount of dividends.

3.2. Trade-Based Financing Concept
Murabahah is referred to a situation where a commodity is resold with a markup on
the original purchased price. So the way murabahah works is that a customer goes to an
Islamic bank and specifies a commodity that he/she wants the bank to purchase. The bank
purchases that commodity and then sells it to the customer at a markup price agreed upon
beforehand. Note that for a murabahah contract to Islamically acceptable, there should not
be any binding agreements between the bank and the customer.
Looking closely at the process of murabahah, the situation can be described, to some
extent, as a debt that arises from a credit purchase. A legitimate question could be raised
here: Since both murabahah and interest-based financing are considered financing
methods that creates debt, what makes murabahah and not interest-based financing
Islamically acceptable?
Note that the similarity between the two is only on the conceptual level where both
are considered financing methods that creates debt. Technically, they are considered two
different financing modes and they operate in a very dissimilar way. The main differences
between the two financing methods can be summarized are as follows:
First, unlike in interest-based financing, in murabahah the financier is financing an
acquisition of an asset with acknowledged utility and known price and not a venture of
uncertain results. Second, murabahah is based on real assets or real commodities, whereas,
interest-based financing is based on money itself. Third, unlike in interest-based financing,
in murabahah no further increases in the contracted price are allowed when payments are
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delayed. Fourth, there are several risks that are associated with murabahah but not with
interest-based financing, such as bearing all the risks of owning a real asset. Take for
example a bank that engages in a murabahah contract with a customer to buy a car. Once
the contract is made, that bank is responsible for anything that happens to the car, to the
extent that the bank is obligated to replace it if damaged, as long as the ownership of that
car is yet to be transferred to the customer.
Bay’mu’ajjal refers to sale on credit where a commodity is delivered now and the
price is paid some time later in the future. Salam is the opposite of bay’mu’ajjal where price
is paid now and the commodity purchased is delivered later in the future. Payments in both
cases may be at the time the contract is made or in installments. Finally, ijarah is referred
to leasing.
Finally, it is worthy to mention that in order to be Islamically acceptable, contracts
of all discussed financing modes must not contain any of the discussed prohibited elements
such as gharar (selling something that is not owned or cannot be described in accurate
detail in terms of type, size, and amount) and/or guaranteeing the financier a positive rate
of return that is irrespective of the actual outcome (riba).

3.3. Asset-Based Financing Concept
Sukuk are Islamic financial certificates that have characteristics that are similar to
those of conventional bonds but a key difference is that they are asset backed. The way
sukuk works is the issuer of a sukk sells a certificate on a real asset to an investor, who then
rents it back to the issuer for a predetermined rental fee.3 Such fee is usually equivalent to

3

Sukk is the singular of sukuk.
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an interest rate benchmark like LIBOR. The issuer also makes a contractual promise to buy
back that certificate at a future date at the par value.
Two main reasons that make sukuk and not conventional bonds Islamically
acceptable. First, sukuk link their cash flows and rate of return to the purchased asset. This,
in turn, creates a proportionate beneficial ownership in the underlying asset. This is not the
case in conventional bonds where they link their cash flows and rate of return to money
itself. Second, sukuk are issued on identifiable real assets that have intrinsic values,
whereas, conventional bonds, are issued on money, which Shariah law views as a medium
of exchange, and thus has no intrinsic value.

4. Equity Investing in Islamic Finance
According to Siddiqi (2002), since the mid 1980s, there were serious doubts that
investing in the stock market is not “Islamically” acceptable. However, in the early 1990s,
the Saudi Arabian Fiqh Academy, the leading authority on religious issues in the Muslim
world, issued a decree ruling that within certain conditions, investing in equity is
permissible under the Shariah law.4 Equity investing became permitted because Shariah
scholars reached a consensus that, under certain conditions, trading stocks fulfill two
important conditions in Islamic finance. First, trading stocks represent trading real assets
that have intrinsic values and not just artificial ones. Second, capital gains and generated
dividends from equity trading are comfortable with the Shariah law because they are based
on the profit-loss sharing financing concept.
In order for a firm to be considered Shariah-compliant, and thus its stock becomes
permissible, it must abide by all Islamic finance principles discussed earlier. To pinpoint
4

Fiqh refers to the Islamic jurisprudence.
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these firms and to distinguish them from conventional ones or to define the non-compliant
financial practices and business activities in an Islamic firm, Shariah scholars proposed
several rules or guidelines that can be summed up in the following two filters: the ethical
filter and the financial filter.

4.1. Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks
In the light of the previous discussion, two Shariah screening filters (ethical and
financial) are proposed in order to pinpoint firms that are compliant with the Islamic
principles. The ethical filter evaluates the firm's overall activities and main businesses in
order to ensure that the firm is not engaging in any of the following prohibited (haram)
activities:5
1. Activities that involve any form of riba (usury or interest rates). For example,
borrowing and/or investing in interest-based instruments. Accordingly, this
automatically excludes all interest-based financial institutions, such as conventional
banks and conventional brokerage firms, from the Shariah-compliant firm category.
2. Activities that are characterized with gharar. For example, activities that involve
selling something that is not owned or cannot be described in specific detail in terms
of size, shape, and amount. Such as trading on margin, engaging in short-selling, and
using the future and option markets to engage in any sorts of trade. Also, some
insurance policies, such as life insurance, are considered impermissible because they
contain gharar elements.
3. Activities that are related by any means to maysir or game of chance.

5

Please see section 2: Prohibitions in Islamic Finance.
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4. Activities that are related to impermissible sectors such as businesses that deal with
non-medical alcohol, tobacco, pork, adult entertainment, and all other unethical
businesses.
However, many firms find it quite difficult to devise, mange, and implement all these
prohibitions, especially when it comes to avoiding interest rates (riba) because all financial
systems are integrated, related, and inseparable. As a result, it is not uncommon to observe
many firms fail to pass the ethical filter because they have a small portion of their revenues
generated from impermissible activities (henceforth, these firms are referred to as partially
contaminated firms).
Taking into consideration that the majority of firms are partially contaminated
firms, Shariah scholars eased the adherence to the Shariah law from strict adherence to
conformity with some exceptions. This means that although they did not pass the ethical
filter, partially contaminated firms can still be deemed Shariah-compliant if they meet two
additional requirements and pass the financial filter. The first requirement is that these
partially contaminated firms must be perceived by the public as exemplary firms and their
main businesses or rendered services must be of public interest. The second requirement is
that the permissible (halal) activities must represent the core activities of these firms, and
the prohibited (haram) activities must be very negligible. Once these two requirements are
met, partially contaminated firms must worry about passing the financial filter if they are
interested in earning a Shariah-compliant title.
The financial filter determines the level of mixed contribution from both prohibited
and permissible activities towards the firm's revenue and profit. According to this filter,
partially contaminated firms must maintain the following ratios to be considered as
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Shariah-compliant: 1) the ratio of impermissible income to total income is less than 5
percent; 2) the ratio of interest-based debt to total assets is less than 33 percent (or 30
percent in some cases); 3) the ratio of account receivables to total assets is less than 45
percent (or 33 percent in some cases); and 4) the ratio of interest-bearing cash and
investments to total assets is less than 33 percent (or 30 percent in some cases).
Note that some practitioners prefer replacing the total asset denominator with
different forms of market capitalization such as market capitalization itself, 12-month
market capitalization average, 24-month market capitalization average, or 36-month
market capitalization average in order to value a company. Practitioners that prefer the
market capitalization divisor argue that the total asset divisor is a pure accounting
perspective that does not account for elements such as the firm’s management, staff, and
acquired intellectual property. Practitioners that use the 12-month market capitalization
average argue that such divisor smooth out irregular price movements. But, during the
recent 2008 financial crisis period, it was found that such divisor undervalues firms. That
undervaluation is not due to changes in the firm’s intrinsic value, but instead it is due to the
bad market conditions. Thus, some practitioners suggest the use of the 24-month or the 36month market capitalization average instead of the 12-month market capitalization
average; see Hassan & Mahlknecht (2011).

5. Conclusion
This chapter lays the foundation stone for the following two chapters where it
provides a primer, and not a comprehensive survey, on Islamic finance. The takeaway from
this chapter is that Islamic finance has many other implications other than identifying
products that fit the religious preference of Muslim investors. One of these implications is
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that Islamic finance or applying Islamic finance mandates is directly related to and affects
fundamentals. For example, firms cannot earn an Islamic title unless they abide by all
Shariah law restrictions and make the necessary adaptations to their regulatory, fiscal, and
fundamental frameworks such as their business activities, operations, financing sources,
profitability, revenues, riskiness, leverage, etc. In other words, firms cannot become Islamic
until they successfully pass both ethical and financial filters.
Since applying Islamic finance mandates is considered directly related to and affects
fundaments, it is expected that the risk-return profile of all sorts of different Shariahcompliant products would also be affected as well. In this dissertation, that effect is called
the “Islamic-effect” and the main purpose of the following two chapters is to empirically
investigate that Islamic-effect. Chapter two empirically investigates the issue in the crosssectional stock return context and chapter three empirically investigates the issue in a
mutual fund context.
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Chapter 2: The Islamic Risk Factor
An Empirical Study in Saudi Arabia
1. Introduction
The increasing capital of Muslim investors and their strong demand to invest that
capital in products that are only comfortable with the Shariah law stimulate the
development of different Shariah-compliant products.6 As a result, there are now Islamic
stocks, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic market indices, and Islamic bonds (sukuk). This opens
the door wide for Muslim investors to participate in different capital and financial markets
without the fear that such participation would destroy their Islamic identity or be at the
cost of their Islamic values and morals. This also raises a legitimate question: Is the
adherence to the Shariah law associated with at any cost?
Several empirical studies investigate that issue by examining the Islamic-effect,
which is the effect of applying Islamic finance mandates on the risk-return profile of
different products, in different contexts. For example there are empirical studies that
investigate the Islamic-effect in: 1) a mutual fund context [Kräussl & Hayat (2008),
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009), and Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010)]; 2) a stock
market index context [Hakim & Rashidian (2002, 2004), Hussein (2004, 2005), and Girard
& Hassan (2008)]; and 3) a portfolio performance context [Derigs & Marzban (2009) and
Donia & Marzban (2010)]. Unfortunately, the literature that discusses the impact of the
Islamic-effect is still not adequate to draw a clear conclusion regarding the direction of that
effect.

Shariah is an Arabic word. And Shariah law is the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life, both
private and public.
6
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That is, some studies find that there is a cost from adhering to the Shariah law, while
other studies find that there is no cost from doing so. Studies, which conclude that there is a
cost from adhering to the Shariah law, argue that Shariah-compliant products have less risk
exposure, and thus reward investors with less return than conventional products. On the
other hand, studies, which conclude that there is no cost from adhering to the Shariah law,
argue that Shariah-compliant products are competitive to conventional products and that
Islamic screens do not adversely affect the risk-return profile of these Shariah-compliant
products. Additionally, there is another line of studies that argue that Shariah-compliant
products could offer good hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. This is
because Shariah law is based on principles that are conducive to enhancing public good,
increasing social welfare, adding real value to the economy, minimizing potential injustice,
and avoiding environmental and social crisis. For example, Shariah law prevents investing
in instruments such as toxic assets and derivatives that have adversely affected
conventional products and triggered the recent 2008 global financial crisis.
In sum, results regarding the Islamic-effect are inconclusive. One main reason for
such inconclusive results is that the Islamic finance and investment industry is still
relatively new compared to its conventional counterpart and the literature in that field is
still at its infancy.
This paper contributes and lessens the gap in the existing Islamic finance and
investment literature by investigating the impact of the Islamic-effect in a context that is
different from that of previous studies. That is, this paper examines the Islamic-effect in the
cross-sectional stock return context. To elaborate, this paper starts from the premise that
adhering to the Shariah law is associated with a cost where Islamic firm stocks compensate
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investors with lower return than conventional firm stocks. This is because Islamic firms are
exposed to less overall risk than conventional firms due to the several restrictions and
necessary adaptations to which these Islamic firms must commit in order for them to earn
a Shariah-compliant title. Thus, it is expected to observe a negative relationship between
Islamic firms and average return. In this paper, that negative relationship is referred to as
the “negative Islamic-effect.” The main objective of this paper is to examine whether that
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor
that affects the cross-sectional expected stock returns. To my knowledge, this is the first
paper that examines the Islamic-effect issue in such context.
What motivates the choice of the ‘negative Islamic-effect’ to examine whether it is a
priced risk that affects stock returns is the fact that such effect is directly related to firm
fundamentals. To elaborate, the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations to
which Islamic firms must commit in order for them to earn a Shariah-compliant title are
considered issues directly related to and affect fundamentals (such as the firm’s primary
business activities, riskiness, operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues,
leverage, etc). Once firm fundamentals are affected, asset prices will also be affected as well
and they will react accordingly. Thus, when examining the cross-sectional stock returns, it
is expected to find that the negative Islamic-effect is, indeed, a risk factor that is systematic
and cannot be diversified. In order to critically investigate this issue, this paper carries out
the investigation to Saudi Arabia because it is one of the few countries that are known for
their strict adherence to the Shariah law.
Examining the Islamic-effect in stock returns is developed in two steps. The first
step is to examine the existence of a negative Islamic-effect by investigating differences in
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stock returns between Islamic and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia. This is done using
two statistical methods: 1) a panel model and 2) a portfolio performance analysis. The
second step is to examine the existence of an Islamic risk factor. That is, to test whether that
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common (shared and undiversified) risk factor that
affects the cross-sectional expected returns of common stocks in the Saudi Arabian market.
This is done using time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French
(1993). The sample period covers the period from January 2003 to April 2011.
The panel data regression analysis reveal that after controlling for the systematic
risk, Islamic firms, on average, earn 0.0055 less monthly returns than conventional firms
(Table 2). Even though that effect is economically small, it is statistically significant at 5
percent. Furthermore, the portfolio performance analysis shows that the Islamic portfolio
underperforms the conventional portfolio using all risk-adjusted performance measures
(Table 3). Also, when stock return portfolios are formed based on sorts of stocks on size
and book-to-market equity, the results, in general, show that Islamic portfolios have lower
averages of monthly excess returns than their respective conventional portfolios (Table 4
panels B and C). All these results support the negative Islamic-effect hypothesis (negative
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns), at least during the period
from January 2003 to April 2011.
Given that the negative Islamic-effect does indeed exist, an Islamic risk factor (CMI)
is formed to test whether it could capture common variation is Saudi stock returns. CMI
(conventional minus Islamic) is a portfolio meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related
to the negative Islamic-effect and it is formed in a way where it focuses on the differences
in return between conventional and Islamic firms and at the same time free, as much as
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possible, from both size and book-to-market equity effects. The Islamic risk factor CMI is
then augmented to a three-factor model that includes the excess market return portfolio
(RM-RF) and both size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML) risk factors in order to
perform asset pricing tests using time-series regressions.
The results indicate that CMI does indeed capture strong common variation in Saudi
stock returns not captured by the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and mimicking
portfolios related to size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML) during the period from
January 2003 to April 2011 (Table 7).
Furthermore, the results from the time-series regressions indicate that the fourfactor model that includes the Islamic risk factor is considered superior to both the singlefactor model and the three-factor model in explaining common variation in Saudi stock
returns.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section 2 discusses the previous literature.
Section 3 discusses Saudi Arabia’s economy and stock market. Section 4 provides the
hypotheses. Section 5 covers the data for the empirical study. Section 6 discusses the
methodology. Section 7 provides the empirical results and discussion. And finally section 8
is the conclusion.

2. Previous Literature
This section is divided into two subsections: previous literature on Shariahcompliant investments (section 2.1) and previous literature on the cross-sectional stock
returns (section 2.2).
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2.1. Previous Literature on Shariah-Compliant Investments
There are several studies that discuss the Islamic-effect issue in different contexts.
The following lists previous studies that discuss the Islamic-effect in a mutual fund context
(section 2.1.1), stock market index context (section 2.1.2), and portfolio performance
context (section 2.1.3).
2.1.1. The Islamic-Effect in a Mutual Fund Context
Elfakhani & Hassan (2005) use a sample of 46 Islamic mutual funds from January 1,
1997 to August 31, 2002 to examine the performance of Islamic mutual funds relative to
Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. They employ different risk-adjusted
performance measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Moreover, they employ
an ANOVA statistical test. Overall, their findings suggest that there is no statistical evidence
that there exist any performance differences between Islamic funds and the employed
market benchmarks. However, their findings suggest that Islamic mutual funds do offer a
good hedging opportunity against market downturns.
Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad (2007) compare the performance of 14 Islamic funds
relative to 51 conventional funds in Malaysia during the period from 1992 to 2001. They
employ different measures such as the adjusted Sharpe, Treynor, adjusted Jensen alpha,
Modigliani and Modigliani (MM) measure, and the information ratio. They find that
conventional funds perform better than Islamic funds during bullish trends; but during
bearish trends, Islamic funds perform better. They conclude that Islamic funds offer
hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. They also find that conventional
funds have diversification levels that are marginally better than Islamic funds, but both
funds are unable to achieve at least 50 percent of the market diversification level.
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Kräussl & Hayat (2008) use a sample of 59 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) to examine
the performance of these funds relative to Islamic and conventional market benchmarks
during the period from 2001 to 2006. They employ a set of measures such as the Jensen
alpha, Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, and the information ratio.
They find that, on average, there are no significant performance differences between IEFs
and the employed market benchmarks (both Islamic and conventional). However, a closer
look at the bear market of 2002, they document that IEFs significantly outperform the
Islamic and conventional market indices using conditional CAPM. Analyzing the risk-return
characteristics of IEFs, they find that IEFs possess superior systematic risk-to-return ratios.
Therefore, they argue that these IEFs “seem most attractive as part of a larger fully
diversified portfolio like a fund of funds.”
Abderrezak (2008) examines the performance of 46 Islamic equity funds (IEFs)
relative to conventional funds, ethical funds, and Islamic and conventional market indices
during the period from January 1997 to August 2002. He employs several methodologies
such as the Sharpe ratio, single-factor model, and Fama and French three-factor model. He
finds that IEFs are 40 basis points more expensive than their conventional peers.
Furthermore, he finds that IEFs consistently underperform their respective Islamic and
conventional market benchmarks. Finally, he finds that there are no performance
differences between IEFs and ethical funds.
Muhammad & Mokhtar (2008) use weekly net asset values (NAVs) of nine Islamic
equity funds in Malaysia in order to examine their performance relative to the Islamic
market index, Kuala Lumpur Syariah Index (KLSI), for the period from 2002 to 2006. To
assess the performance of these funds, they employ the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. They
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find that eight of these funds underperform the KLSI. However, they find a bag of mixed
results when they employ the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the
systematic risk (beta) to assess the riskiness of these funds.
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009) use a unique dataset of 262 Islamic equity funds
from 20 countries and four regions in order to examine the performance of these funds
relative to constructed portfolios that have exposure to national, regional, and global
markets. Furthermore, they control for different investment styles by employing a
conditional three level Carhart model. The results show that Islamic funds from eight
nations (mostly from the western regions) significantly underperform their respective
equity market benchmarks and Islamic funds from only three nations outperform their
respective market benchmarks and that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks.
Furthermore, they find that Islamic funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
Malaysia do not significantly underperform their respective market benchmarks nor they
are biased towards small stocks. Finally, they argue that Islamic equity funds can offer
hedging opportunities because their investment universe is limited to low debt-to-equity
ratio stocks.
Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010) use a sample of 28 Saudi mutual funds
managed by HSBC in order to examine the performance of 12 Islamic funds relative to 16
conventional funds during the period from January 2003 to January 2010. They use several
performance measures such as the Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT,
and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they employ the Treynor and Mazuy model to examine the
Saudi funds’ selectivity and market timing abilities. They find that Islamic funds
underperform conventional funds during both full and bullish periods, but outperform
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during bearish and financial crisis periods. Furthermore, they find that HSBC managers are
good at showing timing and selectivity skills for Islamic funds during the bearish period,
and for conventional funds during the bullish period. They also assert that Islamic mutual
funds do offer hedging opportunities during economic downturns.
2.1.2. The Islamic-Effect in a Stock Market Index Context
Hassan (2001) employs several statistical tests such as serial correlation, variance
ratio, and Dickey-Fuller tests in order to examine the market efficiency issue for the Dow
Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI). He also examines the volatility of the DJIMI returns
using a GARCH econometric framework. The sample covers the period from 1996 to 2000.
The results show that the DJIMI is efficient and its return is normally distributed, but it
suffers from operational inefficiencies that need to be corrected to make the risk behavior
of the DJIMI stable overtime.
Hakim & Rashidian (2002) use daily data from October 12, 1999 to September 4,
2002 and find that the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI) outperforms the Wilshire
5000 using the Sharpe ratio. Furthermore, a co-integration and a causality analyses reveal
that the two indices are not integrated and that the DJIMI is also not integrated with the
three-month Treasury bill. They conclude that Muslim investors are not penalized by
investing in an Islamic index. And there are diversification benefits that investors could
reap by investing in the DJIMI because it moves independently from the broad market
index (Wilshire 5000) and the three-month Treasury bill.
Hakim & Rashidian (2004) use the Treynor ratio and the conditional CAPM on a
weekly data from January 2000 to August 2004 to analyze the Dow Jones Islamic Market
Index (DJIMI) behavior and its risk characteristics relative to a broader market index [Dow
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Jones World (DJW) Index] and an ethical index [Dow Jones Sustainability (DJS) World
Index]. The results indicate that the total fluctuations in the DJIMI have been in line with
both the DJW and the DJS during the studied period. Also, the results indicate that investors
tracking the DJIMI are exposed to no more risk than investors tracking the DJW. However,
when the performance of the DJIMI is compared to that of the DJS, they find that the DJIMI
underperforms the DJS.
Hussein (2004) uses risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Jensen alpha,
Sharpe, and Treynor in order to examine whether there are any performance differences
between the FTSE Global Islamic Index and both the FTSE All-World Index and the
FTSE4Good (a socially responsible index). He also examines the long-run performance
differences using cumulative returns (CRs) and the buy-and-hold returns (BHRs). The
sample covers the period from July 1996 to August 2003. The results show that the FTSE
Islamic Index performs as well as the FTSE All-World Index during the overall period.
However, breaking the sample period into bull and bear periods, the results indicate that
the FTSE Islamic Index outperforms (underperforms) the FTSE All-world Index during the
bull (bear) period. The outperformance of the FTSE Islamic Index during the bull period is
attributed to the fact that the index tracks large number of firms with low leverage ratios.
However, the underperformance of the index during the bear period is attributed to the
exclusion of liquor firms, which are considered best performers during bear periods.
Hussein (2005) finds that the application of the Shariah screens does not adversely
affect the performance of two Islamic indices [FTSE Global Islamic Index and Dow Jones
Islamic Market Index (DJIMI)]. The results indicate that the short and long-term
performance measures of these indices are no different from that of non-Islamic Indices
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(FTSE All World Index and Dow Jones World Index). The sample period is from December
1993 for Dow Jones indices and from January 1996 for FTSE indices to December 2004.
Yusof & Abd. Majid (2007) use GARCH (1,1) and VAR models to investigate the effect
of different monetary variables (narrow money supply, broad money supply, interest rates,
exchange rates, and the industrial production index) on the conditional volatility of both
Islamic and conventional stock market indices in Malaysia for the period from January
1992 to December 2000. The employed Islamic and conventional stock market indices are
the Rashid Hussain Berhad Islamic Index (RHBII) and the Kuala Lumpur composite Index
(KLCI), respectively. They find that due to the application of Shariah screens, the RHBII is
less vulnerable to volatilities in monetary policy variables (i.e. interest rates) than the KLCI.
Girard & Hassan (2008) examine the performance of five FTSE Islamic indices and
their corresponding non-Islamic indices during the period from December 1998 to
December 2006. A set of different measures are used such as Sharpe, Treynor, Jensen
alpha, and Fama (selectivity, net selectivity, and diversification) measures. Also, they
examine the performance persistence of these indices using Carhart (1997) four-factor
model. They find that there are no significant performance differences between Islamic and
non-Islamic indices. They also find that Islamic indices are growth and small cap oriented,
whereas conventional indices are more value and mid cap oriented. The co-integration
analysis reveal that both types of indices are integrated for the overall period and the
behavior of Islamic indices do not differ from that of conventional indices.
Hashim (2008) utilize the CAPM to examine the application of Shariah screens on
the FTSE Global Islamic Index during the period from January 1999 to May 2007. The

31

results indicate that the Islamic index outperforms the socially responsible index
(FTSE4Good) and operates in line with the broader market index (FTSE All-World Index).
2.1.3. The Islamic-Effect in a Portfolio Performance Context
Derigs & Marzban (2009) use a Markowitz mean-variance model to examine the
performance of Shariah-compliant portfolios relative to unconstrained conventional
portfolios. When constructing the Shariah-compliant portfolios, they applied the Shariah
screens on the portfolio level instead of on the asset level. The results show that the
reduced investment universe adversely affects the overall risk and return of Shariahcompliant portfolios when compared to conventional portfolios.
Donia & Marzban (2010) compare the performance of Islamic and conventional
portfolios during the recent 2009 financial crisis period using a mean-variance
optimization model in order to construct a set of efficient portfolios. They find that Islamic
portfolios are able to outperform conventional portfolios because Islamic portfolios benefit
from the lower leverage feature that is documented to have a negative relationship with
performance. They also find that Shariah-compliant portfolios outperform conventional
portfolios of small-cap and large-cap US firms.

2.2. Previous Literature on the Cross-Sectional Stock Return
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and Black (1972) provide a turning
point in the stock return behavior literature by independently developing what came to be
recognized as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Such model implies that the market
excess return portfolio is sufficient to explain the differences in the cross-sectional average
returns (beta is all that matters). Since then, sizeable empirical studies came out and
received much attention because they find contradicting evidence to the CAPM predictions.
32

One of the early empirical studies that find contradicting evidence to the CAPM is
Basu (1977). He finds that there is significant evidence that stocks of firms with high
earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios earn higher average returns than stocks of firms with low
earnings-to-price ratios. His findings imply that differences in return could not be
attributed to just differences in beta.
Banz (1981) shows another contradiction to the CAPM. He finds that stocks of firms
with low market capitalization have higher average returns than stocks of firms with large
market capitalization. Furthermore, Basu (1983) finds that small firms continue to have
higher average returns even after the earnings-to-price effect is controlled.
Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein (1985) show a third contradiction to the CAPM by
finding that stocks of firms with high book-to-market (B/M) equity ratios have higher
average returns than stocks of firms with low B/M ratios. Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok
(1991) find similar results when studying the Japanese market.
Bhandari (1988) shows a fourth contradiction to the CAPM. He finds that even when
size and beta are controlled, there is a positive relationship between leverage and average
returns.
Jegadeesh (1990) and Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) provide a fifth contradiction to
the CAPM by documenting the momentum effect. They show that short-tem winners
(stocks that do well over the previous few months) will continue their momentum over the
next month. However, short-term losers (stocks that have low returns in the previous few
months) will continue their poor performance for another month.
Fama & French (1992) examine beta, E/P, size, B/M, and leverage all together in a
single cross-sectional study from 1963 to 1990. They find that the effect of beta disappears
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when beta is allowed to vary in a manner unrelated to size. This result is a shot in the CAPM
heart. Further, they find that size and B/M absorb the explanatory power of all other
variables. Thus, they conclude that the cross-sectional average stock returns in the US can
be nicely explained by these two variables.
Fama & French (1993) introduce a three-factor model where they augment the
single-factor model with two additional risk factors related to size (SMB) and book-tomarket equity (HML). They find that the factor loadings on all three risk factors (RM-RF),
SMB, and HML are significant and the R-squared values for most portfolios are close to one.
This means that SMB and HML capture independent sources of systematic risk not
captured by (RM-RF). They conclude that the three-factor model very well explains the
variation in the cross-sectional average returns of US common stocks during the period
from 1963 to 1991. They also conclude that their results indicate that there is a risk story
behind the dispersion in average returns, and not as several empirical studies argue that
the market is inefficient.

3. Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market
Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy and its economy is considered the largest in
the Middle Eastern region. According to Jadaw Investment 2010 annual report, Saudi
Arabia’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was around USD 435.8 billion and is
expected to reach USD 507.3 billion in 2012. 7 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is considered the
largest oil producer, oil exporter, and oil proven reserves possessor worldwide. 8 It has
almost 20 percent of the world’s proven reserves and has a leading role in OPEC. The
Source is Jadaw Investment, a pioneer in the field of Shariah-compliant investment services:
http://jadwa.com/about/pages/annualreports.aspx.
8 Oil proven reserves are the stock of proved reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). Source is CIA world fact
book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.
7
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official currency is the Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) and since 1986 it has been effectively
pegged to the US dollar where USD 1 = 3.75 SAR.
The Saudi stock market is also considered by far the largest in the Middle Eastern
region. The total equity market capitalization at the end of April 2011 reached SAR 1,346
billion (around USD 358.93 billion).9 Furthermore, there are 146 firms listed on the
exchange as of April 30, 2011. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all listed firms. In
the table, the average, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum monthly returns are
reported for the period from January 2003 to April 2011.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of All 146 Listed Firms from January 2003 to April
2011
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all 146 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) as of
April 30, 2011. Also, this table reports the descriptive statistics for the market index, Tadawul All Share Index
(TASI), and the Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. In the table, the average,
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum monthly returns are reported for the period from January 2003
to April 2011. Also reported are the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for each firm and the firm’s ticker.
Finally, the last column “Islamic Dates” shows which of the listed firms are Islamic and which are non-Islamic
during the studied period. Furthermore, that column shows the dates when each of these listed firms was
able to make it to the Shariah-compliant firm list issued by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi.
SIC

Ticker

8010
8020
8030
8040
8050
8060
8070
8080
8090
8100
8110
8120
8130
8140
8150
8160
8170
8180
8190

TAWUNIYA
MALATH
MEDGULF
ALLIANZ SF
SALAMA
WALAA INSURANCE
ARABIAN SHIELD
SABB TAKAFUL
SANAD
SAICO
SAUDI INDIAN
GULF UNION
ALAHLI TAKAFUL
AL-AHLIA
ACIG
AICC
TRADE UNION
SAGR INSURANCE
UCA

Avg Ret
1.
0.30%
-3.75%
-0.90%
-2.28%
0.00%
-1.96%
-1.44%
0.14%
-0.08%
-1.97%
-0.11%
-1.75%
0.75%
-0.20%
0.41%
2.09%
2.99%
3.30%
0.48%

St. Dev
Max
Insurance Sector
15.25% 57.94%
16.24% 25.30%
13.25% 29.59%
17.78% 44.48%
21.75% 71.05%
16.38% 45.05%
17.07% 57.24%
22.59% 69.10%
30.18% 168.82%
18.74% 50.89%
21.78% 89.69%
17.13% 47.30%
22.94% 81.71%
24.73% 70.14%
24.05% 88.60%
17.10% 53.73%
17.04% 56.80%
24.11% 90.19%
14.72% 41.00%

Min

Islamic Dates

-44.23%
-39.83%
-25.08%
-46.67%
-50.00%
-36.36%
-36.00%
-42.92%
-33.91%
-43.47%
-38.78%
-36.16%
-40.11%
-44.65%
-46.19%
-22.35%
-16.05%
-45.19%
-23.13%

Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic

Information is based on the April-2011 monthly Statistical Report issued by the Saudi Stock Exchange
(Tadawul).
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(table continued)
8200
8210
8220
8230
8240
8250
8260
8270
8280
8290
8300
8310
2050
2100
2270
2280
4061
6001
6002
6010
6020
6040
6050
6060
6070
6080
6090

SAUDI RE
BUPA ARABIA
WEQAYA TAKAFUL
AL RAJHI TAKAFUL
ACE
AXA-COOPERATIVE
GULF GENERAL
BURUJ
AL ALAMIYA
SOLIDARITY
WATANIYA
AMANA INSURANCE
2.
SAVOLA
FPCO
SADAFCO
ALMARAI
ANAAM HOLDING
HB
HERFY FOODS
NADEC
QAACO
TAACO
SFICO
SHARQIYA DEV CO
JADCO
BISACO
GIZACO

1310
1320
1330
2040
2090
2110
2130
2160
2200
2240
2320
2360
2370
4230

MMG
SSP
ALKHODARI
SCERCO
NGCO
SCACO
SIDC
SAAC
APCO
ZIIC
AL BABTAIN
SVCP
MESC
RED SEA HOUSING

2001
2002
2010
2020
2060
2170
2210
2250
2260

CHEMANOL
PETROCHEM
SABIC
SAFCO
NIC
ALCO
NAMA
SIIG
SPC

1.13%
9.72%
25.00%
-9.42%
3.16% 15.95% 52.78% -20.16%
-3.21% 13.20% 24.74% -24.22%
-0.17% 15.46% 38.30% -21.89%
-1.77% 12.44% 32.51% -16.57%
1.85% 17.99% 53.47% -16.33%
-2.62%
9.43%
9.39%
-12.69%
5.13% 17.55% 23.47% -17.14%
-0.19% 12.19% 33.67% -18.96%
6.45% 17.36% 24.92% -10.21%
5.00% 19.08% 22.34% -13.14%
25.96% 30.76% 61.69% -12.89%
Agriculture & Food Industries Sector
1.81% 12.84% 47.01% -47.41%
3.24% 24.67% 133.71% -60.03%
0.21% 18.53% 81.18% -48.30%
1.21% 12.71% 52.50% -34.74%
3.89% 29.59% 132.03% -60.83%
3.19% 14.35% 57.92% -14.72%
1.18%
3.68%
5.59%
-3.33%
2.54% 15.25% 66.28% -45.19%
3.51% 20.55% 73.79% -57.36%
2.37% 18.47% 66.28% -51.39%
5.53% 28.50% 177.30% -60.00%
3.91% 21.83% 91.76% -62.27%
3.01% 18.76% 75.25% -56.21%
6.41% 25.76% 126.84% -58.82%
3.10% 18.52% 56.41% -54.31%
3. Building & Construction Sector
-0.80% 11.00% 25.17% -18.12%
-1.26%
9.18%
21.11% -11.48%
8.07% 23.39% 42.78%
-7.83%
3.24% 14.41% 55.83% -44.20%
0.65% 12.44% 70.60% -29.38%
2.60% 19.48% 86.48% -51.40%
3.39% 19.76% 64.74% -56.75%
0.96% 15.53% 46.28% -42.86%
2.17% 18.23% 59.57% -43.44%
1.07% 13.18% 48.02% -35.21%
-0.11% 11.53% 28.19% -26.40%
-0.77% 12.57% 22.22% -34.64%
-1.75% 13.49% 28.89% -32.01%
0.42% 12.85% 40.64% -36.53%
4. Petrochemical Industries Sector
1.23%
8.85%
21.30% -18.26%
3.67% 12.45% 35.67% -15.63%
2.53% 12.89% 40.16% -35.90%
2.49% 12.75% 37.87% -46.48%
3.32% 15.85% 48.14% -39.00%
4.55% 23.88% 109.55% -53.82%
3.03% 18.61% 66.16% -57.94%
0.75% 15.87% 53.49% -46.43%
0.00% 17.94% 55.25% -40.06%
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Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200301-201104
200807-201104
200407-200906
200508-201104
Not Islamic
200907-201104
200301-201104
200301-201104
200301-201104
200706-200806
200612-201104
200301-201104
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200706-201104
200907-201104
Not Islamic
200301-201104
200301-201104
Not Islamic
200706-200806
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200407-200603
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200301-200611

(table continued)
2290
2310
2330
2350
2380

YANSAB
SIPCHEM
ADVANCED
KAYAN
PETRO RABIGH

2.18% 14.12% 27.11% -36.27%
0.29% 11.31% 34.08% -25.60%
0.55% 14.88% 40.29% -34.50%
0.12% 11.64% 26.32% -27.48%
2.33% 10.64% 21.73% -26.35%
5. Industrial Investment Sector
2.54%
9.62%
31.29% -11.63%
3.42%
8.84%
25.29% -17.11%
2.28% 10.55% 39.09% -15.43%
2.97%
7.79%
13.70%
-3.22%
1.69%
9.21%
11.28%
-9.47%
1.93% 16.60% 71.33% -46.35%
2.14% 14.85% 49.82% -38.02%
1.99% 18.41% 59.39% -61.84%
3.99% 21.29% 103.00% -51.55%
1.89% 14.82% 41.71% -42.14%
0.13%
9.67%
24.14% -21.07%
-0.99%
9.35%
29.06% -26.22%
2.40% 19.67% 63.66% -51.00%
6. Banks and Financial Services Sector
0.90%
9.35%
28.88% -17.91%
1.78% 12.37% 40.01% -37.25%
0.61% 10.91% 34.32% -23.37%
0.69% 10.73% 36.34% -30.31%
1.21%
9.12%
25.52% -23.44%
1.64%
9.17%
29.99% -23.62%
1.28% 10.47% 33.46% -23.13%
1.57% 11.02% 39.67% -27.53%
1.98% 11.65% 36.54% -33.16%
-2.63% 12.64% 23.81% -32.72%
-0.10%
6.24%
17.77% -11.69%
7. Cement Sector
0.87% 11.26% 41.55% -29.32%
1.13% 10.74% 52.91% -35.73%
0.84% 10.01% 27.98% -45.06%
1.32% 11.73% 62.89% -33.65%
0.63%
8.09%
27.45% -27.20%

1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
2070
2150
2180
2220
2230
2300
2340
4140

BCI
MA’ADEN
ASTRA
ALSORAYAI
SHAKER
SPIMACO
ZOUJAJ
FIPCO
NMMCC
SCCO
SPM
ALABDULLATIF
SIECO

1010
1020
1030
1040
1050
1060
1080
1090
1120
1140
1150

RIBL
BJAZ
SAIB
AAAL
BSFR
SABB
ARNB
SAMBA
RJHI
ALBI
ALINMA

3010
3020
3030
3040
3050

ARCCO
YACCO
SACCO
QACCO
SOCCO

3060

YNCCO

0.39%

3080
3090
3091

EACCO
TACCO
JOUF CEMENT

0.44%
0.54%
3.47%

4001
4002
4050
4160
4180
4190
4200
4240
4290

A.OTHAIM MARKET
MOUWASAT
SASCO
THIMAR
AHFCO
JARIR
ALDREES
ALHOKAIR
ALKHALEEJ TRNG

Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200807-201104
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200807-201104
200907-201104
200907-201104
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200301-201104
200706-201104
Not Islamic
200604-201104
200612-201104
200807-201104
Not Islamic
200807-201104
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200301-201104
200407-201104
200706-201104

27.45%

-22.56%

9.05%
30.14%
10.27% 41.95%
12.30% 19.70%
8. Retail Sector
3.47%
8.61%
26.34%
2.76%
7.66%
17.52%
2.56% 20.11% 127.27%
3.85% 23.95% 81.92%
1.48% 18.23% 73.83%
1.68%
7.85%
41.91%
0.08% 10.97% 29.31%
0.89% 10.58% 28.43%
-0.57% 11.60% 36.45%

-24.45%
-31.36%
-8.16%

200301-201104
Not Islamic
200706-201104
200508-201104
200706-201104
200301-200406
& 200706-200806
200612-201104
200706-201104
Not Islamic

-15.79%
-8.19%
-38.71%
-51.09%
-48.85%
-12.19%
-25.00%
-26.56%
-31.60%

200807-201104
200907-201104
200508-201104
200807-201104
Not Islamic
Not Islamic
200508-201104
200706-201104
Not Islamic

9.16%
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(table continued)
4020
4090
4100
4150
4220
4250
4300
4310
2030
2120
2140
2190
4080
4130
4280
7010
7020
7030
7040
4030
4040
4110
4260
4070
4210
4270
2080
5110
4010
4170

9. Real Estate Development Sector
1.12% 14.77% 45.60% -45.15%
Not Islamic
1.86% 14.65% 71.09% -39.94%
200301-201104
0.82% 15.58% 92.01% -46.65%
200301-201104
1.79% 17.00% 73.66% -47.93%
200301-201104
-1.36%
9.92%
23.61% -28.74%
200706-201104
-0.81%
5.04%
10.39%
-9.64%
200706-201104
-2.88%
8.48%
21.91% -29.89%
200706-201104
3.21% 13.18% 18.90%
-8.55%
200907-201104
10. Multi-Investment Sector
SARCO
3.56% 21.60% 134.26% -44.49%
Not Islamic
SAICO
4.29% 23.19% 83.52% -58.56%
200807-201104
AADC
2.75% 23.35% 149.40% -57.09%
Not Islamic
SISCO
2.97% 21.19% 103.82% -49.48%
200807-201104
ATTMCO
2.12% 16.86% 70.39% -41.30%
Not Islamic
ABDICO
4.70% 28.20% 90.10% -73.98%
200706-201104
KINGDOM
0.38% 17.11% 58.95% -22.31%
Not Islamic
11. Telecommunication & Information Technology Sector
STC
-0.12%
9.07%
25.39% -23.23%
Not Islamic
EEC
-1.03% 12.32% 41.94% -29.95%
200301-201104
ZAIN KSA
-1.02%
7.14%
21.05% -16.67%
200706-200906
ATHEEB TELECOM
-4.01%
9.49%
4.11%
-24.69%
200807-201104
12. Transport Sector
NSCSA
1.01% 13.50% 41.49% -35.34%
Not Islamic
SAPTCO
1.02% 14.30% 53.11% -43.73%
200301-201104
SLTCO
1.93% 18.44% 73.66% -49.30%
200301-201104
BUDGET SAUDI
-1.32% 13.61% 45.63% -31.17%
200706-201104
13. Media and Publishing Sector
TAPRCO
3.75% 21.39% 79.81% -56.99%
Not Islamic
RESEARCH
-2.00%
8.04%
16.13% -23.03%
Not Islamic
SPPC
-1.96% 10.06% 34.15% -21.85%
Not Islamic
14. Energy & Utilities Retail Sector
NGIC
0.59% 12.61% 48.01% -46.32%
200407-201104
SECO
1.03% 10.99% 46.24% -33.49%
Not Islamic
15. Hotel & Tourism Sector
SHARCO
2.24% 19.22% 124.83% -56.17%
200807-201104
TECO
3.90% 23.98% 86.55% -55.38%
200612-201104
Market Index and Risk-Free rate
TASI
1.28%
8.55%
19.25% -21.58%
SIBOR 1Month
0.21%
0.15%
0.43%
0.03%
SRECO
TIRECO
MCDCO
ADCO
EMAAR EC
JABAL OMAR
DAR AL ARKAN
KEC

Table 1 shows that the Amana Insurance Company has the highest average monthly
returns for the entire studied period with around 25.96 percent, and the Atheeb
Telecommunication Company has the lowest average monthly returns with a loss of
around 4.01 percent. The table also shows that all the 146 firms fall under 15 different
sectors. The insurance sector has the largest number of firms (31 firms) and both sectors
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(the energy and utilities retail sector and the hotel and tourism sector) have the least
number of firms (2 firms in each sector). Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics for
the market index: Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) and the Saudi Interbank Offering Rate
(SIBOR) with one-month maturity. TASI and SIBOR have average monthly returns of
around 1.28 and 0.21 percent, respectively.
Table 1 also reports a column named “Islamic Dates” that provides the dates when
each of the 146 listed firms was able to make it to the Shariah-compliant firm list that is
issued by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi.10 Dr. Al-Osaimi thoroughly studies all listed
firms on a regular basis in order to determine which of these firms are considered Shariahcompliant. Dr. Al-Osaimi is a very well respected scholar in the Islamic finance field, thus
his list of Islamic firms is considered an essential guide for Muslim investors to identify
Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia.

4. Hypotheses
4.1. Hypothesis I
Islamic firms must abide by all Shariah law restrictions and make the necessary
adaptations to their regulatory and fiscal frameworks before they can be considered
Islamic. An example of these restrictions and adaptations is that Islamic firms must avoid
all interest-based financing sources (riba) or, in some specific situations, must maintain a
very low interest-based debt ratio (no more than 33 or 30 percent). Thus, Islamic firms are
believed to be inherently less susceptible to financial risk and changes in interest rates than

Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi is an Associate Professor in the College of Economics and
Administrative Science at Al Emam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University. Also, Dr. Al-Osaimi is the general
manager of the “Shariah Group” unit at Albilad Bank and a member of the bank’s Shariah board. He was also
the ex-manager of the department of Shariah audit at Al-Rajhi Bank. The main website for Dr. Al-Osaimi can
be found at the following link: www.halal2.com.
10
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are conventional firms. Another example is that Islamic firms cannot utilize risky
instruments such as toxic assets and derivatives that have adversely affected conventional
firms and triggered the recent 2008 global financial crisis. A third example is that Islamic
firms must avoid all gharar (uncertainty, ambiguity, and excessive risk) elements in all
financial transactions and contracts, whereas, conventional firm are not obligated to do so.
All these restrictions and necessary adaptations to which Islamic firms must commit
in order to earn a Shariah-compliant title make these firms have some unique business
characteristics and a distinguished risk-return profile when compared to conventional
firms. And this is what will be examined under this hypothesis.
Hypothesis I states that it is expected that Islamic firms are less vulnerable to
instability and have less risk exposure when compared to conventional firms due to the
application of Islamic finance mandates. Consequently, according to the risk-return
tradeoff theory which suggests that low risk is associated with low return and high risk is
associated with high return, it is expected that Islamic firm stocks provide investors with
lower return than conventional firm stocks because of the lower level of risk assumed
when Islamic stocks are held. In other words, it is expected that there is a negative
relationship between Islamic firms and average returns (negative Islamic-effect).

4.2. Hypothesis II
Adhering to the Shariah law is considered an issue that could affect stock prices
since it is directly related to and affects firm fundamentals. That is, applying Islamic finance
mandates does, in one way or another, affect firms’ primary business activities, riskiness,
operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues, leverage, etc. Since this is the case,
this hypothesis tests whether that negative Islamic-effect (from hypothesis I) is considered
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a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor that affects cross-sectional stock
returns.
To do so, a portfolio that mimics the risk factor in returns related to the negative
Islamic-effect is constructed. That portfolio is called CMI (conventional minus Islamic) or
the “Islamic risk factor” and it represents risk premiums for holding conventional stocks
over Islamic stocks. CMI is then augmented to a three-factor model that includes the excess
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and both size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML)
risk factors in order to perform asset pricing tests using time-series regressions.
If that negative Islamic-effect indeed proxy for a common risk factor in returns, then
CMI should capture common variation in stock returns not captured by (RM-RF), SMB, and
HML risk factors. That is, loadings on CMI should be significant and negative (positive)
when the Islamic (conventional) portfolio is used as the dependent variable in the timeseries regressions, regardless of the size and book-to-market equity orientation of that
Islamic (conventional) portfolio. This implies that even if the market, size, and book-tomarket equity effects are controlled, investors holding Islamic stocks require lower rate of
return than investors holding conventional stocks because firms that adhere to the Shariah
law are less risky than firms that do not adhere to such law.
Furthermore, if CMI captures common variation in stock returns, the following
should be observed when CMI is augmented to the three-factor model: 1) an increase in the
adjusted R-squared values and 2) a decrease in the standard error of regression s(e) values
because s(e) represents the firm-specific unsystematic and thus diversifiable risk.
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5. The Data
5.1. Data Sources
From the main website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), the following has
been collected: the daily stock prices for the entire 146 listed firms from January 1, 2002 to
April 30, 2011; the book value of equity for all 146 firms at December 31 for each year from
2002 to 2010; and the daily number of shares outstanding for all 146 firms from January 1,
2002 to April 30, 2011.11 Also collected are the daily values of the market index: Tadawul
All Share Index (TASI) for the period from January 1, 2003 to April 30, 2011. It is worthy to
note that the selected sample is free from the survivorship bias.12 As mentioned earlier, the
list of Shariah-compliant Saudi firms used in this empirical study is based on the list
provided by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi.
From Bloomberg, the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with
one-month maturity is collected for the period from January 2003 to April 2011. In this
empirical study, SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the monthly riskfree rate. As discussed earlier, it would be more appropriate to use the rate of return on
sukuk instead of the rate of the risk-free asset since Shariah law forbids any return that is in
the context of debt. But the problem is that data on sukuk rates are still not fully available to
be used in Islamic finance empirical studies.

The main website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) can be found at the following link:
http://www.tadawul.com.sa.
12 Bishah Agriculture Development Company (SIC=6080) is the only firm that was suspended from trading. It
has been suspended since January 10, 2007. Even though it is suspended, Bishah is included in the firm
sample for this empirical study.
11
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5.2. Preparing the Monthly Time-Series Data
The sample period covers the period from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly
data). The computed monthly variables used in this empirical study are: the monthly stock
and TASI returns, the firm’s monthly market value (size), and the firms’ monthly book-tomarket equity that is based on the year ending in December 31 of (t-1). They are calculated
as follows:
-

The monthly stock and TASI returns are calculated as follows:

(1)

where
-

is the monthly return at month (M) for either firm (i) or TASI.

The firm’s monthly market value (size) is calculated as follows:

(2)

where
-

is the monthly size at month (M) for firm (i).

The firm’s monthly book-to-market equity is computed using values of the year ending
in December 31 of (t-1) in order to make sure that the book value of equity is already
known. It is calculated as follows:

(3)

where:
Book-to-market equity at month (M) for firm (i) of the year (t)
Book value of equity for firm (i) on the last day of December of year (t-1)
Market value for firm (i) on the last day of December of the year (t-1) and it is
calculated as follows:

It is worthy to note that it is considered a common practice in finance to exclude
firms from both financial and utility sectors when performing standard asset pricing tests
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due to their unique financial structure. These firms use leverage or borrowed funds
extensively and therefore are more sensitive to financial risks and changes in interest rates
than firms in other sectors. When interest rates increase, share prices of these firms
normally decrease. This could be a serious issue when performing standard asset pricing
tests. For example, a study by Foerster & Sapp (2005) show that including firms in the
financial sector does, indeed, affect the significance results of the explanatory power of
different risk factors in these tests.
In this empirical study, however, including firms in both financial and utility sectors
is believed to be necessary and a must. To elaborate, firms that are classified as Shariahcompliant are expected to adhere to all Shariah law principles regardless of their sector.
Therefore, the issue that firms are more or less sensitive to financial risks and changes in
interest rates is irrelevant when assessing the firms’ strict adherence to the Shariah law.
Firms have only two choices: either they are Shariah-compliant or not. Thus, for this
empirical study, it is necessary to include all firms, including those in both financial and
utility sectors, since the main objective is to examine the Islamic-effect and whether that
effect is considered a systematic risk factor that affects cross-sectional stock returns.

6. Methodology
The role of the Islamic-effect in stock returns for the period from January 2003 to
April 2011 is developed in two steps. The first step is to examine the existence of a negative
Islamic-effect (section 6.1). The second step is to examine the existence of an Islamic risk
factor (section 6.2).

44

6.1. Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect
A negative Islamic-effect exists if there is statistical evidence that Islamic firms in
Saudi Arabia underperform conventional firms. Two statistical methods are used to
investigate this issue: a panel model (section 6.1.1) and a portfolio performance analysis
(section 6.1.2).
6.1.1. The Panel Model
The main reason for using a panel model is to control for any significant firm effects.
Usually when estimating a panel model, a choice between three different models [a pooled
regression model (OLS), a fixed effect model (FEM), or a random effect model (REM)] must
be made. That choice depends on which model best fits the sample data in hand.
OLS is used when all constant terms are equal. That is, there are no significant firm
effects. In such cases, data are pooled and an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is
preformed. Under the assumption of equality constant terms, the OLS estimator is
considered efficient and consistent. OLS is estimated as follows:
(4)

where:
Return for firm (i) at month (t)
Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t)
The intercept of the model
The systematic or market risk
The return on the market index (TASI) at month (t)
Coefficient on the Islamic dummy variable. It represents the difference in stock
returns between Islamic and conventional firms. Thus, this coefficient
represents the Islamic-effect
Dummy variable that give 1 when firm (i) is considered Islamic during month
(t) and zero otherwise
The error term with zero mean for firm (i)

FEM is used when there are significant firm effects. That is, constant terms are not
equal. If so, OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent due to the variable omission problem.
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In order test the significance of the firm effects, an F-test is performed to test the null
hypothesis that constant terms are all equal (Ho:

= ). Failing to reject the null hypothesis

indicates that OLS should be used because it is efficient and FEM is not. However, rejecting
the null hypothesis indicates that FEM should be used because it is consistent and OLS is
not. The FEM is estimated as follows:
(5)

where

-

are firm-specific constant terms,

-

are firm dummy variables

to designate a particular firm, and the rest is defined as in equation (4).
REM is used when there are significant firm effects but omitting such effects from
the model will not affect the consistency of the model because it is assumed that they are
not correlated with the independent variables. That is, the REM treats firm-specific
constant terms as randomly distributed variables across cross-sectional units. The
advantage of the REM is that it uses far less estimated parameters, and therefore is more
efficient than the FEM if there is no correlation between the omitted firm-specific effects
and the independent variables. The disadvantage of this model is that it could be
inconsistent if there is correlation between the unobserved firm effects and the
independent variables.
To test which model to use, FEM or REM, a Hausman’s specification test is
preformed. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation; both models (FEM and REM) are
consistent, but the FEM is inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis; the FEM is
consistent, but the REM is not. Thus, failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of
the REM, whereas, the rejection of the null hypothesis supports the use of the FEM. REM is
estimated as follows:
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(6)

where

is the firm-specific random element and the rest is defined as in equation (4).
Regardless what model is used, a statistically significant and negative coefficient on

the “Islamic” dummy variable (i.e. the D coefficient) indicates that there is statistical
evidence that Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia produce average returns that are lower than
conventional firms. That is, there is a negative Islamic-effect and such effect is attributed to
the fact that Saudi Islamic firms are strictly adhering to the Shariah law.
6.1.2. Portfolio Performance Analysis
One advantage of this method is that the idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific risk) will
be diversified away when stocks are held in a portfolio. Based on this view, two valueweighted return portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are formed and three common riskadjusted performance measures (Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha) are computed for
each portfolio in order to test the existence of the negative Islamic-effect. The market
benchmark used to assess the performance of both Islamic and conventional portfolios is
the created market return portfolio (RM) as shown in equation (11). The three riskadjusted performance measures are:
6.1.2.1. Sharpe Ratio
The Sharpe ratio is derived by Sharpe (1966) as an absolute risk-adjusted
performance measure. Thus, no market benchmark is needed to calculate the Sharpe ratio.
The idea of this ratio is to see how much additional return is received for the additional
volatility of holding the risky asset over the risk-free asset. The risk in the Sharpe ratio is
measured by the portfolio’s standard deviation, which represents the total risk (diversified
and undiversified risks). This ratio is useful in ranking portfolios because a higher ratio is
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only warranted if return is higher with the same level of risk or if the risk is lower with the
same level of return. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows:
(7)

where:
Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p)
The average rate of return for portfolio (p)
The average risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity
Standard deviation of portfolio (p)

6.1.2.2. Treynor Ratio
Treynor ratio is considered a relative risk-adjusted measure. Thus, a market
benchmark is needed to calculate it. This ratio measures the excess returns over the
riskless asset that could be earned per unit of market risk. Market risk or systematic risk is
measured by the portfolio’s beta, which measures the co-movement of the portfolio with
the market. It is calculated as follows:
(8)

where

are defined as in equation (7) and:
Treynor ratio for portfolio (p)
Beta for Portfolio (p). Estimated using CAPM as shown in the following equation:

(9)

where:
Rate of return for portfolio (p) at month (t)
Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t)
The intercept and it is also called the Jensen alpha index
Portfolio's beta or the market risk
The return on the created market return portfolio at month (t) as shown in equation (11)
The error term with zero mean
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6.1.2.3. Jensen Alpha Index
The Jensen alpha index is a relative risk-adjusted performance measure that was
first introduced by Jensen (1967) to determine the abnormal return of a portfolio over the
theoretical expected return using a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Thus, the Jensen
alpha index is the constant term in the single-factor model presented in equation (9). A
portfolio is considered outperforming the market index if the Jensen alpha is positive and
statistically significant.
In addition to the created Islamic and conventional value-weighted return
portfolios, an Islamic and a conventional value-weighted size and book-to-market equity
portfolios are formed. The Islamic and conventional value-weighted return, size, and bookto-market equity portfolios are calculated as follows:
(10)

where:
Represents the following variables: the value-weighted return (
), size
(
, and book-to-market equity (
) for portfolio (p = Islamic or
conventional) at month (M)
is defined as in equation (2) for month (M) and firm (i). The subscript (p)
refers to the portfolio (Islamic or conventional)
Is the sum of sizes for all (N) firms in portfolio (p = Islamic or conventional) at
month (M)
Represents the following variables: the monthly return (
), size (
, and
book-to-market equity (
) as defined, respectively, in equations (1), (2), and
(3) for firm (i) in portfolio (p = Islamic or conventional) at month (M)

The averages of the monthly value-weighted portfolios of return (
(

, and book-to-market equity (

), size

) are calculated by just taking the simple

average values of these portfolios (see Table 3).
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6.2. Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor
This section discusses the methodology used to test if the negative Islamic-effect is
considered a common (shared and undiversified) risk factor that affects the cross-sectional
expected returns of common stocks in the Saudi Arabian market. The methodology used is
the time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French (1993).
6.2.1. The Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are eight value-weighted excess return portfolios formed
on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah compliancy
(Islamic and conventional). The dependent variables’ monthly return, size, and book-tomarket equity are calculated as shown in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
In each month (M), stocks are split into two groups: Islamic (I) and conventional (C).
Then for each of these two groups, the following is performed. Stocks are ranked on size
and then the median size is used to split stocks into two groups: small (S) and big (B). Then
stocks are ranked again but this time the ranking is based on the book-to-market equity
and then the median book-to-market equity is used to split stocks into two groups: Low (L)
and High (H). It is worthy to note that because there are relatively few listed firms (only
146 firms) on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), it is better and more appropriate to
split each of the size and book-to-market equity stocks into maximum two groups in order
to avoid a skewed distribution.
Then eight stock portfolios are formed based on the intersection of the two Shariah
compliancy groups (I and C), two size groups (S and B), and two book-to-market equity
groups (L and H). The eight portfolios are as follows: (ISL, ISH, IBL, IBH, CSL, CSH, CBL, and
CBH). For example, the ISL portfolio contains stocks in the Islamic group that are also in the
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small size and low book-to-market equity groups. The CBH portfolio contains stocks in the
conventional group that are also in the big size and high book-to-market equity groups.
Finally, the monthly value-weighted return, size, and book-to-market equity for the
eight portfolios are calculated. The calculation of these value-weighted portfolios is as
shown in equation (10). Then the averages of the monthly value-weighted return, size, and
book-to-market equity portfolios are calculated by just taking the simple average value of
these portfolios (see Table 4 panels B and C).
6.2.2. The Explanatory Variables
The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and
portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB),
book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI). The time-series of the
(RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI are also called monthly risk premiums for risk factors related
to the market, size, book-to-market equity, and the negative Islamic-effect, respectively.
The market return portfolio RM is calculated as shown below and then the excess
market return portfolio (RM-RF) is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate (SIBOR with
one-month maturity) from RM.
(11)

As discussed in the literature review, it is very well documented that there is a
negative relationship between size and average returns. Thus, SMB (small minus big) is
calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the two small Islamic and the
two small conventional portfolios minus the average return on the two big Islamic and the
two big conventional portfolios. This difference is expected to make the created portfolio
that mimics the risk factor that is related to size free, as much as possible, from both the
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book-to-market equity and the Islamic-effect influences and more focused on the
differences in return between small and big stocks. SMB is calculated as follows:
(12)

Also as discussed in the literature review, it is very well documented that there is a
positive relationship between book-to-market equity and average returns. Thus, HML (high
minus low) is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the two high
Islamic and the two high conventional portfolios minus the average return on the two low
Islamic and the two low conventional portfolios. This difference is expected to make the
created portfolio that mimics the risk factor that is related to the book-to-market equity
free, as much as possible, from both the size and the Islamic-effect influences and more
focused on the differences in return between value (high book-to-market equity) and
growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. HML is calculated as follows:
(13)

Based on hypothesis I, it is expected that there is a negative relationship between
Saudi Islamic firms and average returns (negative Islamic-effect). Thus, a portfolio meant to
mimic the risk factor in returns that is related to the negative Islamic-effect is created and
in this paper that portfolio is referred to as CMI (conventional minus Islamic) or the
“Islamic risk factor.” It is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the four
conventional portfolios minus the average return on the four Islamic portfolios. Forming
CMI in that manner makes the created portfolio that mimics the risk factor that is related to
the negative Islamic-effect more focused on differences in return between conventional
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and Islamic firms and at the same time free, as much as possible, from both size and bookto-market equity effects. CMI is calculated as follows:
(14)

Finally, averages of all independent variables (averages of monthly risk premiums
for the market, size, book-to-market equity, and Islamic risk factors) are just the simple
average values of these variables (see Table 4 panel A).
6.2.3. The Four-Factor Model
The time-series regressions are estimated as follows:
(15)

where:
Rate of return for the portfolio (p) at month (t)
Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t)
The intercept of the model
Portfolio's beta or the market risk
Return on the created market portfolio at month (t) as shown in equation (11)
Loadings on the size risk factor for portfolio (p)
(Small minus big) size risk factor
Loadings on the book-to-market equity risk factor for portfolio (p)
(High minus low) book-to-market equity risk factor
Loadings on the Islamic risk factor for portfolio (p)
(Conventional minus Islamic) Islamic risk factor.
The error term with zero mean

It is worthy to note that it is essential to test the null hypothesis of zero intercepts in
order to assess how well the cross-sectional average returns are sufficiently explained by
averages of risk premiums of common risk factors related to the market (RM-RF), size
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI).
If this four-factor model is very well specified, then intercepts should be
indistinguishable from zero (insignificant and close to zero). This is because averages of
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SMB, HML, and CMI are expected to explain the differences in average returns across
stocks, and the average excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) is expected to explain why
stock returns are, on average, above the risk-free rate (SIBOR with one-month maturity).

7. Empirical Results and Discussion
The following empirical results discussion is divided into two main sections. The
first section (section 7.1) discusses the results from examining the existence of a negative
Islamic-effect. In this section, the results from utilizing a panel model (section 7.1.1) as well
as the results from employing a portfolio performance analysis (section 7.1.2) is presented.
The second section (section 7.2) discusses the results from examining the existence of an
Islamic risk factor using time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama &
French (1993). In this section, the descriptive statistics results for both independent and
dependent variables (section 7.2.1) as well as the results from the time-series regressions
(section 7.2.2) are presented.

7.1. Results from Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect
7.1.1. The Panel Model Results
Table 2 presents the results from testing the existence of a negative Islamic-effect
using a panel model. As shown from the table, the null hypothesis that all constant terms
are equal cannot be rejected. That is, the F-statistics is around 0.7693 and it is insignificant
at all conventional levels (p-value is 0.9815). This supports the use of the OLS over the FEM
because no significant firm effects are present (OLS is efficient, but FEM is not).
Looking at the OLS results, the coefficient on the Islamic dummy variable is
approximately -0.0055 and it is significant at 5 percent (t-statistics is -2.162). This supports
the existence of a negative Islamic-effect where Islamic firms earn, on average, 0.0055 less
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monthly returns than conventional firms. Even though the return difference between
Islamic and conventional firms is economically small, the significance of such difference
cannot be disregarded.
Table 2: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Panel Model
The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011. The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi
Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The proxy for the market index is the Tadawul All
Share Index (TASI). The dependent variable is the excess monthly stock returns over the monthly risk-free
rate for all 146 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The independent variables are the
monthly excess market returns over the monthly risk-free rate and the Islamic dummy variable, which gives 1
if the firm (i) is Islamic during month (t) and zero otherwise. There are three models reported: ordinary least
squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM), and random effect model (REM). The adjusted R-squared from each
model is also reported. Also, reported are the F-statistics and the p-value for testing the hypothesis that all
constant terms are equal (
. Failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of OLS, however,
rejecting the null supports the use of the FEM. Also, reported are the Hausman test and the p-value for testing
the hypothesis of choosing the REM over the FEM. Failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of the
REM, whereas, rejecting the null supports the use of the FEM. Finally, all standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test.
OLS :
FEM:
REM:
OLS
Intercept
0.0085
T-stat
4.902***
(RM-RF)
1.0690
T-stat
42.29***
Islamic
-0.0055
T-stat
-2.162**
Adjusted R-Squared
29.96%
Number of Firms
Number of Observations (Unbalanced Data)
F (145, 9256) of Ho: OLS, Ha: FEM
P-value
Hausman test, Chi Square (2) of Ho: REM, Ha: FEM
P-value
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

FEM

1.0640
42.66***
-0.0157
-2.564**
29.71%
146
9404
0.7693
0.9815
3.9501
13.88%

REM
0.0084
3.569***
1.0670
63.56***
-0.0077
-2.061**
29.96%

7.1.2. The Portfolio Performance Analysis Results
Table 3 presents the results of the created value-weighted Islamic and conventional
portfolios. The results show that averages of the monthly value-weighted Islamic and
conventional return portfolios (non risk-adjusted average returns) are 2.16 and 1.82
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percent per month and they are significantly different from zero at 10 and 5 percent,
respectively. Furthermore, the results show that the non risk-adjusted average return for
the Islamic portfolio is only marginally 0.34 percent higher than that of the conventional
portfolio [t-statistics is only (0.229)].
Table 3: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Portfolio Performance Analysis
Two value-weighted return portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are formed and three common riskadjusted performance measures (Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha) are calculated for each portfolio in order
to test for the negative Islamic-effect existence. In addition to the Islamic and conventional value-weighted
return portfolios, an Islamic and a conventional value-weighted size and book-to-market equity portfolios are
formed. The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011. The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly
Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The market benchmark used is the created
market return portfolio as shown in equation (11). The mean, size, and BM refer to the averages of the valueweighted monthly return, size, and book-to-market equity portfolios, respectively. SAR refers to the Saudi
Arabian riyal. Firms refers to the average of monthly number of firms in the portfolio. The t(mean) refers to
the t-statistics of a zero-mean test. Difference and t(difference) refer to the difference in average returns
between Islamic and conventional portfolios and the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero meandifference, respectively. The Jensen alpha index and the beta, which is used in the Treynor ratio calculation,
are estimated using a standard single-factor model and all standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test.
Portfolio
Islamic
Conventional
Mean
2.160%
1.820%
t(mean)
1.846*
2.053**
Difference
0.34%
t(difference)
0.2290
Sharpe
16.60%
18.10%
Treynor
1.960%
2.390%
Jensen Alpha
-0.0014
0.0019
Size (Thousands of SAR) 32,045,383.46 80,586,674.91
BM
1.347
1.508
Firms
32.34
61.70
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

However, when risk is adjusted, the results indicate that the Islamic portfolio
slightly underperforms its counterpart the conventional portfolio using both the Sharpe
and Treynor ratios. The Sharpe ratios for both Islamic and conventional portfolios are
around 16.60 and 18.10 percent per month, respectively. The Treynor ratios for both
Islamic and conventional portfolios are around 1.960 and 2.390 percent per month,
respectively. Looking at the Jensen alpha index, the results indicate that the Islamic
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portfolio slightly underperforms the market benchmark by 0.0014 per month, whereas, the
conventional portfolio slightly outperforms the market benchmark by 0.0019 per month.
However, that under- and out-performance is only marginal.
Furthermore, the results show that the average of the Islamic size-portfolio is SAR
32 billion (approximately USD 8.5 billion) and it is considerably lower than the average of
the conventional size-portfolio of SAR 80.6 billion (approximately USD 21.5 billion). Also
the average of the Islamic book-to-market-equity-portfolio is 1.347 and it is somewhat
lower than the average of the conventional book-to-market-equity-portfolio of 1.508.
Additionally, the average number of firms in the Islamic portfolio (32.34) is considered
almost one-half of the average number of firms in the conventional portfolio (61.7).
7.1.3. Interpretation
The results from both methods (panel model and portfolio performance analysis)
are very much consistent and indicate, as hypothesized, that there is a negative
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns. That negative relationship is
referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.” In other words, investors holding Saudi Islamic
firm stocks are rewarded with lower return than investors holding Saudi conventional firm
stocks, at least during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. This could be attributed
to the fact that Saudi Islamic firms are more conservative, less vulnerable to instability, and
have less risk exposure when compared to Saudi conventional firms. This is not surprising
given the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations to which Islamic firms must
commit to earn a Shariah-compliant title.
However, it is worthy to note that although Saudi Islamic firms underperform Saudi
conventional firms, that underperformance is considered somewhat economically small.
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This is considered good news for Muslim investors because for them it is a relief to know
that there is not a great cost for preserving their Islamic values, morals, and identity.
These findings lead to the second part of this paper which is to examine if that
negative Islamic-effect is associated with a common risk factor that might explain the
negative relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns.

7.2. Results from Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics Results
This section reports the descriptive statistics for both the independent (section
7.2.1.1) and the dependent (section 7.2.1.2) variables used in the time-series regressions.

7.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Table 4 panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, and t-statistics for testing the
hypothesis of zero-mean for the market return portfolio (RM), excess market return
portfolio (RM-RF), size risk factor (SMB), book-to-market equity risk factor (HML), and the
Islamic risk factor (CMI). Also, panel A reports the correlation coefficients between (RMRF), (SMB), (HML), and (CMI) which are considered the independent variables in the timeseries regressions. As discussed earlier, (RM-RF), (SMB), (HML), and (CMI) are also called
risk premiums for risk factors related to the market, size, book-to-market equity, and
negative Islamic-effect, respectively.
The results indicate that the average risk premium for the market risk factor (RMRF) during the entire sample period (January 2003 to April 2011) is around 2.10 percent
per month and it is significantly, at 10 percent, different from zero (t-statistics is 1.913).
This is quite large from and investment perspective (around 25.2 percent per year).
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In order to understand why it is quite large, (RM-RF) is investigated during two
different Saudi stock market trends: bull (from January 2003 to February 2006) and bear
(from March 2006 to April 2011). The results (not tabled) indicate that during the bull
(bear) period, the average risk premium for (RM-RF) is approximately 7.14 (-0.64) percent
per month or 85.68 (-7.68) percent per year. This means that the observed large average
risk premium for (RM-RF) during the entire sample period can be attributed to the
aggressive bullish market activities that took place during the period from January 2003 to
February 2006.
On the other hand, averages of risk premiums for risk factors related to size (SMB),
book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI) are all less than one
percent per month (0.747, 0.344, and 0.042 percent per month, respectively). Furthermore,
they are all insignificantly different from zero at all conventional levels due to their high
standard deviations (8.10, 4.14, and 4.24 percent per month for SMB, HML and CMI,
respectively). Nevertheless, the results from (Table 7) show that the effect of these
independent variables (SMB, HML, and CMI) on the estimated spread in monthly stock
returns is quite significant. Not only that, but also the estimated spread in returns due to
both size and book-to-market equity risk factors is considered quite large.
For example, the significant slopes on SMB cover a range from 0.424 to 0.564 (when
slopes are positive) and from -0.433 to -0.556 (when slopes are negative). This means that
the estimated spread in monthly returns due to the size risk factor is very large and
significant where it ranges from 31.67 percent (0.747 x 0.424) to 42.13 percent (0.747 x
0.564) when slopes are positive and from -32.35 percent (0.747 x -0.433) to -41.53 percent
(0.747 x -0.556) when slopes are negative.
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Similarly, the significant slopes on HML cover a range from 0.214 to 0.857 (when
slopes are positive) and from -0.520 to -0.883 (when slopes are negative).13 This means
that the estimated spread in monthly returns due to the book-to-market equity risk factor
is also very large and significant where it ranges from 7.36 percent (0.344 x 0.214) to 29.48
percent (0.344 x 0.857) when slopes are positive and from -17.89 percent (0.344 x -0.520)
to -30.38 percent (0.344 x -0.883) when slopes are negative.
Finally, the significant slopes on CMI cover a range from 0.345 to 0.785 (when
slopes are positive) and from -0.316 to -0.814 (when slopes are negative). This makes the
significant estimated spread in the monthly returns due to the Islamic risk factor ranges
from 1.45 percent (0.042 x 0.345) to 3.30 percent (0.042 x 0.785) when slopes are positive
and from -1.33 percent (0.042 x -0.316) to -3.42 percent (0.042 x -0.814) when slopes are
negative. It is worthy to note that the estimated spread in the monthly returns due CMI is
considered small and not as large as that due to either SMB or HML. That small spread is
very much consistent with the results obtained from examining the negative Islamic-effect
existence (section 7.1) where results show that there is a negative Islamic-effect, but that
effect is somewhat small.
Panel A also reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables
used in the time-series regressions: (RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI. The results provide clear
evidence that the way SMB, HML, and CMI are calculated does, in fact, separate, as much as
possible, the effects of the size, book-to-market equity, and negative Islamic-effect from
each other. This minimizes the multicollinearity problem in the four-factor model. The

Note that excluded from that range is the slope of 0.123 when the CBL portfolio is used as the dependent
variable in the time-series regressions. This is because results from (Table 7: Four-Factor Model) show that
such slope is insignificantly different from zero at all conventional levels.
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correlation coefficient between SMB and both HML and CMI is -0.0282 and -0.147,
respectively. And the correlation between HML and CMI is only 0.0751.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables in the
Time-Series Regressions
The dependent variables are eight value-weighted excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big),
book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent
variables are the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk
factors in return related to size (SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI).
The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free rate is the
monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The market benchmark used (RM)
is the created market return portfolio as shown in equation (11). Panel A reports the mean and standard
deviation for the explanatory variables along with the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero means.
Also reported in panel A is the correlation coefficients between all explanatory variables used in the timeseries regressions. Panels B and C report the descriptive statistics for the Islamic and conventional portfolios
(dependent variables), respectively. In each panel, averages of monthly value-weighed excess return, size,
and book-to-market equity portfolios are reported along with averages of monthly number of firms in each
portfolio. Also reported are the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero means for each of the eight
excess return portfolios. SAR refers to the Saudi Arabian riyal.

Panel A: Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean
Std.
t(mean)
RM
2.310% 11.000% 2.108** RM-RF
RM-RF
2.100% 11.000%
1.913*
1
SMB
0.747% 8.100%
0.922
0.568
HML
0.344% 4.140%
0.831
-0.194
CMI
0.042% 4.240%
0.0981
-0.189
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Correlation
SMB
HML
1
-0.0282
-0.147

1
0.0751

CMI

1

7.2.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables
Table 4 panels B and C report the descriptive statistics results for all Islamic and
conventional portfolios (dependent variables), respectively. In each panel, averages of
monthly value-weighed excess return, size, and book-to-market equity portfolios are
reported along with averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio. The average
excess return results for both portfolios, Islamic (left-hand side of panel B) and
conventional (left-hand side of panel C), are considered the range of cross-sectional
average returns that risk premiums for common risk factors in returns (independent
variables) are attempting to explain in the time-series regressions.
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Table 4 Continued
Dependent variables: portfolios sorted based on Shariah compliance (Islamic and conventional), size (small and big),
and book-to-market equity (high and low)

Panel B: Islamic Portfolios
Averages of monthly value-weighted excess return portfolios
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles
Size Quintile
Low
High
Low
High Low High
Means
Std
t(mean)
Small
2.160% 2.290% 13.30% 14.20% 1.621 1.613
Big
2.110% 1.770% 14.20% 9.990% 1.489 1.768*
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Size Quintile
Small
Big

Averages of monthly value-weighted
size and book-to-market (BM) portfolios
and averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles
Low
High
Low High Low High
Size (Thousands of SAR)
BM
Firms
889,224.7
887,740.6 1.0360 3.3540 8.410 7.850
41,572,233.1 13,216,526.8 0.7260 2.3370 8.270 7.810

Panel C: Conventional Portfolios
Averages of monthly value-weighted excess return portfolios
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles
Size Quintile
Low
High
Low
High Low High
Means
Std
t(mean)
Small
2.210% 3.240% 15.40% 14.80% 1.435 2.186**
Big
1.240% 1.80% 9.210% 8.990% 1.351 1.998**
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Size Quintile
Small
Big
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Averages of monthly value-weighted
size and book-to-market (BM) portfolios
and averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles
Low
High
Low High Low High
Size (Thousands of SAR)
BM
Firms
851,981.4
916,841.7 1.3010 2.9870 15.30 15.150
118,092,960.6 22,343,710.7 1.0640 2.1740 14.740 16.510

The results confirm findings of previous studies that there is a negative relationship
between size and average return. That is, the results indicate that average excess return
decreases with size in both book-to-market equity quintiles for both Islamic and
conventional portfolios. For example, when moving from the small to the big quintile under
the low quintile, average excess return decreases from 2.16 to 2.11 percent per month for
Islamic portfolios (panel B) and from 2.21 to 1.24 percent per month for conventional
portfolios (panel C). Also, when moving from the small to the big quintile under the high
quintile, average excess return decreases from 2.29 to 1.77 percent per month for Islamic
portfolios (panel B) and from 3.24 to 1.8 percent per month for conventional portfolios
(panel C).
The results, in general, also confirm findings of previous studies that there is a
positive relationship between book-to-market equity and average returns. That is, the
results indicate that average excess return increases with book-to-market equity in both
size quintiles for both Islamic and conventional portfolios except for the big-Islamic
portfolio. For example, when moving from the low to the high book-to-market equity
quintile under the small quintile, average excess return increases from 2.16 to 2.29 percent
per month for Islamic portfolios (panel B) and from 2.21 to 3.24 percent per month for
conventional portfolios (panel C). Also, when moving from the low to the high book-tomarket equity quintile under the big quintile, average excess return increases from 1.24 to
1.80 percent per month for conventional portfolios (panel C); but decreases from 2.11 to
1.77 percent per month for Islamic portfolios (panel B).
Looking at the left-hand side of both panels B and C, the results show that the
average excess return decreases when moving from conventional (panel C) to Islamic
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(panel B) stock portfolios, regardless of the size and book-to-market equity orientations of
these portfolios. The results indicate that the monthly average excess return decreases
from: 1) 2.21 to 2.16 percent when moving from CSL to ISL; 2) 3.24 to 2.29 percent when
moving from CSH to ISH; and 3) 1.80 to 1.77 percent when moving from CBH to IBH. These
results are very much consistent with other previously obtained results and provide
additional evidence that supports the hypothesis of a negative Islamic-effect in Saudi Stock
returns, at least during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. However, there is one
exception to the above results. That is, the average excess return increases from 1.24 to
2.11 when moving from the CBL to IBL.
Note that the hypothesis of zero-means cannot be rejected for five out of eight
portfolios (ISL, ISH, IBL, CSL, and CBL). These results are not surprising given that stock
returns are very volatile (high standard deviations that are around 14 percent per month).
The good news is that such results will not have an adverse affect on the power of the
asset-pricing tests. This is because, as shown in (Table 7), the created common risk factors
in returns are going to absorb most of the variation in stock returns, and therefore the
asset-pricing tests on the intercepts in the time-series regressions are going to show that
all intercepts are indistinguishable from zero. In other words, the model is well specified.
Looking at the right-hand side of panels B and C in (Table 4), the results show that
averages for size-portfolios range from SAR 887.7 million (around USD 236.7 million) to
SAR 41.6 billion (around USD 11.1 billion) for Islamic portfolios (panel B); and from SAR
852 million (around USD 227.2 million) to SAR 118.1 billion (around USD 31.5 billion) for
conventional portfolios (panel C). Furthermore, the results show that averages for book-tomarket equity portfolios range from 0.726 to 3.354 for Islamic portfolios (panel B); and
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from 1.064 to 2.987 for conventional portfolios (panel C). Finally, results show that
averages of monthly number of firms in the Islamic portfolios (panel B) range from 7.81 to
8.41, whereas, that range is around 14.74 to 16.51 in the conventional portfolios (panel C).
7.2.2. Time-Series Regressions Results
Examining the existence of a common Islamic risk factor in Saudi stock returns is
developed in three steps. First, utilize a single-factor model. Regressions based on the
single-factor model employ only the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) to explain the
excess return on eight stock return portfolios. Second, utilize a three-factor model.
Regressions based on the three-factor model employ the excess market return portfolio
(RM-RF) and mimicking return portfolios for factors related to size (SMB) and book-tomarket equity (HML) to explain the excess return on eight stock return portfolios. Third,
utilize a four-factor model. Regressions based on the four-factor model employ the excess
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and mimicking return portfolios for factors related to size
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI) to explain the
excess return on eight stock return portfolios.
Note that results from the four-factor model show that the model works very well,
but the single-factor and three-factor models help explain why.
Table 5 shows the results from the single-factor model. The results show that the
excess return on the market portfolio (RM-RF) do indeed, as expected, capture significant
amount of variation in stock returns. The

coefficients from all regressions are positive

and highly significant at 1 percent. Furthermore, the results show that both Islamic-small
portfolios (ISL and ISH) are less sensitive to market movements than their corresponding
conventional-small portfolios (CSL and CSH). The s for ISL and ISH portfolios are 1.117
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and 1.152, whereas the

s for CSL and CSH portfolios are 1.311 and 1.257, respectively.

The opposite is true when looking at the big-size quintiles. That is, Islamic-big portfolios
are more sensitive to market movements than conventional-big portfolios. The s for IBL
and IBH portfolios are 1.104 and 0.772, whereas the

s for CBL and CBH portfolios are

0.614 and 0.672, respectively.
Table 5: Single-Factor Model
This table reports the results from the single-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variable is only the excess market return portfolio
(RM-RF). The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free
rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. All standard errors are
corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. s(e) is standard error of
regression.
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles
Size
Quintile

Small
Big
Small
Big
s(e)

Islamic

Conventional

Coef

Low
-0.002

High
-0.001

Low
-0.005

High
0.006

T-stat

-0.403

-0.210

-0.967

1.133

Coef

-0.002

0.001

0.000

0.004

T-stat
Coef

-0.368
1.117

0.255
1.152

-0.071
1.311

0.768
1.257

T-stat

20.231***

18.013***

22.486***

22.503***

Coef

1.104

0.772

0.614

0.672

T-stat

9.071***

13.269***

7.096***

11.794***

5.18%

6.51%

5.46%

5.44%

Small
Big

7.34%

5.30%

6.30%

5.16%

Small

84.90%

79.00%

87.40%

86.60%

Big
73.10%
71.90%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

53.20%

67.10%

Adj.
R-Squared

Even though the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) seems to capture
significant amount of common variation in stock returns, the adjusted R-squared results
indicate that there is plenty of room for other factors to also capture common variation in
stock returns. For example, the highest (lowest) adjusted R-squared value among Islamic
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portfolios is only 84.90 (71.90) percent for the ISL (IBH) portfolio. And the highest (lowest)
adjusted R-squared value among conventional portfolios is only 87.40 (53.20) percent for
the CSL (CBL) portfolio.
Finally, testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts is one way to test how well the
average risk premium for the market risk factor can explain the cross-sectional average
returns of all eight portfolios. The results from (Table 5) indicate that all intercepts are
economically low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant.
Table 6 shows the results from the three-factor model after adding the SMB and
HML to the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF). The results indicate that still the
excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) captures significant amount of common variation
in stock returns. All

s are positive and highly significant at 1 percent. Also, the results

show that still small-Islamic portfolios are less sensitive to the market than smallconventional portfolios, and big-Islamic portfolios are more sensitive to the market than
big-conventional portfolios.
The results of all SMB coefficients ( ) reveal that they are all highly significant at 1
percent which means that SMB clearly captures common variation in stock returns that is
missed by both: the excess market portfolio (RM-RF) and HML. Furthermore, the results
confirm the negative relationship between average return and size. In both book-to-market
equity quintiles (low and high) for both Islamic and conventional portfolios, SMB
coefficients decrease by around 200 percent when moving from the small- to the big-size
quintile.
Similarly, the results of all HML coefficients ( ) reveal that they are all highly
significant, except for the coefficient of the conventional-big-low (CBL) portfolio. This
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means that HML, in general, captures common variation in stock returns that is missed by
both: the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and SMB. Furthermore, the results
confirm the positive relationship between average return and book-to-market equity. In
both size quintiles (small and big) for both Islamic and conventional portfolios, HML
coefficients increase when moving from the low to the high book-to-market equity quintile.
Table 6: Three-Factor Model
This table reports the results from the three-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio
(RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB) and bookto-market equity (HML). The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for
the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. All
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. s(e) is
standard error of regression.
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles
Size
Quintile
Small
Big

Adj.
R-Squared

Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat

Coef
T-stat
Coef
Big
T-stat
Coef
Small
T-stat
Coef
Big
T-stat
Coef
Small
T-stat
Coef
Big
T-stat
Small
Big
Small
Small

s(e)

Islamic

Conventional

Low
0.001
0.369
0.002
0.330

High
-0.005
-1.213
-0.002
-0.425

Low
-0.001
-0.389
-0.002
-0.393

High
0.005
1.358
0.002
0.518

0.896
18.348***
1.206
14.859***
0.435
5.133***
-0.405
-4.446***
-0.535
-4.089***
-0.921
-2.645***
3.90%
5.56%
91.40%

1.011
18.693***
0.998
14.901***
0.483
6.840***
-0.445
-3.816***
0.833
4.502***
0.530
4.116***
4.30%
4.02%
90.90%

1.028
27.588***
0.869
11.408***
0.553
9.948***
-0.582
-7.094***
-0.704
-10.133***
0.160
0.611
3.20%
5.01%
95.70%

1.065
20.460***
0.927
16.193***
0.530
6.214***
-0.568
-6.608***
0.406
3.250***
0.231
2.335**
3.64%
3.49%
94.00%

70.40%

84.90%

Big
84.60%
83.80%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively
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Overall, the significant loadings on all three risk factors indicate that they capture
strong common variation in stock returns. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a large
increase in the adjusted R-squared when moving from the single-factor model to the threefactor model. The results, indeed, indicate that the three-factor model is a better fit than the
single-factor model in explaining the excess return of all eight portfolios because all
adjusted R-squared values from the three-factor model are higher than that from the
single-factor model.
For example, results from regressing the Islamic portfolios indicate that the highest
(lowest) adjusted R-squared value belongs to the ISL (IBH) portfolio and it increased from
84.90 (71.90) percent in the single-factor model to 91.40 (83.80) percent in the threefactor model. Also, results from regressing the conventional portfolios indicate that the
highest (lowest) adjusted R-squared value belongs to the CSL (CBL) portfolio and it
increased from 87.40 (53.20) percent in the single-factor model to 95.70 (70.40) percent in
the three-factor model.
Also, the standard error s(e) of regression results, which are considered a proxy for
the diversifiable risk, indicate that the three-factor model is superior to the single-factor
model in capturing common variation in stock returns. Results indicate that all s(e) values
of all eight portfolios are lower than those from the single-factor model. For example,
results from regressing the Islamic (conventional) portfolios indicate that the highest s(e)
value belongs to the IBL (CBL) portfolio and it decreased from 7.34 (6.30) percent in the
single-factor model to 5.56 (5.01) percent in the three-factor model. Finally, the results
from testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts indicate that all intercepts are economically
low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant.
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Table 7: Four-Factor Model
This table reports the results from the four-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio
(RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB), book-tomarket equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI). The sample period is from January 2003 to April
2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR)
with one-month maturity. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s
(1980) correction test. s(e) is standard error of regression.
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles
Size
Quintile

Islamic
Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat
Coef
T-stat

Low
0.002
0.516
0.003
0.696
0.879
20.723***
1.161
19.188***
0.424
5.744***
-0.433
-3.708***

High
-0.004
-1.097
-0.001
-0.31
0.982
23.054***
0.978
18.516***
0.465
7.887***
-0.456
-4.746***

Low
-0.002
-0.623
-0.003
-0.84
1.047
29.791***
0.913
17.442***
0.564
10.233***
-0.556
-6.795***

High
0.004
1.284
0.001
0.401
1.092
29.631***
0.947
21.308***
0.547
9.806***
-0.555
-8.413***

Coef
T-stat
Coef
Big
T-stat
Coef
Small
T-stat
Coef
Big
T-stat
Small
Big
Small

-0.52
-2.999***
-0.883
-3.819***
-0.316
-2.036**
-0.814
-4.397***
3.68%
4.40%
92.30%

0.857
7.141***
0.546
3.536***
-0.524
-3.875***
-0.347
-2.626**
3.71%
3.76%
93.20%

-0.720
-7.484***
0.123
0.854
0.345
3.486***
0.785
5.543***
2.86%
3.78%
96.50%

0.383
3.998***
0.214
2.592**
0.495
4.781***
0.376
3.778***
3.00%
3.13%
95.90%

83.20%

87.90%

Small
Big
Small
Big
Small
Big
Small

s(e)
Adj.
R-Squared

Conventional

Big
90.40%
85.80%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Table 7 shows the results from the four-factor model after augmenting CMI, which is
a portfolio mimicking the risk factor in returns related to the negative Islamic-effect, to the
three-factor model. The results of

, s, and h coefficients are very much similar to those
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obtained from the three-factor model (Table 6). However, the new issue in (Table 7) is the
results of the ( ) coefficients, which are loadings on the Islamic risk factor (CMI). As
hypothesized, the loadings on CMI for all Islamic portfolios: ISL (-0.316), ISH (-0.524), IBL
(-0.814), and IBH (-0.347) are negative and highly significant at 5, 1, 1, and 5 percent,
respectively. Also, loadings on CMI for all conventional portfolios: CSL (0.345), CSH (0.495),
CBL (0.785), and CBH (0.376) are positive and highly significant at 1 percent.
These results indicate that there is a significant negative relationship between Saudi
Islamic firms and average returns, and a significant positive relationship between Saudi
conventional firms and average returns. These results are also considered clear evidence
that CMI captures common variation in stock returns that are not captured by the (RM-RF),
SMB, and HML.
Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared results show that the four-factor model that
includes CMI is considered a better fit than the single-factor and the three-factor models in
explaining the excess return of all eight stock portfolios. That is, when CMI is added in the
four-factor model, all adjusted R-squared values increase and are considered the highest
relative to the adjusted R-squared values obtained from both the single-factor model and
the three-factor model.
Furthermore, all standard error of regression s(e) values obtained from the fourfactor model are considered lower than those obtained from either the single-factor or the
three-factor models. This supports the notion that the four-factor model is superior to both
the single-factor and the three-factor models in capturing common variation in stock
returns. The highest s(e) value when Islamic portfolios are regressed is only 4.40 percent
and it belongs to the IBL portfolio. It is lower than the 5.56 percent obtained from the
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three-factor model. Also, the highest s(e) value when conventional portfolios are regressed
is only 3.78 percent and it belongs to CBL portfolio. It is lower than the 5.01 percent
obtained from the three-factor model.
Finally, the results from testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts indicate that all
intercepts are economically low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant. Such
results suggest that a model that uses (RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI does, indeed, a good
job in explaining the cross-sectional average returns of Saudi common stocks; at least
during the period from January 2003 to April 2011.

8. Conclusion
This paper attempts to lessen the gap in the Islamic finance and investment
literature by providing new insights to whether the adherence to the Shariah law is
associated with any costs. This is done by investigating the Islamic-effect issue in the crosssectional stock return context. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the
Islamic-effect issue in such context.
The paper starts from the assessment that there is a negative relationship between
Islamic firms and average return due to the application of Islamic finance mandates or
Shariah screens. This assessment is investigated by looking at dispersion in stock return
between Islamic and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia during the period from January
2003 to April 2011. The results do confirm that negative relationship and show that there
is a small cost from adhering to the Shariah law. That is, Saudi Islamic stocks, on average,
compensate investors with slightly less return than Saudi conventional stocks. In this
paper, that negative relationship between Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia and average return
is referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.”
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Then this paper examines if that negative Islamic-effect is associated with a common
(shared and undiversified) risk factor in returns that might explain the negative
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns. This is done using timeseries regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French (1993). The results
indicate that the portfolio that is constructed to mimic the risk factor related to the
negative Islamic-effect (CMI), which can also be referred to as the “Islamic risk factor”, do
capture strong common variation in stock returns even in the presence of the excess
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the risk factors related to
size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML).
This indicates that the dispersion in average return of Saudi common stocks can be
explained by a new risk story other than the market, size, and book-to-market equity risk
stories. In other words, even when the market, size, and book-to-market equity are
controlled, Saudi firms that apply Islamic finance mandates are considered less risky than
Saudi firms that do not apply such mandates (adhering to the Shariah law makes Saudi
firms have less risk exposure). As a result, investors holding Saudi Islamic stocks should
require lower rate of return than investors holding Saudi conventional stocks because
investors holding Saudi Islamic stocks assume less risk.
The main reason for existence of the Islamic risk factor is the fact that adhering to
the Shariah law represents more than just a preference of Muslim investors. That is,
adhering to the Shariah law is an issue that is related to firm fundamentals such as the
firm’s profitability, riskiness, earnings, revenues, leverage, and all other fundamental
issues. And as long as firm fundamentals are affected, it follows that asset prices (stock
prices) would also be affected as well.
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Furthermore, results show that the four-factor model that controls for the Islamic
risk factor (CMI) does a better job than both the single-factor and the three-factor models
in explaining dispersion in average return of Saudi common stocks. Such findings suggest
that using a model that controls for the Islamic-effect issue, like the proposed four-factor
model, is more appropriate in all Islamic finance applications that require estimates of
expected stock returns than using any other model that does not control for such effect.
This is because the Islamic-effect issue is considered common, systematic, and
undiversified risk that affects asset prices and therefore must be controlled in all these
applications.
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Chapter 3: Islamic Mutual Funds
A Case Study in Saudi Arabia
1. Introduction
The number of Islamic mutual funds and the market value of these funds have
experienced an excellent growth since the early period of the 1990s. This, as a result, gave
birth to several empirical studies that want to investigate the performance and riskiness of
these funds relative to conventional mutual funds such as [Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad
(2007), Abderrezak (2008), and Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010)] as well as relative to
both Islamic and conventional market indices such as [Elfakhani & Hassan (2005), Kräussl
& Hayat (2008), and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009)].
However, given that the Islamic finance and investment industry is relatively new
compared to its conventional counterpart and the literature on Islamic mutual funds is still
at its infancy, findings across these empirical studies still do not provide a definite answer
to the most important question raised in that literature: Is investing in Islamic mutual
funds associated with any cost? That is, some of these studies conclude that investing in
Islamic mutual funds comes at no cost where their findings indicate that there is no
evidence that there exist any performance differences between Islamic and conventional
funds as well as between Islamic mutual funds and both Islamic and conventional market
indices. On the other hand, there are other studies that conclude that there is a cost
associated with investing in Islamic mutual funds where such funds provide investors with
lower return than conventional mutual funds.
Now, to critically investigate whether investing in Islamic mutual funds is associated
with any cost, this paper carries out the investigation to Saudi Arabia. It is worthy to note
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that there are two main reasons that make Saudi Arabia an ideal experiential environment
to conduct this empirical study. First, Saudi Arabia alone possesses the largest amount of
Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide (it possesses around 52 percent of the total
Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide).14 Second, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the
few countries that strictly adhere to the Shariah law. Thus, studying Islamic mutual funds
located in Saudi Arabia is a good place to start investigating the Islamic-effect issue in
mutual funds.
Overall, the main objective of this paper is to investigate if there is any cost from
investing in Islamic mutual funds by assessing the performance and riskiness of Saudi
Islamic mutual funds relative to Saudi conventional mutual funds as well as relative to
different Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. This investigation covers the
period from July 2004 to January 2010. It is worthy to note that Merdad, Hassan, &
Alhenawi (2010) address the same issue, but their paper is only a case study that focuses
on mutual funds managed by HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited. To my knowledge, this is the first
paper that comprehensively examines the Islamic mutual fund issue in the context of Saudi
Arabia.
The contribution of this paper to the Islamic mutual fund literature is fivefold. First,
this study uses a very unique sample of Saudi mutual funds: out of a total of 234 mutual
funds available in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010, this paper uses a sample of 143 Saudi
mutual funds (96 funds are Islamic and 47 funds are conventional) from July 2004 to
See “GCC Mutual Fund Industry Survey 2010.” Dr. Gıyas Gökkent is the Group Chief Economist in the
National Bank of Abu Dhabi and he is the editor and author of the “GCC Mutual Fund Industry Survey 2010”
which was released on Feb 9, 2011. The study can be found in the following link:
http://www.nbad.com/economic/countries/gcc_mf_industry_survey2010.php.
Note that Shariah is an Arabic word that refers to the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life,
both private and public.
14
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January 2010. That sample very much represents the Saudi mutual fund industry in terms
of geographical focuses, diversity, investment objectives, Shariah compliancy, and
institutional management. This is an important aspect, especially when discussing Saudi
Islamic mutual funds.
That is, the sample of Saudi Islamic mutual funds used in this empirical study is
superior to any other sample of Saudi Islamic mutual funds used in any other study of
Islamic mutual funds. This is because studies that examine the Islamic mutual fund issue
like Abderrezak (2008), Kräussl & Hayat (2008), and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009)
have relatively a small number of Saudi Islamic mutual funds in their entire sample set
compared to that used in this sample set. This is very much understandable given that their
objective is to examine Islamic mutual funds in general not Saudi Islamic mutual funds in
particular. As a result, findings of these studies better fit Islamic mutual funds than Saudi
Islamic mutual funds.
On the other hand, since this study uses a sample of only Saudi mutual funds and the
fact that such sample fairly represents the entire industry of Saudi mutual funds, including
Islamic mutual funds, then findings from this study are going to be more relevant to Saudi
Islamic mutual funds. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that assessing Saudi Islamic mutual
funds is a key factor in assessing Islamic mutual funds in general. This is because, as
mentioned earlier, the largest amount of Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide is
located in Saudi Arabia.
Second, studies like Ahmed (2001) and Dabbeeru (2006a, 2006b, and 2006c) are
considered among the first to provide a primer analysis on the performance of Saudi Arabia
mutual funds. However, their findings very much lack statistical sophistication. This paper,
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however, overcomes this issue by employing very commonly known methods, statistical
tests, and models including a constructed multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997)
four-factor model to control for different equity investment styles when assessing the riskreturn profile of Saudi mutual funds.
Third, one way to enhance comparability is to control for different geographical or
regional focuses of mutual funds. In Saudi Arabia, mutual funds have six different regional
focuses: local, international, Arab, Asia, US, and Europe. To facilitate comparison, all mutual
funds that are US-, Asia-, Europe-, and internationally-focused are grouped together under
one regional focus called “internationally-focused funds.” As a result, the sample of Saudi
mutual funds used in this empirical study has only three main geographical focuses: local,
Arab, and international. Locally-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located only in
Saudi Arabia. Arab-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located only in countries
that are members in the Arab league, excluding Saudi Arabia. Internationally-focused funds
are funds that invest in assets located in all countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and those
that belong in the above Arab group.
Fourth, to enhance reliability and robustness of results, this paper not only explores
the Saudi Islamic mutual fund issue during the overall sample period (July 2004 to January
2010), but also during three other periods that are based on trends in the Saudi Arabian
stock market. These periods are: bull period (July 2004 to February 2006), bear period
(March 2006 to January 2010), and the recent 2008-financial crisis period (September
2008 to January 2010).
Fifth, the methodology used to assess the risk-return profile of funds is not based on
using individual funds, but instead it is based on using a portfolio approach in order to
80

diversify away fund-specific risks. Thus, Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are
grouped into portfolios based on the following characteristics: the funds’ geographical
focuses (local, Arab, and international), the funds’ Shariah compliancy (Islamic and
conventional), and four different Saudi stock market trends (overall, bull, bear, and the
recent 2008 financial crisis periods).
Findings suggest that there is a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law when
locally-focused fund portfolios are investigated. On the other hand, there is a cost from
adhering to the Shariah law when internationally-focused fund portfolios are investigated.
Finally, when Arab-focused fund portfolios are investigated, findings suggest that there is
neither a cost nor a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law. All these results hold
regardless of the sample period under examination (overall, bull, bear, and financial crisis).
Also, all these results are robust regardless of different appropriate market benchmarks
used to adjust for risk.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section 2 discusses Islamic mutual funds.
Section 3 discusses the previous literature. Section 4 discusses Saudi Arabia’s economy and
stock market. Section 5 discusses Saudi Arabia’s mutual funds. Section 6 provides the
hypothesis. Section 7 covers the data for the empirical study. Section 8 discusses the
methodology. Section 9 provides the empirical results. Section 10 discusses the empirical
results. And finally section 11 is the conclusion.

2. Islamic Mutual Funds
Many money managers and financial institutions, whether they are from the Arab or
western world, start to offer different Shariah-compliant assets that fit Muslim religious
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preferences. One important and highly demanded asset among these Shariah-compliant
assets is the Islamic mutual fund.

2.1. History of Islamic Mutual Funds
According to Kräussl & Hayat (2008), the first Islamic equity fund (IEF) was founded
in 1986 by the North American Islamic Trust to manage the funding of mosques in the US.
Since then and until 1992, the number of Islamic funds and the value of assets invested in
them were growing at a decreasing rate. However, after 1992, Islamic funds experienced an
excellent growth mainly due to the consensus that Shariah scholars reached during the
early period of the 1990s regarding the permissibility of equity investing. For example,
according to Elfakhani & Hassan (2005), the number of Islamic funds increased from eight
funds prior to 1992 to 95 funds with a total market value of USD 5 billion in 2000.
Furthermore, McKenzie (2010, 2011) documents that the number of Islamic funds grew
from 200 funds in 2003 (with a total market value of USD 20 billion) to 760 funds by the
end of the first quarter of 2010 (with a total market value of USD 52.3 billion). Equity funds
had the lion’s share with almost 35 percent of these Islamic funds.
All these statistics show how popular these Islamic mutual funds became in a short
period of time. It is worthy to note that this popularity of Islamic mutual funds is not only
among Muslim Investors, but also among non-Muslim investors as well. There are two
factors that could explain the reasons why these funds are gaining tremendous popularity
among both Muslim and non-Muslim investors.
The first factor is very intuitive and does not distinguish whether the investor is
Muslim or non-Muslim. That is, both Muslim and non-Muslim investors are attracted to
Islamic mutual funds because of the already existing appealing features that are embedded
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in mutual funds in general regardless if these funds are Islamic or conventional. That is,
mutual funds, in general, are considered an ideal choice for investors seeking liquidity,
portfolio diversification, and investment expertise. Also, mutual funds provide investors
with more flexibility in the sense that they provide investors with a wide range of funds
that have different asset allocations, various objectives, and a number of investment styles
so that investors can choose what best fit their investment goals, risk tolerance, liquidity
needs, as well as religious and ethical preferences.
The second factor, however, distinguishes between the two types of investors. To
elaborate, Muslim investors, like all other investors, want to benefit and prosper from the
developments in both capital and financial markets. However, Muslim investors want to do
so while preserving their Islamic values and morals. Fortunately, the birth of Islamic
mutual funds provides them with opportunity to participate in these capital and financial
markets without the fear that doing so will come at the cost of their Islamic identity and
values. And this is the main reason why these Islamic funds are gaining a lot of attention
and popularity among Muslim investors.
On the other hand, the popularity of Islamic mutual funds among non-Muslim
investors does not come from the fact that these funds are comfortable with the Shariah
law. In fact, non-Muslim investors are not even concerned whether these funds are
adhering to the Shariah law or not. Instead, the popularity of these Islamic funds comes
from the fact that these funds possess an ethical nature. This ethical nature is a result of the
restrictions that Shariah law imposes on these funds. For example, Islamic funds are not
allowed to invest in firms that deal with tobacco, adult entertainment, non-medical and
toxic drugs, gambling, etc. This ethical-nature feature is the main reason why some non83

Muslim investors are attracted to such funds because they view investing in these Islamic
funds as a form of Social Responsibility Investing (SRI).
Due to this unprecedented popularity and growth in Islamic mutual funds, several
proper benchmarks were launch by the late 1990s in order to help benchmark the
performance of these Islamic funds. For example, there is the Dow Jones Islamic market
index (DJIMI) which was launched in 1999, FTSE Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS) which
was launched at the end of 1998, MSCI global Islamic indices, and the Global Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic index which was launched in 2006.

2.2. The Shariah Law Effect on Islamic Mutual Funds
Because of their adherence to the Shariah law, Islamic mutual funds differ in many
aspects from conventional mutual fund. The following discusses two of these aspects:
The first aspect is the asset allocation aspect. Managers of Islamic mutual funds
must only invest in assets that are in accordance with the Shariah law. That is, fund
managers are restricted to invest in only securities that pass both the ethical and the
financial filters.15 This causes the asset allocation of Islamic mutual funds to be completely
different from that of conventional mutual funds. In other words, the investment universe
of Islamic funds is considerably smaller than that of conventional funds.
The second aspect is the income purification aspect. Shariah law is a law that is
concerned about increasing social welfare, enhancing public good, implementing economic
justice, and providing sustenance to the economically unfortunate. Thus, Shariah law,
under certain conditions, requires all Muslims to pay a form of charity called zakat to those
in need and those that are economically unfortunate to purify both wealth and earned
Please see Chapter 1: Islamic Finance, section 4.1: Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks for more details
on the ethical and financial filters.
15
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income. Zakat is paid on Muslim’s personal wealth if such wealth is held idle for one lunar
year, is considered over what is necessary to satisfy basic needs, and exceeds a minimum
amount (called nisab in Arabic).
It is worthy to note that different types of assets have different zakat rates. The
zakat rate for most forms of monetary wealth and earned income is 2.5 percent. This
implies that if all zakat conditions are met, a 2.5 percent on any generated income from
mutual funds, even if these funds are Islamic, must be paid by Muslim investors as a form of
purification.
Another form of income purification is purifying “impure” earnings. Note that
partially contaminated Islamic firms (firms that are Islamic but have a small portion of
their earnings generated from impermissible activities) can still keep their Islamic title as
long as they pass the financial filter. This implies that there is no problem for Islamic
mutual funds to extend their investment universe to include such firms.
If managers of Islamic mutual funds decide to include these partially contaminated
firms, then Shariah scholars argue that the portion of earnings that is generated from
impermissible activities (impure earnings) should be cleansed or purified by donating such
earnings to charity. For example if a firm has a three percent interest-based income, then
three percent of every dividend payment must be donated to charities as a form of
purification.
The purification of impure earnings is usually executed in two ways. The first way is
done by Islamic fund managers before distributing any income. The second way is by
reporting to investors the necessary financial ratios so that they can purify earnings
themselves.
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While all Shariah scholars agree on purifying dividends and believe that it is a must,
purifying capital gains is still debatable, see Obaidullah (2005). That is, some Shariah
scholars argue that there is no need to purify capital gains while others see otherwise. As
for those that argue that there is no need to purify capital gains, they assert that the stock
price of a partially contaminated Islamic firm represents the price of only the permissible
(halal) assets. This is because the small portion of assets created from impure activities is
considered negligible and to some extend unknown when compared to the firm’s bulk of
halal assets. As for those that argue that capital gains must be purified, they assert that
what is prohibited still remains prohibited and needs to be avoided even if it was
negligible. Based on this view, the stock price of a partially contaminated Islamic firm
represents the price of both permissible (halal) and impure (haram) assets. Therefore,
capital gains need to be cleanses or purified.

3. Previous Literature
This section contains two subsections: previous literature on conventional mutual
funds (section 3.1) and previous literature on Islamic mutual funds (section 3.2).

3.1. Previous Literature on Conventional Mutual Funds
There are tremendous studies that have been addressing the mutual funds’
performance issue and some of these studies go back to the 1960s. For example, based on
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965),
Jensen (1967) derived a risk-adjusted performance measure (known as the ‘Jensen alpha’)
in order to estimate the fund manager’s ability to earn an abnormal return. He uses this
measure to examine the ability of 115 mutual fund managers to earn abnormal returns
during the period from 1945 to 1964. Jensen document that, on average, these funds are
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not able to outperform the market benchmark of the Standard and Poor Composite 500
Price Index (S&P500).
Using a sample of 123 mutual funds during the period from 1960 to 1969, McDonald
(1974) also finds that the majority of funds did not outperform the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE).
Also Kon & Jen (1979) use a sample of 49 mutual funds from January 1960 to
December 1971 to examine the non-stationary of the market-related risk for mutual funds
over time. They divide their sample into different risk regimes and then run regular OLS
regressions for each regime. They find that there are multiple levels of beta that exists for
37 funds. They conclude that many funds are engaging in market timing activities.
Kon (1983) examines the existence of both the selectivity and market timing skills
using 37 mutual funds from January 1960 to June 1976. He finds that six funds have
positive performance in both timing and selectivity and 22 funds exhibit a trade-off
between the two activities. However, Chen, Cheng, Rahman, & Chan (1992) find that there
exist no market timing skills using 93 mutual funds from January 1977 to March 1984.
Using 279 mutual funds from December 31, 1974 to December 31, 1984; Grinblantt
& Titman (1992) find that there are performance differences between funds and they
attribute these differences to the fund manager’s ability to earn abnormal returns.
Using the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model; Annuar, Shamsher, & Ngu (1997)
examine the existence of both selectivity and market timing skills of 31 Malaysian funds
from July 1990 to August 1995. Their findings show that there is statistical evidence that
these funds possess selectivity skills, but not market timing skills. Furthermore, they find
that these funds did not achieve their expected level of diversification.
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Shamsher, Annuar, & Taufiq (2000) examine 41 actively- and passively-managed
Malaysian funds during the period from 1995 to 1999. They find no statistical significance
when examining the performance of both actively- and passively-managed funds using
measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they find no differences
in the selection skills between actively- and passively-managed funds. Also, they find that
both types of funds possess no market timing abilities.
Finally, Dabbeeru provides three simple studies as a primer analysis on the
performance of mutual funds in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, all three studies lack
statistical sophistication. In his first paper, Dabbeeru (2006a) discusses mutual funds in
Saudi Arabia during the period from January 1, 2006 to June 15, 2006. He employs only the
standard deviation, risk per return, and non risk-adjusted returns to assess the
performance and riskiness of Saudi mutual funds. In his second paper, Dabbeeru (2006b)
examines the performance of 97 Saudi equity mutual funds during the period from
February 2005 to October 2006. In this study, Dabbeeru examines the past performance of
these funds where he reports the year-to-date (YTD) returns for both funds and the Saudi
market index (Tadawul).16 Finally, in his final paper, Dabbeeru (2006c) examines balanced,
debt, and liquid funds instead of equity funds.

3.2. Previous Literature on Islamic Mutual Funds
Ahmed (2001) provides a primer on the performance of 13 Islamic equity funds in
Saudi Arabia. These funds are managed by only two institutional managers: the National
Commercial Bank (NCB) and Al-Baraka Group. However, no statistical tests are reported in
his study.
16

Tadawul is now called Tadawul All Share Index (TASI).
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Elfakhani & Hassan (2005) use a sample of 46 Islamic mutual funds from January 1,
1997 to August 31, 2002 to examine the performance of Islamic mutual funds relative to
Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. They employ different risk-adjusted
performance measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Moreover, they employ
an ANOVA statistical test. Overall, their findings suggest that there is no statistical evidence
that there exist any performance differences between Islamic funds and the employed
market benchmarks. However, their findings suggest that Islamic mutual funds do offer a
good hedging opportunity against market downturns.
Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad (2007) compare the performance of 14 Islamic funds
relative to 51 conventional funds in Malaysia during the period from 1992 to 2001. They
employ different measures such as the adjusted Sharpe, Treynor, adjusted Jensen alpha,
Modigliani and Modigliani (MM) measure, and the information ratio. They find that
conventional funds perform better than Islamic funds during bullish trends; but during
bearish trends, Islamic funds perform better. They conclude that Islamic funds offer
hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. They also find that conventional
funds have diversification levels that are marginally better than Islamic funds, but both
funds are unable to achieve at least 50 percent of the market diversification level.
Kräussl & Hayat (2008) use a sample of 59 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) to examine
the performance of these funds relative to Islamic and conventional market benchmarks
during the period from 2001 to 2006. They employ a set of measures such as the Jensen
alpha, Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, and the information ratio.
They find that, on average, there are no significant performance differences between IEFs
and the employed market benchmarks (both Islamic and conventional). However, a closer
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look at the bear market of 2002, they document that IEFs significantly outperform the
Islamic and conventional market indices using conditional CAPM. Analyzing the risk-return
characteristics of IEFs, they find that IEFs possess superior systematic risk-to-return ratios.
Therefore, they argue that these IEFs “seem most attractive as part of a larger fully
diversified portfolio like a fund of funds.”
Abderrezak (2008) examines the performance of 46 Islamic equity funds (IEFs)
relative to conventional funds, ethical funds, and Islamic and conventional market indices
during the period from January 1997 to August 2002. He employs several methodologies
such as the Sharpe ratio, single-factor model, and Fama and French three-factor model. He
finds that IEFs are 40 basis points more expensive than their conventional peers.
Furthermore, he finds that IEFs consistently underperform their respective Islamic and
conventional market benchmarks. Finally, he finds that there are no performance
differences between IEFs and ethical funds.
Muhammad & Mokhtar (2008) use weekly net asset values (NAVs) of nine Islamic
equity funds in Malaysia in order to examine their performance relative to the Islamic
market index, Kuala Lumpur Syariah Index (KLSI), for the period from 2002 to 2006. To
assess the performance of these funds, they employ the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. They
find that eight of these funds underperform the KLSI. However, they find a bag of mixed
results when they employ the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the
systematic risk (beta) to assess the riskiness of these funds.
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009) use a unique dataset of 262 Islamic equity funds
from 20 countries and four regions in order to examine the performance of these funds
relative to constructed portfolios that have exposure to national, regional, and global
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markets. Furthermore, they control for different investment styles by employing a
conditional three level Carhart model. The results show that Islamic funds from eight
nations (mostly from the western regions) significantly underperform their respective
equity market benchmarks and funds from only three nations outperform their respective
market benchmarks and that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks. Furthermore,
they find that Islamic funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Malaysia do not
significantly underperform their respective market benchmarks nor they are biased
towards small stocks. Finally, they argue that Islamic equity funds can offer hedging
opportunities because their investment universe is limited to low debt-to-equity ratio
stocks.
Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010) use a sample of 28 Saudi mutual funds
managed by HSBC in order to examine the performance of 12 Islamic funds relative to 16
conventional funds during the period from January 2003 to January 2010. They use several
performance measures such as the Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT,
and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they employ the Treynor and Mazuy model to examine the
Saudi funds’ selectivity and market timing abilities. They find that Islamic funds
underperform conventional funds during both full and bullish periods, but outperform
during bearish and financial crisis periods. Furthermore, they find that HSBC managers are
good at showing timing and selectivity skills for Islamic funds during the bearish period,
and for conventional funds during the bullish period. They also assert that Islamic mutual
funds do offer hedging opportunities during economic downturns.
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4. Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market
Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy and its economy is considered the largest in
the Middle Eastern region. According to Jadaw Investment 2010 Annual Report, Saudi
Arabia’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) is around USD 435.8 billion and is expected
to reach USD 507.3 billion in 2012.17 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest
oil producer, oil exporter, and oil proven reserves possessor worldwide. 18 It has almost 20
percent of the world’s proven reserves, and has a leading role in OPEC.
The official currency is the Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) and since 1986 it has been
effectively pegged to the US dollar where USD 1 = 3.75 SAR. Furthermore, the Saudi stock
market is also considered by far the largest in the Middle Eastern region. As of January 31,
2010, there are 135 firms listed on the exchange and the total equity market capitalization
reached SAR 1,242.09 billion (around USD 331.22 billion).19
The market index is called Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) and it reached a market
high of 20,634.86 points at the end of February 2006 before it declined to 8,757.04 points
at the end of August 2008. Starting from September 2008, the effect of the recent 2008
financial crisis started to become acute. As a result, TASI started to decline until it reached
its all time low of 4,130.01 points at the beginning of March 2009.
Overall, the period before March 2006 has all the characteristics of a bullish market
in terms of price and trading volume increases. The period from March 2006 until January
2010 is marked by bearish market activities. Finally, the period from September 2008 until
Source is Jadaw Investment, a pioneer in the field of Shariah-compliant investment services:
http://jadwa.com/about/pages/annualreports.aspx.
18 Oil proven reserves are the stock of proved reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). Source is CIA world fact
book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.
19 Information is based on the January-2010 monthly Statistical Report issued by the Saudi Stock Exchange
(Tadawul).
17
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January 2010 represents the period where the recent financial crisis started to negatively
affect economies and financial markets worldwide including Saudi Arabia’s economy and
stock market.

5. Saudi Arabia’s Mutual Funds
Table 1: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Institutional Managers
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are categorized
based on institutional managers that manage these funds. The second column shows the name of the
institutional manager, the third column shows the number of funds under their management, and the last
column is the percentage of funds each manager manages in a descending order.
No

Fund Manager

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

RIYADH CAPITAL
NCB CAPITAL
SAMBA CAPITAL & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
HSBC SAUDI ARABIA LIMITED
ANB INVEST
SAUDI HOLLANDI CAPITAL
AL RAJHI CAPITAL
JADWA INVESTMENT
CAAM SAUDI FRANSI
SAIB BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT
FALCOM FINANCIAL SERVICES
ALBILAD INVESTMENT
ALJAZIRA CAPITAL
KSB CAPITAL GROUP
AL TAWFEEK FINANCIAL GROUP
AUDI CAPITAL
SHUAA CAPITAL SAUDI ARABIA
ALAWWAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CO
BAKHEET INVESTMENT GROUP
GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE SAUDI
KHALIJIA INVEST
RASMALA INVESTMENTS SAUDI
THE INVESTOR FOR SECURITIES
EFG-HERMES KSA
MIDDLE EAST FINANCIAL INVESTMENT
MORGAN STANLEY SAUDI ARABIA
RANA INVESTMENT
WATAN INVESTMENT & SECURITIES
Total

No. of
MFs
31
27
25
21
18
15
14
14
12
10
6
5
5
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
234

%
13.25
11.54
10.68
8.97
7.69
6.41
5.98
5.98
5.13
4.27
2.56
2.14
2.14
2.14
1.28
1.28
1.28
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
100

As of April 1, 2010, there are 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia managed by 28
financial institutions (Table 1). The results from this table show that Riyadh Capital
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manages the largest number of funds with 31 funds (13.25 percent). Following Riyadh
Capital are NCB Capital, Samba Capital and Investment Management, and then HSBC Saudi
Arabia Limited with 27, 25, and 21 funds (11.54, 10.68, and 8.97 percent), respectively.
The results from (Table 1) also show that there are five financial institutional
managers that manage only one fund. This means that these five financial institutional
managers manage only 0.43 percent of the total number of mutual funds available in Saudi
Arabia. These financial institutional managers are: EFG-Hermes KSA, Middle East Financial
Investment, Morgan Stanley Saudi Arabia, Rana Investment, and Watan Investment &
Securities.
Table 2: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Security Type, Geographical
Focus, and Investment Goal
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are divided based
on their security type (stocks, bonds, money markets, trade finance, balanced, real estate, and guar & secure),
geographic focus (local, international, US, Europe, Asia, and Arab), and investment goal [growth (G), income
(I), income & growth (I&G), and capital preservation (CP)]. The final column presents the percentage of funds
in both the security type and geographical focus categories (in a descending order). The final row presents
the percentage of funds in each investment goal classification.
No
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Security Type
and
Geographical Focus
Categories
Local stocks
International stocks
Balanced international
Arab stock
Trade finance Local
Trade finance International
Money market local
Asia stock
Money market international
Bond international
EURO stock
US stocks
Balanced local
Real estate local
Guar & secure local
Total
%

Investment Goal Classification
G

I

I&G

CP

51
30
17
20
4
2
1
10
2
1
7
6
3
2
0
156
66.67

1
0
1
0
8
9
4
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
28
11.97

5
3
9
0
0
1
0
0
2
5
0
0
2
0
0
27
11.54

0
0
3
0
8
2
6
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
23
9.83
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Total No.
of MFs

%

57
33
30
20
20
14
11
10
10
8
7
6
5
2
1

24.36
14.10
12.82
8.55
8.55
5.98
4.70
4.27
4.27
3.42
2.99
2.56
2.14
0.85
0.43

234

100

Table 2 presents all mutual funds in Saudi Arabia based on their security type
(stocks, bonds, money markets, trade finance, balanced, real estate, and guar & secure),
geographic focus (local, international, US, Europe, Asia, and Arab), and investment goal
(growth, income, income & growth, and capital preservation,).
There are 16 categories of mutual funds based on their security type and
geographical focus. Most funds are locally-focused and invest in equity: 57 out of 234 funds
(24.36 percent). There is only one fund that is locally-focused and invests in Guar & secure.
Furthermore, funds also vary by investment goals. There are four investment goals under
which all funds in Saudi Arabia fall: growth (156 funds, 66.67 percent), income (28 funds,
11.97 percent), income & growth (27 funds, 11.54 percent), and capital preservation (23
funds, 9.83 percent).
Table 3: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Shariah Compliancy and
Investment Goal
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are broken down
based on their Shariah compliancy subcategory (Islamic and conventional) and investment goal classification
[growth (G), income (I), income & growth (I&G), and capital preservation (CP)]. The percentage of funds is
reported for each subcategory and classification.
Subcategory
Islamic Funds
Conventional Funds
Total
%

G
98
58
156
66.67

Investment Goal Classification
%
I
%
I&G
%
CP
41.88
19
8.12
12
5.13
17
24.79
9
3.85
15
6.41
6
28
27
23
11.97
11.54
9.83

%
7.26
2.56

Total No. of
MFs
146
88

62.39
37.61

234

100

%

Table 3 presents all mutual funds in Saudi Arabia based on their Shariah compliancy
and investment goal. The new issue in this table is that it shows that Saudi Arabia
possesses 146 out of 234 (62.39 percent) Islamic funds, and 88 out 234 (37.61 percent)
conventional funds. Furthermore, this table shows that almost 41.88 percent (98 funds) of
the total 234 funds are Islamic funds with a growth investment goal, whereas, conventional
funds with the same goal are only 24.79 percent (58 funds). Also, Islamic funds are the least
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when funds have an Income & growth objective (12 funds, 5.13 percent), whereas,
conventional funds are the least when funds have a capital preservation objective (6 funds,
2.56 percent).

6. The hypothesis
There are several restrictions and necessary adaptations to which Islamic mutual
funds must commit before they can earn an Islamic title. Due to the nature of these
restrictions and necessary adaptations, the following is hypothesized: first, an Islamic
mutual fund exposes investors to less risk than a conventional mutual fund. Second, an
Islamic mutual fund rewards investors with less return than its conventional mutual fund
counterpart.
To understand the development of this hypothesis, consider the following four
examples. First, because Shariah law prohibits interest (riba); Islamic mutual funds can
neither invest in securities of firms that finance their assets with interest-based debt nor
they can invest in fixed-income instruments. This implies that securities of all interestbased financial institutions (like conventional banks and conventional brokerage firms) as
well as all fixed-income instruments (like conventional bonds both corporate and treasury,
certificates of deposit (CDs), preferred stocks, and warrants) are excluded from the
investment universe of Islamic funds. On the other hand, conventional funds are not
restricted from investing in securities of firms that utilize interest-based debt nor they are
restricted from investing in fixed-income instruments. As a result, Islamic funds are
believed to be inherently less susceptible to financial risk and changes in interest rates than
conventional funds.
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Second, Islamic mutual funds cannot invest in risky instruments such as toxic assets
and derivatives that have adversely affected conventional funds and triggered the recent
2008 global financial crisis.
Third, Islamic funds are restricted from investing in securities of companies whose
major portion of revenues are generated from alcohol, life insurance, tobacco, gambling,
adult entertainment, pork, and all other unethical related products. However, conventional
funds can freely invest in securities across the spectrum of all industries and sectors,
including those securities with high risks exposure.
Fourth, Islamic funds cannot utilize many investment trading practices such as
trading on margin, financing investments with interest-based debt, engaging in shortselling, speculating, and/or resorting to the future and option markets. This is because
most of these practices have elements of gharar. On the other hand, conventional funds are
not restricted from utilizing any of the available investment trading practices.
Overall, all these restrictions and necessary adaptations to earn an Islamic title
make Islamic mutual funds enjoy a considerably smaller investment universe compared to
that of conventional mutual funds. Not only that, but also these restrictions and necessary
adaptations make Islamic mutual funds less vulnerable to instability and have less risk
exposure when compared to conventional mutual funds. This, according to the risk-return
tradeoff theory that suggests a positive relationship between risk and return (low risk is
associated with low return and high risk is associated with high return), implies that
Islamic funds should compensate investors with less return than conventional funds due to
the lower level of risk assumed.
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7. The Data
This section discusses the data and its sources and it is divided into two subsections:
the Saudi mutual fund data (section 7.1) and the multifactor model data (section 7.2).

7.1. Saudi Mutual Fund Data
Table 4: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Institutional Managers
The following table presents the selected sample of 143 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July
2004 to January 2010. Funds are categorized based on institutional managers that manage these funds. The
second column shows the name of the institutional manager, the third column shows the total number of
funds under their management, the fourth column shows the percentage of funds each manager manages, and
the fifth column shows the number of funds each institutional manager manages in the selected sample. The
last column shows the percentage of funds each manager manages in the selected sample.
No

Fund Manager Based on the Selected Sample

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

HSBC SAUDI ARABIA LIMITED
SAUDI HOLLANDI CAPITAL
RIYADH CAPITAL
NCB CAPITAL
JADWA INVESTMENT
AL RAJHI CAPITAL
ANB INVEST
SAIB BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT
CAAM SAUDI FRANSI
SAMBA CAPITAL & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
FALCOM FINANCIAL SERVICES
ALBILAD INVESTMENT
KSB CAPITAL GROUP
AUDI CAPITAL
ALJAZIRA CAPITAL
AL TAWFEEK FINANCIAL GROUP
ALAWWAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CO
BAKHEET INVESTMENT GROUP
GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE SAUDI
RASMALA INVESTMENTS SAUDI
THE INVESTOR FOR SECURITIES
EFG-HERMES KSA
MORGAN STANLEY SAUDI ARABIA
WATAN INVESTMENT & SECURITIES
Total

No. of
all MFs
21
15
31
27
14
14
18
10
12
25
6
5
5
3
5
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
227

%
9.25
6.61
13.66
11.89
6.17
6.17
7.93
4.41
5.29
11.01
2.64
2.20
2.20
1.32
2.20
1.32
0.88
0.88
0.88
0.88
0.88
0.44
0.44
0.44
100

No. of MFs
in the Sample
21
13
12
11
11
10
9
9
8
6
6
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
143

%
14.69
9.09
8.39
7.69
7.69
6.99
6.29
6.29
5.59
4.20
4.20
2.80
2.10
2.10
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
0.70
0.70
0.70
100

It is worthy to note that the mutual fund sample very much represents the Saudi
mutual fund industry in terms of geographical focuses, diversity, investment objectives,
Shariah compliancy, and institutional management. The selected sample data consists of
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daily net asset values (NAVs) of 143 out of 234 mutual funds available in Saudi Arabia
during the period from July 2004 to January 2010. Information on these funds is obtained
from three main sources: 1) the official site of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).20 2)
The official site of HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited.21 And 3) Zawya database.22
Table 4 shows that funds in the selected sample are managed by 24 out of 28
Institutional managers. HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited manages the largest number of funds
with 21 funds (14.69 percent). Following HSBC is the Saudi Hollandi Capital, Riyadh
Capital, and then NCB Capital with 13, 12, and 11 funds (9.09, 8.39, and 7.69 percent ),
respectively.
Table 5: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Shariah Compliancy and Investment Goals
This table presents the selected sample of 143 funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July 2004 to January
2010. Funds are broken down based on their Shariah compliancy subcategory (Islamic and conventional) and
investment goal classification [growth (G), income (I), capital preservation (CP), and income & growth (I&G)].
The percentage of funds is reported for each subcategory and classification.
Subcategory
Islamic Funds
Conventional Funds
Total
%

G
61
28
89
62.24

%
42.66
19.58

Investment Goal Classification
I
%
CP
%
16
11.19
13
9.09
8
5.59
6
4.20
24
19
16.78
13.29

I&G
6
5
11
7.69

%
4.20
3.50

Total No.
of MFs
96
47

67.13
32.87

143

100

%

Table 5 shows that the selected fund sample very well represents the entire Saudi
mutual fund population in terms of the fund’s investment goal objectives and Shariah
compliancy. There are 67.13 percent (96 out 143) Islamic mutual funds and 32.87 percent
(47 out of 143) conventional mutual funds. These percentages are quite similar to those
reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population presented in (Table 3), where there
are 62.39 percent Islamic mutual funds and 37.61 percent conventional mutual funds.
Source is: http://www.tadawul.com.sa.
Source is: http://www.hsbcsaudi.com.
22 Zawya is one of leading Middle Eastern business information firms. Their main website is:
http://www.zawya.com. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Mr. James Randall, the international
business manager, for providing me a trial excess to the database.
20
21
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Table 5 also indicates that when mutual funds in the sample are broken down based
on their investment goal classifications; mutual funds that have a growth investment
objective dominate the fund sample with 89 out of 143 funds (62.24 percent). This
percentage is quite similar to that reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population
presented in (Table 3), where 66.67 percent of all funds available in Saudi Arabia are
growth oriented. Funds that have other investment objectives such as income, capital
preservation, and income & growth objectives represent 16.78, 13.29, and 7.69 percent of
the fund sample that consists of 143 Saudi mutual funds, respectively. These percentages
are also close to the percentages reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population
shown in (Table 3), where 11.97, 11.54, and 9.83 percent of all available funds in Saudi
Arabia have an income, capital preservation, and income & growth objectives, respectively.
Table 5 also indicates that Islamic funds that are growth oriented dominate the fund
sample with 61 out of 143 funds (42.66 percent). On the other hand, conventional funds
that are income & growth oriented are considered the least in the fund sample with only 5
out of 143 funds (3.50 percent).
It is worthy to note that (Table 2) shows that Saudi mutual funds have six regional
focuses: local, international, Arab, Asia, US, and Europe. To enhance comparability, this
empirical study gathers all mutual funds in the sample that are US-, Asia-, Europe-, and
internationally-focused and groups them together under one regional focus called
“internationally-focused funds.” As a result, Saudi mutual funds that make up the sample
used in this empirical study will have only three main geographical focuses (local, Arab,
and international). As mentioned in the introduction, locally-focused funds are funds that
invest in assets located only in Saudi Arabia. Arab-focused funds are funds that invest in
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assets located only in countries that are members in the Arab league, excluding Saudi
Arabia. Finally, internationally-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located in all
countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and those that belong in the above Arab group.
Table 6 breaks down the sample based on: the three main geographical focuses
(local, Arab, and international), investment goal classifications (growth, income, capital
preservation, and income & growth), and Shariah compliancy subcategories (Islamic and
conventional). Results show that out of 143 funds in sample, there are 82 (57.34 percent),
19 (13.29 percent), and 42 (29.37 percent) funds that are locally-, Arab-, and
internationally-focused, respectively. Furthermore, results show that locally-focused
Islamic funds that are growth orientated dominate the sample with 33 out of 143 funds
(23.08 percent). However, both (Islamic and conventional) funds that are internationallyfocused and have an income & growth investment objective are considered the least in the
fund sample where there are only 2 out of 143 funds (1.40 percent) of each type. Also,
results show that all the 19 Arab-focused funds in the fund sample are only growth
oriented and only invest in equity. This is very much similar to results observed when
looking at the entire 20 available Arab-focused funds in Saudi Arabia (Table 2).
From Bloomberg, the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with
one-month maturity is collected for the period from July 2004 to January 2010. In this
empirical study, SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the monthly riskfree rate. Note that it would be more appropriate to use the rate of return on sukuk instead
of the rate of the risk-free asset since Shariah law forbids any return that is in the context of
debt. But the problem is that data on sukuk rates are still not fully available to be used in
Islamic finance empirical studies.
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Table 6: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Geographical Focus, Investment Goal, and Shariah Compliancy
The following table presents the selected sample of 143 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July 2004 to January 2010. Funds are
categorized based on three main geographic focus categories (local, Arab, and international), Shariah compliancy subcategories [Islamic (Is.) and
conventional (Cn.)], and investment goal classifications [growth (G), income (I), capital preservation (CP), and income & growth (I&G)]. The final
column presents the percentage of funds under each geographic focus category. The final row presents the percentage of funds under each investment
goal classification and Shariah compliancy subcategory.
Category
Local
Arab
International
Total
%
Total Funds
Based on
Investment
Goal
Classification
%

G
Is.
33
14
14
61
42.66

%
23.08
9.79
9.79

Investment Goal Classifications and Shariah Compliancy subcategories
I
CP
Cn.
%
Is.
%
Cn.
%
Is.
%
Cn.
%
Is.
20
13.99
8
5.59
4
2.8
7
4.9
3
2.10
4
5
3.50
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
2.10
8
5.59
4
2.80
6
4.20
3
2.10
2
28
16
8
13
6
6
19.58
11.19
5.59
9.09
4.2
4.2

I&G
%
Cn.
2.80
3
0
0
1.40
2
5
3.5

89

24

19

11

62.24

16.78

13.29

7.69
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%
2.10
0
1.40

Total

%

82
19
42

57.34
13.29
29.37

143

100

There are six different market indices used to benchmark the performance of Saudi
funds and they fall under two main groups: Islamic and conventional indices. The Islamic
indices group includes: 1) Global Index of the GCC Islamic (to mainly benchmark locallyfocused Islamic funds).23 2) MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic Index excluding Saudi
Arabia (to mainly benchmark Arab-focused Islamic funds). And 3) MSCI World Islamic
Index (to mainly benchmark internationally-focused Islamic funds). The conventional
indices group includes: 1) Tadawul All Share Index: TASI (to mainly benchmark locallyfocused conventional funds). 2) MSCI Arabian Markets Domestic Index excluding Saudi
Arabia (to mainly benchmark Arab-focused conventional funds). And 3) MSCI World Index
IMI (to mainly benchmark internationally-focused conventional funds).
The monthly historical prices of both Islamic and conventional indices from July
2004 to January 2010 are obtained from three main sources: 1) the official website of the
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).24 2) The official website of the Global Investment
House.25 And 3) the MSCI Barra.26
Finally, to enhance comparability, the sample period in this empirical study is
divided into four different periods depending on different stock market trends in Saudi
Arabia. Such division will hold throughout the entire study. These periods are: the overall
sample period (from July 2004 to January 2010), the bullish period (from July 2004 to

GCC refers to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is represented by six countries: Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. This index is used to benchmark locally-focused Islamic funds
instead of the Saudi Arabia Islamic index. This is because the Saudi Arabia Islamic index is considered
relatively new and do not have data that goes all the way back to July 2004.
24 Source is: http://www.tadawul.com.sa/.
25 Source is: http://www.globalinv.net.
26 Source is: www.msci.com. The MSCI data contained herein is the property of MSCI Inc. (MSCI). MSCI, its
affiliates and any other party involved in, or related to, making or compiling any MSCI data; make no
warranties with respect to any such data. The MSCI data contained herein is used under license and may not
be further used, distributed or disseminated without the express written consent of MSCI.
23
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February 2006), the bearish period (from March 2006 to January 2010), and the recent
2008 financial crisis period (from September 2008 to January 2010).

7.2. Multifactor Model Data
To further enhance comparability between Islamic and conventional funds, a
multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997) four-factor model is used to control for
common investment styles. Such model is constructed using all 135 stocks listed on the
Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) as of January 31, 2010. To be included in the test, all listed
firms must have available data on stock prices, book values of equity, and total shares
outstanding from July 2003 to January 2010.

8. Methodology
The methodology discussion is divided into three sections: Section (8.1) is the non
risk-adjusted returns. Section (8.2) is the simple risk-adjusted performance measures. It
discusses the Sharpe and modified Sharpe ratios, Modigliani and Modigliani index (MM),
Treynor ratio, and TT index. Section (8.3) is the regression approach. It discusses three
models: the single-factor model (CAPM) in order to estimate the Jensen alpha Index as well
as the systematic risk (beta), the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model in order to assess the
selection and market timing abilities, and a multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart
(1997) four-factor model in order to control for common investment styles when assessing
the risk-return profile of funds.

8.1. Non Risk-Adjusted Returns
From the daily net asset values (NAVs), the monthly NAVs for all funds are
calculated as follows:
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(1)

where

is the monthly return for fund (i) at month (t).27
It is worthy to note that the methodology used to assess the risk-return profile of

Saudi funds is not based on using individual funds. Instead, the methodology used is based
on using a portfolio approach in order to diversify away fund-specific risks and to facilitate
comparison between the entire Islamic and conventional Saudi mutual funds industries.
Thus, Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are grouped into portfolios based
on the following characteristics: the funds’ three main geographical focuses (local, Arab,
and international), the funds’ Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional), and four
different stock market trends in Saudi Arabia (overall, bull, bear, and the recent 2008
financial crisis periods).
Forming portfolios in that manner will create 24 (12 Islamic and 12 conventional)
different types of portfolios (see Appendix A). Note that all formed portfolios are equallyweighted and formed on monthly basis.28
Fund portfolios are calculated as follows:
(2)

where

is the monthly return for portfolio (p) during month (t),

of individual funds during month (t), and

is the total number

is defined as in equation (1).

Conventionally, mutual fund returns are calculated as capital gains plus income (dividends). However,
because obtaining data on dividends was very difficult, dividends are not accounted for in this study.
28 According to Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009), “It is common practice to analyze portfolios of assets with
religious of ethical characteristics based on equal weighted rather than value weighted portfolios. This
practice ensures a focus on the assets religious or ethical characteristics and substantially reduces the risk of
bias due to idiosyncratic return characteristics of a specific asset.” This is why in this empirical study all
formed portfolios are equally-weighted portfolios.
27
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8.2. Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures
8.2.1. Sharpe and Modified Sharpe Ratios
The Sharpe ratio is derived by Sharpe (1966) as an absolute risk-adjusted
performance measure. Thus, no market benchmark is needed to calculate the Sharpe ratio.
The idea of this ratio is to see how much additional return is received for additional
volatility of holding the risky asset over the risk-free asset. Thus, this ratio measures how
well a portfolio compensates investors for the additional risk taken. The risk in the Sharpe
ratio is measured by the portfolio’s standard deviation, which represents the total risk
(diversified and undiversified risks). This ratio is useful in ranking portfolios because a
higher ratio is only warranted if return is higher with the same level of risk or if the risk is
lower with the same level of return. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows:
(3)

where:
Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p)
Average of monthly return for portfolio (p)
The average risk-free rate measured by SIBOR one-month maturity
Standard deviation of the portfolio (p)

However, the Sharpe ratio is very difficult to interpret and could lead to spurious
portfolio ranking when the excess return is negative. In other words, it is not always true
that the portfolio with the higher ratio is the best portfolio. For example, if two portfolios, A
and B, have excess average returns of -5 percent and standard deviation of 20 and 25
percent, respectively. Then the Sharpe ratio is -0.25 and -0.20 for A and B, respectively.
According to the Sharpe ratio, portfolio B has a superior risk-return profile when compared
to portfolio A. However, that is not true because B is considered more volatile than A.
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As a result, Israelsen (2005) propose a modification to the Sharpe ratio to overcome
the spurious portfolio ranking when excess return is negative. He introduces an exponent
to the denominator of the Sharpe ratio that is equal to the portfolio excess return divided
by its absolute value. It is worthy to note that the modified Sharpe ratio coincides with the
original ratio when the excess return is positive, and is superior to the original ratio when
the excess return is negative. Therefore, only the modified Sharpe ratio results are reported
in this study and it is calculated as:
(4)

where

is the modified Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p) and the reset is defined as

in equation (3).
8.2.2. MM Measure
Modigliani & Modigliani (1997) propose this measure as a relative risk-adjusted
performance measure. It is very intuitive and easy to interpret and it is also considered an
extension to the Sharpe ratio. This measure shows the return the portfolio would have
gained if it had the same risk as the market benchmark. The risk is measured using the total
risk: the standard deviation. According to this measure, the most appealing portfolios are
those with the highest MM values. MM is calculated as follows:
(5)

where

is the Modigliani and Modigliani measure for portfolio (p),

standard deviation of the market index, and the rest is defined as in equation (3).
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is the

8.2.3. Treynor Ratio
Treynor ratio measures the excess returns over the riskless asset that could be
earned per unit of market risk. Market risk or systematic risk is measured by the portfolio’s
beta, which measures the co-movement of the portfolio with the market. Since, the Treynor
ratio normalizes excess return by the portfolio’s beta instead of the portfolio’s standard
deviation, then the Treynor ratio is superior to the Sharpe ratio in assessing the risk-return
profile if the fund is a part of a larger fully diversified portfolio. This is because the relevant
risk is such circumstance is the market risk (beta). It is calculated as follows:
(6)

where

are defined as in equation (3) and
Is the Treynor ratio for portfolio (p)
Portfolio's beta. Estimated using a single-factor model (CAPM) as is shown in following
equation:

(7)

where:
Returns for portfolio (p) at months (t)
Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at months (t)
The intercept for portfolio (p). In this model it is called the Jensen alpha index
Beta or the market risk for portfolio (p)
Return on the market index at months (t)
The error term with zero mean

8.2.4. TT Index
The TT index is an extension to the Treynor ratio. The TT measure is proposed by
Bodie, Kane, & Marcus (2005) and it measures the excess return of a portfolio per unit of
systematic risk (beta) above the excess return on the market, which by definition has a beta
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of one. Thus, one can look at the TT measure as the difference between the portfolio and
the market Treynor ratio. It is calculated as follows:
(8)

where

is the TT index for portfolio (p),

market index,

is the average monthly return for the

is defined as in equation (6), and

is defined as in equation (3).

8.3. The Regression Approach
8.3.1. The Single-Factor Model (CAPM)
The single-factor model is used to estimate the Jensen alpha index as well as the
systematic risk (beta). The Jensen alpha index is a relative risk-adjusted performance
measure that was first introduced by Jensen (1967) to determine the abnormal return of a
portfolio over the theoretical expected return using a capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Thus, the Jensen alpha index is the constant term in the single-factor model presented in
equation (7). A portfolio is considered outperforming the market if the Jensen alpha is
positive and statistically significant.
The systematic risk (beta), which is also called the market risk, measures the
portfolio’s co-movement with the employed market index. Thus, beta is considered
superior to the standard deviation when assessing the risk of a very well diversified
portfolio. A beta above (below) one indicates that the portfolio’ return is more (less)
volatile than the return of the employed market index. A positive (negative) beta indicates
that the portfolio’s return is positively (negatively) correlated with the return of the
employed market index. However, a zero beta indicates that the portfolio’s return moves
independently from the return of the employed market index. Beta is the coefficient on the
excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) presented in equation (7).
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8.3.2. The Treynor & Mazuy Model
The Treynor & Mazuy (1966) model is used to assess both the selectivity and
market timing skills. It extends the Jensen alpha model by adding a quadratic term.
It is estimated as follows:
(9)

where

and

represent the selectivity and market timing skills for portfolio (p),

respectively.

, and

are defined as in equation (7).

A statistical significant positive alpha (

) [gamma ( )] indicates that managers

possess selectivity [market timing] skills. Selectivity skills mean that managers are able to
pick good performing assets. Market timing skills mean that managers increase their funds’
exposure to the market when they believe that the market is going to do well and reduce
their funds’ exposure to the market when they believe that the market will do badly.
8.3.3. Multifactor Model
Fama & French (1993) illustrate the CAPM insufficiency in explaining the crosssectional US stock returns and introduce a three-factor model that includes a risk factor
related to size (SMB) and a risk factor related to book-to-market equity (HML) in addition
to the market excess returns portfolio (RM-RF). The findings of Fama and French imply
that the three-factor model is incrementally useful in explaining mutual fund returns if
fund managers are significantly engaging in different investment strategies such as
investing in small vs. large cap stocks or value (high book-to-market equity) vs. growth
(low book-to-market equity) stocks.
Nevertheless, there is a growing literature that indicates that the three-factor model
could further be improved. That is, the three-factor model is still insufficiently capable in
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explaining the Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) momentum strategy of buying the past 12month winners and selling the past 12-month losers. To overcome this issue, Carhart
(1997) proposes a four-factor model where a risk factor related to momentum is added to
the existing Fama and French three-factor model.
As a result, in this study a multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997) fourfactor model is employed to investigate the persistence in performance of Saudi mutual
funds. Another reason for employing the four-factor model is that there is growing
evidence that the performance of Islamic funds is indeed attributed to style tilts which
cannot be accounted for using a single-factor model. For example, Hoepner, Rammal, &
Rezec (2009) find that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks. Also, Abderrezak
(2008) finds that Islamic equity funds (IEFs) are biased towards both small cap firms and
growth stocks.
8.3.3.1. The Construction of the Four-Factor Model
Eight value-weighted return portfolios are formed based on the intersection of two
size groups, two book-to-market equity groups, and two momentum groups. The two size
groups are [small (S) and big (B)] and they are split using the median size. The two bookto-market equity groups are [low (L) and High (H)] and they are split using the median of
book-to-market equity. And the momentum groups are [winners (W) and Losers (Z)] and
they are split based on winners (good performers in the past 12-months) and losers (bad
performers in the past 12-months).
The eight return portfolios are as follows: (SLW, SHW, BLW, BHW, SLZ, SHZ, BLZ,
and BHZ). For example, the SLW portfolio contains returns of stocks in the small size, low
book-to-market equity, and winners groups. The BHZ portfolio contains returns of stocks in
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the big size, high book-to-market equity, and losers groups. From these eight valueweighted return portfolios, three risk factors are created. These risk factors are considered
portfolios meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related to size (SMB), book-to-market
equity (HML), and momentum (MOM). The construction of these factors is as follows:
It is very well documented that there is a negative relationship between size and
average returns. Thus, SMB (small minus big) is calculated by taking, in each month, the
average return on the two small-winners and the two small-losers portfolios minus the
average return on the two big-winners and the two big-losers portfolios. This difference is
expected to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk factor that is related to size free,
as much as possible, from both the book-to-market equity and momentum effects and more
focused on the differences in return between small and big stocks. It is calculated as
follows:
(10)

Also, it is very well documented that there is a positive relationship between bookto-market equity and average returns. Thus, HML (high minus low) is calculated by taking,
in each month, the average return on the two high-winners and the two high-losers
portfolios minus the average return on the two low-winners and the two low-losers
portfolios. This difference is expected to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk
factor that is related to the book-to-market equity free, as much as possible, from both the
size and momentum effects and more focused on the differences in return between value
(high book-to-market equity) and growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. It is
calculated as follows:
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(11)

MOM is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the four-winner
portfolios minus the average return on the four-loser portfolios. This difference is expected
to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk factor related to momentum free, as much
as possible, from the size and book-to-market equity effects and more focused on the
differences in return between momentum (buying past 12-month winners) and contrarian
(selling past 12-month losers) stocks. It is calculated as follows:
(12)

The four-factor model is estimated as follows:
(13)

where
Returns of portfolio (p) at month (t)
Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR one-month maturity at month (t)
The intercept of the model. It is the selectivity skill coefficient for portfolio (p)
Beta or the market risk for portfolio (p)
The return on the market index at month (t)
Loadings on the size risk factor for portfolio (p)
(Small minus big) size risk factor
Loadings on the book-to-market equity risk factor for portfolio (p)
(High minus low) book-to-market equity risk factor
Loadings on the momentum risk factor for portfolio (p)
(Winner minus losers) momentum risk factor
The error term with zero mean

9. Empirical Results
The following empirical results discussion is going to be presented based on the
three main geographical focuses of the created fund portfolios. That is, section 9.1
discusses the empirical results for the locally-focused fund portfolios. Section 9.2 discusses
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the empirical results for the Arab-focused fund portfolios. And section 9.3 discusses the
empirical results for the internationally-focused fund portfolios.
In each section there is one main table that contains five different panels (A to E).
Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted returns. Panel B reports the results from the simple
risk-adjusted performance measures, which are the modified Sharpe ratio, MM index,
Treynor ratio, and the TT index. Panels C to E report the results from the regression
approach. That is, panel C reports the results from the single-factor model. Panel D reports
the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And panel E reports the results from the
four-factor model.

9.1. Empirical Results for Locally-Focused Portfolios
Table 7 reports the results for only the locally-focused fund portfolios. The market
indices used to benchmark the performance of these locally-focused portfolios are also
locally-focused and they are: 1) GCC Islamic: Global Index of the GCC Islamic and 2) TASI:
Tadawul All Share Index. To enhance comparability, each of the Islamic and conventional
locally-focused portfolios are benchmarked against the locally-focused Islamic market
index (GCC Islamic) and then against the locally-focused conventional market index (TASI).
Table 7-panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for
the locally-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate that the
locally-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire studied period is 0.17 percent less risky
(using the variance) than its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio and that
difference in the total risk is considered statistically significant at 1 percent. Even though
the locally-focused Islamic portfolio has less total risk exposure than its peer, the results
during the entire studied period indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows
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any differences in the performance (non risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the
conventional locally-focused fund portfolios.
Table 7: Results for the Locally-Focused Portfolios
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels
in this table report the results for only the locally-focused portfolios. The market indices used to benchmark
the performance of these locally-focused portfolios are also locally-focused and they are: 1) GCC Islamic:
Global Index of the GCC Islamic and 2) TASI: Tadawul All Share Index. Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted
return mean and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance
measures (modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the results from the single-factor model
(CAPM). Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And finally Panel E reports the results
from the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity
problems using White’s (1980) correction test.

Table 7-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Locally-Focused Portfolios)
Overall period
Bull
Mean Variance
Mean Variance
Islamic portfolio
0.31%
0.17%
2.27%
0.04%
Conventional portfolio
0.38%
0.34%
3.66%
0.08%
The difference
-0.07% -0.17%*** -1.38%* -0.04%*
GCC Islamic
0.94%
0.96%
7.70%
0.29%
TASI
0.46%
0.91%
5.89%
0.24%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Bear
Mean Variance
-0.52% 0.21%
-1.02% 0.39%
0.49% -0.18%**
-1.94% 0.97%
-1.85% 1.03%

Financial Crisis
Mean Variance
-0.77% 0.20%
-1.40% 0.48%
0.63% -0.28%**
-3.36% 0.98%
-1.61% 1.00%

Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, the results
indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is also considered significantly less risky
(using the variance) than its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio. That is, the
locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.04, 0.18, and 0.28 percent less risky than
its peer during the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods and that difference in the total risk
is statistically significant at 10, 5, and 5 percent, respectively.
Looking at the performance (non risk-adjusted return) of these portfolios during
these three market trends (bull, bear and financial crisis periods), the results during the
bull period reveal that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio significantly at 10 percent
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underperforms the locally-focused conventional portfolio and that underperformance is
around 1.38 percent per month. However, during the bear and financial crisis periods, the
non risk-adjusted return results reveal that there is no statistical evidence that shows any
differences in the performance between the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused
portfolios.
Table 7-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (Locally-Focused
Portfolios)
Index

Overall period

Bull

Bear

Financial Crisis

Modified Sharpe Ratio

Islamic
0.96%

Conv.
1.82%

Islamic
Conv.
Islamic Conv.
96.23% 116.06% -0.04% -0.08%

Islamic
-0.04%

Conv.
-0.10%

GCC Islamic

0.37%

0.45%

5.48%

6.55%

-1.44% -1.75%

-1.84%

-2.05%

TASI
GCC Islamic

0.36%
0.11%

0.45%
0.21%

5.00%
8.71%

5.97%
9.85%

-1.49% -1.82%
-1.95% -2.34%

-1.86%
-2.13%

-2.07%
-2.43%

MM
Treynor
TT

TASI

0.09%

0.18%

5.11%

6.03%

-1.81% -2.14%

-1.99%

-2.20%

GCC Islamic

-0.55%

-0.46%

1.29%

2.43%

0.26%

-0.13%

1.33%

1.03%

TASI

-0.09%

-0.01%

-0.49%

0.43%

0.31%

-0.02%

-0.28%

-0.50%

Table 7-panel B- reports the simple risk-adjusted performance measures for the
locally-focused fund portfolios. The results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic
portfolio underperforms its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio during both the
overall and bull periods, but performs less badly than its peer during the bear and financial
crisis periods. This is true regardless of the simple risk-adjusted performance measure
used and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark employed to adjust for risk.
Table 7-panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During
the overall studied period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and
highly significant at 1 percent regardless what locally-focused market benchmark (GCC
Islamic or TASI) is used to adjust for risk. Similar results are observed when the entire
sample period is broken down to bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. This means that
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both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are considered less volatile than
both locally-focused market benchmarks.
Table 7-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Locally-Focused Portfolios)
Index
GCC Islamic
Diff
TASI

Overall period
Islamic
-0.002

Conv.
-0.0024

0.0003
-0.0004

0.0000

Bull
Islamic
0.0029

Conv.
0.0083

-0.0054
-0.0019

0.0024

Bear
Islamic
0.001

Conv.
-0.0007

0.0018
0.0014

-0.0001

Financial Crisis
Islamic
0.0054

Conv.
0.0064

-0.0009
-0.0012

-0.0034

Diff
-0.0004
-0.0043
0.0015
0.0022
GCC Islamic 0.3654*** 0.5165*** 0.2285** 0.3423** 0.4047*** 0.5476*** 0.4069*** 0.6166***
Diff
TASI
Adj.
R2

Diff
GCC Islamic

-0.1511**

-0.1139

-0.1430*

-0.2097*

0.4225*** 0.5968*** 0.3896*** 0.5592*** 0.4366*** 0.5994*** 0.4356*** 0.6792***
-0.1744***
72.70% 73.65%

-0.1696**
32.12% 36.69%

TASI
93.61% 94.73% 85.19%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

87.82%

-0.1628***
75.28% 73.41%

-0.2436***
79.62% 75.93%

94.00%

94.21%

94.42%

95.56%

Looking at differences in the systematic risk (beta) during the overall studied
period, the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered
significantly less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio; regardless what
locally-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk. In other words, at 5 (1)
percent level of significance, the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.1511
(0.1744) less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio when the GCC Islamic
(TASI) is used as the locally-focused market benchmark. Similar results are observed if the
sample period is broken down to bull, bear, and financial crisis periods.
However, there is one meaningless exception when the GCC Islamic index is used to
adjust for risk during the bull period where the results indicate that still the locally-focused
Islamic portfolio is less risky, but that beta-difference is statistically insignificant. This
exception is meaningless because the adjusted R-squared results show that the locallyfocused conventional market index (TASI) is considered a better fit than the locally-focused
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Islamic index (GCC Islamic) in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locallyfocused portfolios. To illustrate, when TASI is used, the adjusted R-squared values for the
locally-focused Islamic (conventional) portfolio is 93.61 (94.73), 85.19 (87.82), 94.00
(94.42), and 94.21 (95.56) percent versus 72.70 (73.65), 32.12 (36.69), 75.28 (73.41), and
79.62 (75.93) percent when the GCC Islamic index is used during the overall, bull, bear, and
financial crisis periods, respectively.
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results during the
overall period reveal that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) do not
outperform both locally-focused market benchmarks. Similar results are observed during
the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. That is, alphas are either negative or
insignificantly positive.
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional
locally-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that
shows any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results hold
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused
market benchmark used.
Table 7-panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. Consistent
with the adjusted R-squared results obtained from the single-factor model (panel C), the
adjusted R-squared results from this model still indicate that TASI is considered a better fit
than the GCC Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locallyfocused fund portfolios. Thus, results that are based on using TASI provide a better picture
when discussing the selectivity and market time skills than the results that are based on
using the GCC Islamic index.
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Table 7-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Locally-Focused Portfolios)
Measure

Index
GCC Islamic

Overall period
Islamic
-0.0021

Diff
TASI
Diff
GCC Islamic

Adj.
R2

Diff
GCC Islamic

Conv. Islamic Conv.
-0.0046 0.0028 0.0022

0.0025
0.0033**

0.0026

0.0006
-0.002

0.0028

0.0007
-0.0047
0.005
0.2286 -0.0507 -1.822

Diff
TASI

Bull

-0.2237

1.7713

Bear
Islamic
-0.0016

Financial Crisis

Conv.
-0.0063

0.0047
0.0060***

0.0029

0.0031
0.3299
0.6932
-0.3632

Islamic
0.0069

Conv.
0.0045

0.0024
0.004

0.0004

0.0036
-0.1949
0.2358
-0.4307

-0.4036*** -0.294 -0.0149 0.1962 -0.4761*** -0.3133 -0.5657*** -0.4158
-0.1096
-0.2112
72.27% 73.51% 28.14% 36.37%

TASI
94.64% 94.95% 84.31% 87.12%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

-0.1627
75.65% 75.00%

-0.1499
78.54% 74.44%

95.44%

97.03%

94.66%

95.98%

As for the selectivity skills (alphas), the results when the GCC Islamic index is used
as the locally-focused market index indicate that both locally-focused fund portfolios
(Islamic and conventional) do not possess any selectivity skills; regardless of the sample
period under examination. However, when TASI is used as the locally-focused market
index, the results indicate that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio possesses some
selectivity skills of 0.0033 (significant at 5 percent) and 0.0060 (significant at 1 percent)
during only the overall and bear periods, respectively. The results during the bull and
financial crisis periods indicate that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) possess no selectivity skills.
As for the market timing skills (gammas), results reveal that both locally-focused
fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) do not possess any market timing skills;
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused
market benchmark used.
Finally, the results reveal that there is no statistical evidence that shows any
differences in both the selectivity and market timing skills between the Islamic and the
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conventional locally-focused portfolios. This is true regardless of the sample period under
examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for
risk.
Table 7-panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. Again, the adjusted
R-squared result from this model indicate that TASI is considered by far a better fit than
the GCC Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locallyfocused portfolios. Thus, results that are based on using TASI are more reliable than the
results that are based on using the GCC Islamic index.
The systematic risk (beta) results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and
highly significant; regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the
locally-focused market index used to adjust for risk. This supports the notion that both
locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are less volatile than both locallyfocused market indices (GCC Islamic and TASI). Furthermore, the beta-difference results
show that there is statistical evidence that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is
considered less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio. However, there is one
exception when the GCC Islamic index is employed during the bull period where the betadifference results still show that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is less risky than its
respective peer, but that risk difference is statistically insignificant.
Assessing the portfolios’ performance relative to locally-focused market indices, the
alpha results when the locally-focused Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is used reveal that
neither locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with
abnormal return. However, when the locally-focused conventional index (TASI) is used, the
alpha results indicate that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio provides investors with
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a small abnormal return during only the overall and bear periods. That is, the locallyfocused Islamic portfolio outperforms TASI by only 0.0025 (significant at 10 percent)
during the overall period and by 0.0042 (significant at 5 percent) during the bear period.
Table 7-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Locally-Focused Portfolios)
Index
GCC Islamic
Diff
TASI

Overall period
Islamic
0.0014

Conv.
0.0005

0.0009
0.0025*

0.0021

Bull
Islamic
-0.0020

Conv.
0.0005

-0.0024
-0.0033** -0.0004

Bear
Islamic
0.0057

Conv.
0.0055

0.0002
0.0042**

0.0034

Financial Crisis
Islamic
0.0051

Conv.
0.0033

0.0018
0.0020

-0.0030

Diff
0.0004
-0.0029
0.0008
0.0049
GCC Islamic 0.3640*** 0.5241*** 0.2234** 0.3222*** 0.3901*** 0.5374*** 0.4034*** 0.6358***
Diff
TASI
Diff
GCC Islamic
Diff
TASI

-0.1601***

-0.0988

-0.1473*

0.4177*** 0.6003*** 0.3968*** 0.5410*** 0.4303*** 0.5998*** 0.4149*** 0.6817***
-0.1826***
0.0084

-0.0503

0.0586
0.0356***

-0.1443**
0.0036

-0.0682

0.0718

-0.0109 0.0611*** 0.0109

-0.1695***
0.0173

-0.0235

0.0408
0.0237

-0.0165

Diff
0.0465*
0.0502
0.0402
GCC Islamic -0.1851*** -0.2072* -0.2311** -0.2380* -0.1974* -0.2633*
Diff
TASI

0.0221

0.0069

0.0660

0.0342

-0.0767

0.1109*
-0.1709 -0.2872
0.1163

-0.0422
-0.0608 -0.0435

-0.0513
0.1073
0.1911

-0.0024
-0.1009 -0.1268

0.0680
-0.0158
0.1008

Diff

-0.0173

-0.0838

0.0260

-0.1166

-0.0368

-0.0193
75.52% 75.47%

0.0077

-0.0277

0.0863

Diff
GCC Islamic

-0.0562**

-0.0301

-0.0371

-0.0728** -0.0215

Diff
GCC Islamic

-0.0380

-0.2668***
0.0492

0.0041

TASI
Adj.
R2

-0.2324**

-0.0926 -0.1606***

0.0608

-0.0582* -0.0655*

-0.0958

-0.0531
43.04% 43.30%

0.0073
76.94% 75.30%

-0.1181
79.93% 74.44%

94.00%

94.37%

TASI
94.19% 94.71% 94.44%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

86.80%

94.64%

0.0223

96.54%

Consistent with the results obtained from the single-factor model (panel C), the
alpha-difference results from the four-factor model indicate that there is no statistical
evidence that shows any differences in the performance between the Islamic and
conventional locally-focused portfolios. These results are observed regardless of the
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sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark
used to adjust for risk.
The results from the SMB risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the SMB
risk factor and that both portfolios exhibit identical sensitivities to the SMB risk factor.
These results hold regardless of the sample period under examination. However, when
TASI is used, the results from the SMB risk factor indicate that only the locally-focused
Islamic portfolio is biased towards small capitalization stocks during only the overall and
bull periods. That is, loading on the SMB risk factor during the overall (bull) period is
0.0356 (0.0611) and it is statistically significant at 1 percent. Looking at the SMB-difference
portfolio, the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is significantly at 10
percent considered more sensitive to the SMB risk factor (more biased towards small
capitalization stocks) than is the locally-focused conventional portfolio. This is observed
during only the overall and the financial crisis periods.
The results from the HML risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are more biased towards
growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. This is observed during all periods, but the
financial crisis period. However, when TASI is used, the results from the HML risk factor
indicate that during the overall and bear periods; there is no statistical evidence that both
locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are biased towards either value (high
book-to-market equity) or growth stocks. However, during the bull (financial crisis) period,
the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic (conventional) portfolio is biased
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towards growth stocks where the loading on the HML risk factor is -0.0728 (-0.1606) and it
is statistically significant at 5 (1) percent.
The results from the MOM risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the
MOM risk factor, regardless of the sample period under examination. However, when TASI
is employed, results from the MOM risk factor during the overall sample period indicate
that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is biased towards a contrarian investment
strategy. Loading on the MOM risk factor is -0.0562 and it is statically significantly at 5
percent. Furthermore, the results during the bear period indicate that both locally-focused
portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are also biased towards a contrarian investment
strategy. Loading on the MOM risk factor for the locally-focused Islamic (conventional)
portfolio is -0.0582 (-0.0655) and it is considered statistically significant at 10 percent.
However, results during both the bull and financial crisis periods indicate that both locallyfocused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the MOM risk factor.
Finally, the HML- and MOM-difference portfolio results show that both Islamic and
conventional locally-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to both HML
and MOM risk factors. This is true regardless of the sample period under examination and
regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.

9.2. Empirical Results for Arab-Focused Portfolios
Table 8 reports the results for only the Arab-focused fund portfolios. The market
indices used to benchmark the performance of these Arab-focused portfolios are also Arabfocused and they are: 1) MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic: MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic
Index excluding Saudi Arabia and 2) MSCI Arab Mrk Index: MSCI Arabian Markets
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Domestic Index excluding Saudi Arabia. To enhance comparability, each of the Islamic and
the conventional Arab-focused portfolios are benchmarked against the Arab-focused
Islamic market index (MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index) and then against the Arab-focused
conventional market index (MSCI Arab Mrk Index).
Table 8: Results for the Arab-Focused Portfolios
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels
in this table report the results for only the Arab-focused portfolios. The market indices used to benchmark the
performance of these Arab-focused portfolios are also Arab-focused and they are: 1) MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic:
MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic Index excluding Saudi Arabia and 2) MSCI Arab Mrk Index: MSCI
Arabian Markets Domestic Index excluding Saudi Arabia. Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted return mean
and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance measures
(modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the results from the single-factor model (CAPM).
Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And finally Panel E reports the results from
the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems
using White’s (1980) correction test.

Table 8-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Arab-Focused Portfolios)
Overall period
Bull
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Islamic portfolio
-0.03% 0.45%
2.54%
0.26%
Conventional portfolio
0.70%
0.31%
3.67%
0.19%
The difference
-0.73% 0.14%* -1.13% 0.06%
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
0.98%
0.95%
6.33%
1.23%
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
0.77%
0.61%
4.63%
0.58%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Bear
Mean Variance
-1.12% 0.49%
-0.56% 0.31%
-0.56% 0.19%*
-1.29% 0.67%
-0.87% 0.55%

Financial Crisis
Mean Variance
-2.43% 0.67%
-1.69% 0.50%
-0.74% 0.17%
-3.64% 1.14%
-3.05% 0.99%

Table 8 -panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for
the Arab-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate that the
Arab-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire studied period is 0.14 percent more risky
(using the variance) than its peer the Arab-focused conventional portfolio and that
difference in the total risk is considered statistically significant at 10 percent. Even though
the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio is more risky than its peer, the results during the entire
studied period indicate that there is no statistical evidence that there exist any differences
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in the performance (non risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional
Arab-focused fund portfolios.
Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods; the results
show that during the bull and financial crisis periods, there is no statistical evidence that
there exist any risk differences between the Islamic and conventional Arab-focused fund
portfolios. However, the results during the bear period indicate that the Arab-focused
Islamic fund portfolio is considered 0.19 percent more risky than its peer the Arab-focused
conventional fund portfolio and that total risk difference is statistically significant at 10
percent.
Looking at the performance of these Arab-focused portfolios during these three
periods (bull, bear, and financial crisis periods), the non risk-adjusted return results
indicate that there is no statistical evidence that there exist any differences in the
performance between the Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios.
Table 8-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (Arab-Focused
Portfolios)
Index
Modified Sharpe Ratio
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
MM
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
Treynor
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
TT
MSCI Arab Mrk Index

Overall period

Bull

Bear

Financial Crisis

Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv.
-0.02% 7.79% 44.48% 77.24% -0.10% -0.05% -0.21% -0.13%
-0.16% 1.03% 5.21% 8.84% -1.35% -0.95% -3.18% -2.58%
-0.08% 0.88% 3.68% 6.18% -1.19% -0.84% -2.97% -2.41%
-0.61% 0.94% 12.34% 12.54% -1.92% -1.43% -3.57% -3.04%
-0.47% 0.74% 6.83%
-1.33% 0.23% 6.30%

8.86% -1.79% -1.30% -3.45% -2.90%
6.49% -0.37% 0.12% 0.17% 0.69%

-0.97% 0.24% 2.48%

4.51% -0.65% -0.16% -0.30%

0.25%

Table 8 -panel B- reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance
measures for the Arab-focused fund portfolios. The results indicate that the Arab-focused
Islamic portfolio underperforms its peer the Arab-focused conventional portfolio during
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both the overall and bull periods. However, contrary to what is observed when analyzing
locally-focused portfolios (Table 7- panel B), the results from this panel reveal that the
Arab-focused Islamic portfolio performs worse than the Arab-focused conventional
portfolio during both the bear and financial crisis periods. These results hold regardless of
the simple risk-adjusted performance measure used and regardless of the Arab-focused
market benchmark employed to adjust for risk.
Table 8-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Arab-Focused Portfolios)
Index

Overall period

Islamic
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0065
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index

Conv.
0.0011

-0.0075
-0.0062

0.0014

Bull

Bear

Islamic Conv.
Islamic
0.0115 0.0175** -0.0026
-0.006
0.0082 0.0173*

Conv.
0.0007

-0.0034
-0.005

-0.001

Financial Crisis
Islamic
0.0012

Conv.
0.0041

-0.0029
-0.0022

0.0015

Diff
-0.0076
-0.0091
-0.004
-0.0037
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.4865*** 0.4582*** 0.1825* 0.2701*** 0.7192*** 0.5758*** 0.7061*** 0.5865***
Diff

0.0283

-0.0877

0.1434

0.1196

MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.6405*** 0.5800*** 0.3299** 0.3822*** 0.7735*** 0.6357*** 0.7312*** 0.6157***
Diff
0.0605
-0.0523
Adj. MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 49.27% 63.84% 11.39% 43.32%
R2 MSCI Arab Mrk Index 55.76% 66.61% 20.74% 40.91%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

0.1377
69.39% 71.63%

0.1155
82.73% 75.54%

65.53%

77.08%

71.43%

72.48%

Table 8 -panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During
the overall sample period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and
highly significant at 1 percent. This suggests that during the entire sample period, both
Arab-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are considered less volatile than both
Arab-focused market benchmarks (MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index and MSCI Arab Mrk
Index). Furthermore, the beta-difference portfolio results during the overall period indicate
that there is no statistical evidence that shows any systematic risk differences between the
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios; regardless of Arab-focused
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market benchmark used to adjust for risk. Similar results are observed during the bull, bear
and financial crisis periods.
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results indicate that
there is no statistical evidence that both Islamic and conventional Arab-focused fund
portfolios outperform both Arab-focused market indices. Similar results are observed
during the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, but there is one exception during the bull
period. That is, the results during the bull period indicate that only the Arab-focused
conventional portfolio slightly outperforms both Arab-focused market benchmarks. In
other words, the results show that the Arab-focused conventional portfolio outperforms
both the MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index by 0.0175 (statistically significant at 5 percent) and
the MSCI Arab Mrk Index by 0.0173 (statistically significant at 10 percent).
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional
Arab-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows
any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results hold
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused
market benchmark used.
Table 8 -panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. The results
show that there is no statistical evidence that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic
and conventional) possess any selectivity and/or market timing skills during all four
sample periods; regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
However, there is only one exception when looking at the selectivity skills of the Arabfocused conventional fund portfolio during the bull period. That is, the results show that
the Arab-focused conventional fund portfolio do possess some selectivity skills of 0.0183 127

significant at 5 percent- (0.0166 -significant at 10 percent-) when the MSCI Arab Mrk
Islamic Index (MSCI Arab Mrk Index) is employed as the Arab-focused market benchmark.
Note that the selectivity skills results from this panel are very much consistent with the
Jensen alpha index results observed above in (panel C).
Table 8-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Arab-Focused Portfolios)
Index
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
Diff
Adj. MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic
R2
MSCI Arab Mrk Index

Overall period

Bull

Financial Crisis

Islamic

Conv.

Islamic

Islamic Conv.

Islamic

Conv.

0.0029

0.0064

0.0095 0.0183** -0.0022 0.0006

0.0045

0.0033

-0.0035
-0.0025

0.0028

-0.0054

-0.0088

-0.5939

-0.0132

0.0012

0.2138

1.4636
7.06%

-0.0033

0.0006

-0.1409 -0.0709 0.0248 -0.4385 0.0945

0.4754

-0.2307 1.6775

-0.3632

-0.0028

0.0035 0.0166* -0.0068 -0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0009

-1.0172** -0.5842* 0.3346
-0.433

Conv.

Bear

-0.0957
0.3681

0.523

-0.1548

-0.533
-0.2658 0.3298
-0.5956

54.46%

66.14%

40.19% 68.70% 70.98% 82.01% 73.82%

55.86%

66.26% 21.44% 37.55% 64.92% 71.36% 75.57% 70.77%

*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Furthermore, the results from this panel indicate that there is no statistical evidence
that shows any differences in both the selectivity and market time skills between the
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused portfolios during all four studied periods;
regardless what Arab-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk.
Table 8 -panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. The systematic risk
(beta) results indicate that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional)
are less volatile than both Arab-focused market indices (Islamic and conventional). This is
true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of Arab-focused
market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception when looking at
the beta results for the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio during the bull period where results
indicate that there is no statistical evidence of any co-movement between such fund
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portfolio and the Arab-focused Islamic index: MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index. Furthermore,
the beta-difference results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows any
systematic risk differences between the Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused
portfolios; regardless of sample period under examination and regardless of the Arabfocused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
The alpha results show that there is no statistical evidence that both Arab-focused
portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with abnormal returns.
Furthermore, the alpha-difference portfolio results indicate that there is no statistical
evidence that shows any differences in the performance between the Islamic and the
conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios. These results hold regardless of the sample
period under examination and regardless of Arab-focused market benchmark used to
adjust for risk.
The results from the SMB and MOM risk factors indicate that there is no statistical
evidence that both Arab-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are sensitive to
either the SMB and/or MOM risk factors; regardless of sample period under examination
and regardless of the Arab-focused index used. However, results from the HML risk factor
indicate that only the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio is biased toward growth stocks during
only the overall and bear periods; regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used.
Loading on the HML risk factor is -0.2252 (-0.1968) during the overall period and -0.2613
(-0.2938) during the bear period when the MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index (MSCI Arab Mrk
Index) is used. All loadings are significantly at 10 percent.
Finally, the SMB-, HML-, and MOM-difference portfolio results indicate that both
Islamic and conventional Arab-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to
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all these risk factors. These results hold regardless of the sample period under examination
and regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
Table 8-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Arab-Focused Portfolios)
Index

Overall period

Islamic
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0043
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index

Conv. Islamic Conv.
0.0029 -0.0069 0.0076

-0.0072
-0.0057

Bull

-0.0145

0.0018 -0.0066 0.0097

Bear
Islamic
-0.0005

Conv.
0.0032

-0.0036
-0.0020

0.0018

Financial Crisis
Islamic
0.0090

Conv.
0.0068

0.0022
0.0089

0.0061

Diff
-0.0076
-0.0163
-0.0038
0.0028
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.4857*** 0.4594*** 0.1552 0.2569*** 0.7153*** 0.5750*** 0.6567*** 0.5749***
Diff

0.0263

-0.1017

0.1403

0.0817

MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.6380*** 0.5814*** 0.2630* 0.3626** 0.7675*** 0.6311*** 0.6617*** 0.5941***
Diff
0.0566
-0.0997
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.0371 -0.0098 0.0797 0.0143
s

Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index

0.0469
0.0306

0.0654

-0.0132 0.0694

0.0022

0.1364
-0.0027 -0.0309

0.0676
0.0509 -0.0690

0.0282

0.1200

0.0268

-0.0095

Diff
0.0438
0.0672
0.0363
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.2252* -0.0505 -0.3996 -0.1536 -0.2613* -0.0823
Diff

-0.1748

-0.2460

-0.1790

MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.1968* -0.0231 -0.3172 -0.0481 -0.2938* -0.1072
Diff
-0.1736
-0.2690
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0412 -0.0312 0.3451 0.1863
Diff
MSCI Arab Mrk Index
Diff

-0.0100
-0.0104

0.1587

-0.0052 0.3012

-0.0052

0.1408

0.1604

Adj. MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 49.38% 62.38% 15.33% 37.64%
R2 MSCI Arab Mrk Index 55.65% 65.08% 19.39% 32.00%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

0.0881

-0.0430

0.1312
-0.1684 -0.0474
-0.1210
-0.1284

-0.0088

-0.1866
-0.0506 -0.0457

-0.1196
-0.2447 -0.0459

-0.0049

-0.1987

-0.0701

-0.0566

-0.0136

-0.3423

-0.1044

-0.2378

69.73%

70.52%

80.23%

70.73%

66.33%

70.23%

73.41%

66.73%

9.3. Empirical Results for Internationally-Focused Portfolios
Table 9 reports the results for only the internationally-focused fund portfolios. The
market indices used to benchmark the performance of these internationally-focused
portfolios are also internationally-focused and they are: 1) MSCI World Islamic: MSCI
World Islamic Index and 2) MSCI World Index: MSCI World Index IMI. To enhance
comparability, each of the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused portfolios
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are benchmarked against the internationally-focused Islamic market index (MSCI World
Islamic Index) and then against the internationally-focused conventional market index
(MSCI World Index).
Table 9: Results for the Internationally-Focused Portfolios
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels
in this table report the results for only the internationally-focused portfolios. The market indices used to
benchmark the performance of these internationally-focused portfolios are also internationally-focused and
they are: 1) MSCI World Islamic: MSCI World Islamic Index and 2) MSCI World Index: MSCI World Index IMI.
Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the
simple risk-adjusted performance measures (modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the
results from the single-factor model (CAPM). Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model.
And finally Panel E reports the results from the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are
corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test.

Table 9-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Internationally-Focused Portfolios)
Overall period
Bull
Bear
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Mean Variance
Islamic portfolio
0.21%
0.02%
0.62%
0.004%
0.04%
0.03%
Conventional portfolio
0.29%
0.01%
0.45%
0.001%
0.21%
0.02%
The difference
-0.08% 0.01%*** 0.17% 0.003%*** -0.18% 0.01%**
MSCI World Islamic
0.41%
0.21%
1.04%
0.08%
0.14%
0.26%
MSCI World Index
0.24%
0.25%
1.15%
0.07%
-0.15% 0.32%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

Financial Crisis
Mean Variance
-0.13% 0.06%
0.06%
0.03%
-0.19% 0.04%*
-0.62% 0.57%
-0.66% 0.73%

Table 9 -panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for
the internationally-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate
that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire sample period is 0.01
percent more risky (using the variance) than its peer the internationally-focused
conventional portfolio and that difference in the total risk is considered statistically
significant at 1 percent. Even though the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio has more
total risk exposure than its peer, the results during the entire studied period indicate that
there is no statistical evidence that shows any differences in the performance (non risk131

adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused fund
portfolios.
Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, the results
indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is also considered significantly
more risky (using the variance) than its peer the internationally-focused conventional
portfolio. That is, the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.003, 0.01,
and 0.04 percent more risky than its peer during the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods
and that total risk difference is statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Although the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered more risky than its
peer, there is no statistical evidence that shows any differences in the performance (non
risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused
portfolios during these three periods.
Table 9-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (InternationallyFocused Portfolios)
Index
Modified Sharpe Ratio
MSCI World Islamic
MM
MSCI World Index
MSCI World Islamic
Treynor
MSCI World Index
MSCI World Islamic
TT
MSCI World Index

Overall period

Bull

Bear

Financial Crisis

Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv.
-0.001% 1.17% 51.97% 53.19% -0.004% -0.001% -0.01% -0.001%
0.08% 0.33% 1.73% 1.77% -0.43% 0.04% -0.58% -0.05%
0.06%
-0.22%

0.33%
0.07%

1.65%
2.12%

1.68%
3.73%

-0.50%
-0.79%

0.02%
-0.26%

-0.67%
-0.71%

-0.07%
-0.15%

-0.25% 0.07% 2.06%
-0.36% -0.07% 1.36%

3.79%
2.98%

-0.89%
-0.66%

-0.29%
-0.13%

-0.81%
0.01%

-0.17%
0.57%

-0.21%

2.92%

-0.47%

0.13%

-0.05%

0.58%

0.11%

1.19%

Table 9 -panel B- reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance
measures for the internationally-focused fund portfolios. The results from this panel are
very much similar to the results reported in (Table 8 –panel B) when the Arab-focused
portfolios are discussed. The results indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic fund
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portfolio underperforms its peer the internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio.
This is true using all measures, regardless of the sample period under examination and
regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark employed to adjust for risk.
Table 9-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Internationally-Focused Portfolios)
Index

Overall period

Islamic
MSCI World Islamic -0.001
Diff
MSCI World Index

Conv.
-0.0001

-0.0009
-0.0005

0.0002

Bull

Bear

Islamic Conv. Islamic
0.0021** 0.0013** -0.0019
0.0008
0.0019* 0.0013*

Conv.
-0.0003

-0.0017
-0.0012

0.0002

Financial Crisis
Islamic
0.0000

Conv.
0.0011

-0.0011
-0.0001

0.001

Diff
-0.0007
0.0006
-0.0015
-0.0012
MSCI World Islamic 0.2813*** 0.1879*** 0.1576*** 0.0448* 0.2930*** 0.2045*** 0.3109*** 0.2014***
Diff

0.0934***

0.1127**

0.0885***

0.1095***

MSCI World Index 0.2556*** 0.1727*** 0.1623*** 0.0442 0.2609*** 0.1840*** 0.2743*** 0.1772***
Diff

0.0829***

0.1181**

Adj. MSCI World Islamic 73.00% 66.04% 46.89%
R2 MSCI World Index 71.60% 66.35% 43.78%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

0.0769**

0.0972***

13.24%

76.07%

71.52%

84.40%

79.72%

10.65%

73.32%

70.40%

83.93%

78.77%

Table 9 -panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During
the overall sample period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and
highly significant at 1 percent; regardless what internationally-focused market benchmark
(MSCI World Islamic Index or MSCI World Index) is used to adjust for risk. This means that
during the entire sample period, both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) are considered less volatile than both internationally-focused market
benchmarks. Similar results are observed when the entire sample period is broken down to
bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. However, there is one exception where the results
during the bull period indicate that there is no statistical evidence of any co-movement
between the internationally-focused conventional portfolio and the internationally-focused
conventional market index: MSCI World Index.
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Looking at differences in beta, the beta-difference portfolio results suggest that the
internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is, indeed, considered more risky than the
internationally-focused conventional portfolio and these results are statistically significant
of at least 5 percent. These findings are observed regardless of the sample period under
examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to
adjust for risk.
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results during the
overall, bear, and financial crisis periods reveal that both internationally-focused portfolios
(Islamic and conventional) do not outperform both internationally-focused market
benchmarks (Islamic and conventional). That is, alphas are either negative or
insignificantly positive. On the other hand, the results during the bull period indicate that
there is statistical evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) slightly outperform both internationally-focused market benchmarks. That
outperformance ranges from 0.0013 to only 0.0021.
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional
internationally-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence
that shows any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results
hold regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the
internationally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
Table 9 -panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. The results
show that there is no statistical evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios
(Islamic and conventional) possess any selectivity and/or market timing skills during all
four sample periods; regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to
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adjust for risk. However, there are two exceptions when the MSCI World Islamic Index is
used to adjust for risk: 1) during the bull period, the internationally-focused Islamic
portfolio possesses some selectivity skills of around 0.0030 and it is statistically significant
at 10 percent; and 2) during the bear period, the internationally-focused conventional
portfolio possesses market timing abilities of around 0.4290 and it is statistically
significant at 1 percent.
Table 9-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Internationally-Focused Portfolios)
Index
MSCI World Islamic

Adj.
R2

Overall period

Bull

Bear

Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic
-0.0012 -0.0006 0.0030* 0.0012 -0.0027*

Conv.
-0.0014

Islamic Conv.
-0.0019 -0.0012

Diff

-0.0006

0.0018

MSCI World Index

-0.0004 -0.0001

0.0023 0.0009

-0.0013

Diff
MSCI World Islamic

-0.0003
0.0665 0.2071

0.0013
-1.2298 0.1936

-0.001
0.3182 0.4290***

0.0002
0.3719
0.474

Diff

-0.1406

-1.4234

-0.1108

-0.1022

MSCI World Index

-0.0607 0.1136

Diff
MSCI World Islamic

-0.535

0.5307

-0.1743
-1.0657
72.61% 66.07% 45.98% 8.38%

MSCI World Index
71.20% 66.10% 40.80% 6.79%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

-0.0014

Financial Crisis

0.0393

-0.0004

0.2051

-0.0006
0.0001

-0.0367

-0.0001

0.176

-0.1658
76.17%
73.12%

-0.2127
84.11% 81.28%

72.73%

82.79% 77.97%

70.58%

Results from this panel also shows that there is no statistical evidence that shows
any differences in both the selectivity and market timing skills between the Islamic and the
conventional internationally-focused portfolios during all four studied periods; regardless
what internationally-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk.
Table 9 -panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. The beta results
indicate that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are less
volatile than both internationally-focused market indices (Islamic and conventional). That
is, all betas are positive, less than 1, and highly significant. Furthermore, the beta-difference
results indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered more risky
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than the internationally-focused conventional portfolio. All these results hold regardless of
the sample period under examination and regardless of internationally-focused market
benchmark used to adjust for risk.
Table 9-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Internationally-Focused Portfolios)
Index

Overall period

Islamic
MSCI World Islamic -0.0004
Diff

Conv.
0.0006

-0.0010

MSCI World Index -0.00002

0.0009

Bull

Bear

Islamic Conv. Islamic
0.0010 -0.00003 0.0001
0.0010
-0.0002

-0.0005

Conv.
0.0019*

-0.0018
0.0008

0.0024**

Financial Crisis
Islamic
-0.0010

Conv.
0.0029

-0.0039
0.0018

0.0044

Diff
-0.0009
0.0003
-0.0016
-0.0026
MSCI World Islamic 0.2771*** 0.1851*** 0.1579*** 0.0535** 0.2829*** 0.1949*** 0.3308*** 0.1794***
Diff

0.0920***

0.1044**

0.0880***

0.1514*

MSCI World Index 0.2522*** 0.1710*** 0.1733*** 0.0607** 0.2511*** 0.1756*** 0.2650*** 0.1444***
Diff
MSCI World Islamic
Diff
MSCI World Index

0.0813***
0.0148

0.0076

0.0072
0.0153

0.0078

Diff
0.0075
MSCI World Islamic -0.0147 0.0071
Diff
MSCI World Index

-0.0218
-0.0072

0.0125

Diff
-0.0197
MSCI World Islamic -0.0123 -0.0145
Diff
MSCI World Index

0.0022
-0.0112

-0.0133

0.1127**
0.0155

0.0025

0.0131
0.0162

0.0027

0.0135
-0.0059 0.0036
-0.0095
-0.0150

0.0009

0.0755**
0.0204

0.0163

0.0041
0.0210

0.0165

0.0045
-0.0542* -0.0254
-0.0288
-0.0382

-0.0138

-0.0158
-0.0244
0.0158 0.0202 -0.0423** -0.0433**
-0.0044
0.0306

0.0010

0.1206*
-0.0621

-0.0705
-0.0246

0.0283

-0.0529
-0.0513 -0.0576
0.0063
-0.0333

-0.0476

0.0143
0.0510 -0.0484
0.0994

0.0254* -0.0418* -0.0423** -0.0372

Diff
0.0021
0.0052
MSCI
World
Islamic
72.62%
65.21%
45.39%
15.64%
Adj.
2
R MSCI World Index 71.04% 65.70% 48.14% 19.00%
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively

0.0085

-0.0947

0.0004
76.99% 72.61%

0.0575
84.43% 77.61%

73.38%

82.11%

71.28%

76.33%

The alpha results show that there is no statistical evidence that both internationallyfocused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with abnormal returns;
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the internationallyfocused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception during
the bear period where the results show that the internationally-focused conventional
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portfolio slightly outperforms both internationally-focused market benchmarks. In other
words, the results during the bear period indicate that the internationally-focused
conventional portfolio outperforms: 1) the MSCI World Islamic Index by 0.0019 (significant
at 10 percent), and 2) the MSCI World Index by 0.0024 (significant at 5 percent).
The alpha-difference results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows
any performance differences between the Islamic and the conventional internationallyfocused portfolios. These results holds regardless of the sample period under examination
and regardless of internationally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. These
results are also very much consistent with the results obtained from the single-factor
model (panel C).
The results from the SMB and HML risk factors indicate that there is no statistical
evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are
sensitive to either the SMB and/or HML risk factors; regardless of sample period under
examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to
adjust for risk. However, there is one exception where the results during the bear period
indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is biased toward growth stocks
when it is benchmarked against the internationally-focused Islamic index (MSCI World
Islamic Index). Loading on the HML risk factor is -0.0542 and it is statistically significant at
10 percent.
The results from the MOM risk factor indicate that during the overall, bull, and
financial crisis periods, there is no statistical evidence that both portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) are sensitive to the MOM risk factor; regardless of the internationallyfocused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception during
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the bull period where the results indicate that the internationally-focused conventional
portfolio is biased towards a momentum investment strategy when the internationallyfocused conventional index (MSCI World Index) is used to adjust for risk (loading on the
MOM risk factor is 0.0254 and it is statistically significant at 10 percent). On the other hand,
results during the bear period indicate that there is statistical evidence that both
internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are biased towards a
contrarian

investment

strategy;

regardless

what

internationally-focused

market

benchmark is used to adjust for risk. That is, results show that loadings on the MOM risk
factor during the bear period ranges from -0.0418 to -0.0433.
Finally, the SMB-, HML-, and MOM-difference portfolio results indicate that both
Islamic and conventional internationally-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical
sensitivities to all these risk factors. These results hold regardless of the sample period
under examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used
to adjust for risk.

10. Discussing the Empirical Results
Before discussing the empirical results, it is essential to reiterate what is meant by
locally-, Arab-, and internationally-focused fund portfolios. A locally-focused fund portfolio
is a portfolio that contains Saudi mutual funds that invest in assets located only in Saudi
Arabia. An Arab-focused fund portfolio is a portfolio that contains Saudi mutual funds that
invest in assets located only in countries that are members of the Arab league, excluding
Saudi Arabia. An internationally-focused fund portfolio is a portfolio that contains Saudi
mutual funds that invest in assets located in all other countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and
countries that belong in the previous Arab group.
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10.1. Locally-Focused Fund Portfolios
Assessing the locally-focused fund portfolios, the total risk (variance) results
indicate, as hypothesized, that there is statistical evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is,
indeed, less risky than the conventional fund portfolio. This is true regardless of the period
under examination. Even though the Islamic fund portfolio is less risky, there is no
statistical evidence that the performance (using non risk-adjusted returns) of such
portfolio is different from that of the conventional fund portfolio (fail to reject the null
hypothesis). This is true during all periods, but the bull period.
However, when risk is adjusted, results provide a different story. As hypothesized,
all simple risk-adjusted performance measures show that the locally-focused Islamic fund
portfolio underperforms its peer the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio during
both the overall and bull periods. That underperformance could mainly be attributed to the
lower level of risk assumed. Furthermore, all risk-adjusted performance measures show
that the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio performs less badly than its peer the locallyfocused conventional fund portfolio during both the bear and financial crisis periods. Such
finding is not surprising given that the Islamic fund portfolio has less risk exposure, and
therefore is not going to perform worse than the conventional fund portfolio in adverse
market trends. However, it worthy to note that these differences in performance between
the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios are very small using all
these simple risk-adjusted performance measures during all studied periods, except when
using the modified Sharpe ratio during the bull period.
For example, during the overall period, the underperformance of the Islamic fund
portfolio ranges from 0.08 to only 0.86 percent. Also, during the bull period, the
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underperformance of the Islamic fund portfolio ranges from 0.92 to only 1.14 percent
(excluding the results from the modified Sharpe ratio where the underperformance is
around 19.83 percent). Lastly, during both the bear and financial crisis periods, the
outperformance of the Islamic fund portfolio ranges from 0.04 to only 0.39 percent.
In order to further examine the persistence of these small performance and risk
differences between the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios, a
regression approach is employed.
Looking at the risk differences (differences in beta), the results from both the singlefactor and four-factor models confirm the earlier finding that the locally-focused Islamic
fund portfolio is, indeed, less risky than the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio
(reject the null hypothesis of no risk differences between Islamic and conventional funds).
This is true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the
locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception
when the locally-focused Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is employed during the bull period
where the beta-difference results from both models still indicate that the Islamic fund
portfolio is less risky than its peer, but that risk difference is statistically insignificant.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that such exception does not carry any importance
because the locally-focused Islamic market benchmark (GCC Islamic) is considered by far
inferior to the locally-focused conventional market index (TASI) in explaining returns of
both Islamic and conventional locally-focused portfolios.
Looking at the performance differences (differences in alpha), the results from all
three models (single-factor, Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) indicate that
there is no statistical evidence that shows any performance differences between the Islamic
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and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios (fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
performance differences between Islamic and conventional funds). These findings are
observed regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locallyfocused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
It is worthy to note that all findings from examining locally-focused fund portfolios
suggest that the risk-return profile of the Islamic fund portfolio is considered superior to
that of the conventional fund portfolio. This is considered good news for investors
interested in investing in a portfolio of locally-focused Islamic funds because these
investors are exposed to lower risk, but at the same time they are not penalized by less
return. In other words, investors interested in locally-focused portfolios are better off
investing in an Islamic fund portfolio than in a conventional fund portfolio because the
Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to less risk for a return that is statistically no
different from that earned when investing in the conventional fund portfolio.
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no
evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the Islamic
and the conventional locally-focused portfolios. This is true regardless of the sample period
under examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust
for risk.
Finally, the results from the four-factor model indicate that when the locally-focused
Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is employed, both locally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and
MOM. This is true regardless of the sample period under examination. However, as
indicated earlier, the locally-focused conventional index (TASI) is much superior to the GCC
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Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locally-focused fund
portfolios. Thus, the results that are based on using TASI shed more light on the behavior of
locally-focused fund portfolios when common equity investment strategies are introduced
into the picture.
When TASI is used, results from the four-factor model indicate that the locallyfocused Islamic fund portfolio during only the overall and financial crisis periods is more
sensitive to the SMB risk factor where such fund portfolio is more biased towards small
capitalization stocks than is its peer the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio. Such
findings are consistent with findings of Abderrezak (2008) and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec
(2009) where they find that Islamic funds, in general, are biased towards small
capitalization stocks. However, results from both HML and MOM risk factors indicate that
both locally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) exhibit virtually identical
sensitivities to these risk factors, regardless of sample period under examination.

10.2. Arab-Focused Fund Portfolios
Results from analyzing the Arab-focused fund portfolios suggest the following.
Contrary to what is hypothesized; the variance results indicate that during only the overall
and bear periods, there is statistical evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is more risky
than the conventional fund portfolio. However, during the bull and financial crisis periods,
there no evidence that there exist any differences in the variance. Nonetheless, the
performance results (using non risk-adjusted returns) show that there is no statistical
evidence, regardless of the sample period under examination, that there exist any
differences in the performance between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios.
However, when risk is adjusted, all simple risk-adjusted performance measures show that
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the Islamic fund portfolio underperforms its peer the conventional fund portfolio. This is
true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused
market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
To further examine the risk-return profile of these Arab-focused fund portfolios, a
regression approach is used. Assessing the riskiness of these fund portfolios, the betadifference results from both the single-factor and four-factor models indicate that the null
hypothesis of no risk differences between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios
cannot be rejected at all conventional levels. Assessing the performance of these Arabfocused fund portfolios, the alpha-difference results from all three models (single-factor,
Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) also indicate that the null hypothesis of no
return differences between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios cannot be
rejected at all conventional levels. All these results are observed regardless of the sample
period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to
adjust for risk. All these findings support the assertion that there is neither a cost nor a
benefit from adhering to the Shariah law when investing in Arab-focused fund portfolios.
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no
statistical evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios. Also, the results from the fourfactor model indicate that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional)
exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and MOM. Again, all
findings from both models (Treynor & Mazuy and the four-factor models) are observed
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused
market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
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10.3. Internationally-Focused Fund Portfolios
Results from analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios suggest the
following. Contrary to what is hypothesized, the variance results indicate that there is
strong evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is slightly more risky than the conventional
fund portfolio. This is true regardless of the period under examination. Nonetheless, the
performance results (using non risk-adjusted returns) show that there is no statistical
evidence that there exist any differences in the performance between the Islamic and the
conventional fund portfolios; regardless of the sample period under examination.
Consistent with the results from analyzing the Arab-focused fund portfolios; the
results from analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios show that when risk is
adjusted, all simple risk-adjusted performance measures indicate that the Islamic fund
portfolio underperforms its peer the conventional fund portfolio. All these results hold
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the internationallyfocused market benchmark used to adjust for risk.
In order to further examine and compare the risk-return profile between Islamic
and conventional internationally-focused fund portfolios, a regression approach is
employed. Consist with the variance results, the systematic risk (beta) results from both
the single-factor and four-factor models indicate that the Islamic fund portfolio is, indeed,
more risky than the conventional fund portfolio. Assessing the performance, the results
from all three models (single-factor, Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) indicate
that there is no statistical evidence that shows any performance differences between the
Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios. All these findings are observed regardless of
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the period under examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market
benchmark used to adjust for risk.
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no
evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the Islamic
and the conventional internationally-focused fund portfolios. Also, the results from the
four-factor model indicate that both internationally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and
conventional) exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and
MOM. All findings from both models (Treynor & Mazuy and the four-factor models) are
observed regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the
internationally-focused market index employed.
It is worthy to note that when the locally-focused fund portfolios are analyzed,
findings suggest that investors that invest in a locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio are
better off than those who invest in a locally-focused conventional fund portfolio. However,
the opposite is true when analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios. That is,
investors are better off investing in an internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio
than in an internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio. This is because the
internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to more risk for a return
that is statistically no different from that earned when investing in an internationallyfocused conventional fund portfolio.

10.4. Final Note
Analyzing portfolios of Saudi mutual funds indicates that the risk-return profile of
the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios changes depending on the portfolio’s
geographical focus. A locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio has a superior risk-return
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profile than a locally-focused conventional fund portfolio, whereas, the opposite is
observed when investigating the internationally-focused fund portfolios. On the other
hand, there is no statistical evidence that the risk-return profile of an Arab-focused Islamic
fund portfolio is different from that of the Arab-focused conventional fund portfolio. All
these findings are observed regardless of the sample period under examination (overall,
bull, bear, and financial crisis periods). Also, all these findings are observed regardless of
different appropriate market benchmarks used to adjust for risk.
A possible explanation for the different risk-return profile between locally- and both
Arab- and internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolios is that Shariah-compliant assets
that are located outside of Saudi Arabia could not be as strict and consistent in adhering to
the Shariah law as those located in Saudi Arabia.
To elaborate, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the few countries that have a law
that is strictly based on Shariah. Furthermore, the majority of the population embraces the
Islamic religion and believes that such religion is not just a ritual practice, but instead it is a
way of life where all Islamic rules and regulations must be implemented in all aspects of life
including those aspects related to finance and investment. Thus, Shariah-compliant assets
that are designed and marketed to attract strict Muslim investors are going to be under
more scrutiny to ensure their strict adherence to the Shariah law when they are located in
Saudi Arabia. This is because these assets are surrounded with two monitoring
mechanisms: the Saudi law and strict Muslim investors in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is not
surprising to know that Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused (funds invest in
Shariah-compliant assets located only in Saudi Arabia) are adhering to the Shariah law in a
very strict and consistent manner.
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However, the case is more likely to be different when Shariah-compliant assets are
examined in different countries or regions, especially in non-Muslim countries. That is,
each country or region has its own way in complying with the Shariah law which results in
a lack of standardization in Shariah screenings. For example, some countries require the
ratio of ‘account receivables to total assets’, ‘interest-bearing debt to total assets’, and
‘interest-bearing cash and investments to total assets’ to be less than 45, 30, and 30
percent, respectively; while other countries require these ratios to be less than 33 percent.
Another example is that some countries use total assets as the denominator when
evaluating these financial filter ratios, while other countries use different variations of
market capitalization (such as market capitalization itself, 12-, 24-, and 36-month market
capitalization average). All these dissimilarities in setting the Islamic norms between
countries will most likely affect the overall Shariah adherence decision from one country to
another.29
In other words, because there are some inconsistencies in setting the Islamic norms
from one country to another, it is not unlikely for a firm to be classified as Islamic in one
country, but as non-Islamic in another country. And this is the main reason why it is
expected that Shariah-compliant assets that are located in countries other than Saudi
Arabia are not as strict and consistent in adhering to the Shariah law as those assets that are
located in Saudi Arabia.
As a result, Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused are expected to better
represent mutual funds that are not just comfortable with the Shariah law, but instead
mutual funds that are consistently and strictly adhering to the Shariah law than Islamic

29

See Chapter 1: Islamic Finance, section 4.1: Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks for more details.
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mutual funds that are either Arab- or internationally-focused (funds invest in Shariahcompliant assets located in all counties, but Saudi Arabia). If this is the case, then this could
explain why there are differences in the risk-return profile between the locally- and both
Arab- and internationally-focused portfolios of Saudi Islamic mutual funds. However, the
investigation of such issue is out of the scope of this paper and is left for future research.

11. Conclusion
This paper investigates one of the most important issues raised in the Islamic
mutual fund literature. That issue is whether investing in Islamic mutual funds comes at
any cost. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that comprehensively investigates this
issue in the context of Saudi Arabia.
To investigate whether Islamic mutual funds are associated with any costs, this
paper employs a unique sample of 143 Saudi mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47
conventional) during the period from July 2004 to January 2010. That Saudi mutual fund
sample very much represents the Saudi mutual fund industry in terms of geographical
focuses,

diversity,

investment

objectives,

Shariah

compliancy,

and

institutional

management.
Furthermore, this paper utilizes a portfolio approach in order to help diversify away
fund-specific risks. Thus, all Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are grouped into
portfolios based on the following characteristics: three main geographical focuses (local,
Arab, and international), Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional), and four different
Saudi stock market trends (overall, bull, bear, and the recent 2008 financial crisis periods).
Grouping funds into portfolios in this manner facilitates comparability of the data and
enhances reliability of results.
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Then this paper employs very well known performance measures (such as the
modified Sharpe ratio, MM index, Treynor ratio, and TT index) as well as very well known
regression models (such as the single-factor model, the Treynor and Mazuy model, and a
multifactor model that is in the spirit of Carhart (1997) four-factor model) in order to
assess the risk-return profile of these Saudi mutual fund portfolios.
Findings from this paper suggest that using portfolios of Saudi mutual funds to
investigate the issue of whether investing in Islamic mutual funds is associated with any
cost heavily depends on the geographical focuses of these fund portfolios.
That is, investors are better off investing in the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio
due to its superior risk-return profile than in the locally-focused conventional fund
portfolio. That is, the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to less risk
for the same level of return provided by its conventional peer: the locally-focused
conventional fund portfolio.
The opposite is true when internationally-focused fund portfolios are analyzed. That
is, investors are better off investing in the internationally-focused conventional fund
portfolio than in the internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio. This is because the
internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to more risk for the same
level of return provided by the internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio.
However, when Arab-focused fund portfolios are analyzed, findings indicate that
there is neither a cost nor a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law. That is, results
indicate that there is no statistical evidence that the risk-return profile of the Arab-focused
Islamic fund portfolio is different from that of the Arab-focused conventional fund
portfolio.
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It is worthy to note that all these findings are observed regardless of the sample
period under examination (overall, bull, bear, and financial crisis). Also, all these findings
are robust regardless of different appropriate market benchmarks used to adjust for risk.
Finally, findings from this paper raise an important question: Are Saudi Islamic
mutual funds that are Arab- and/or internationally-focused adhere to the Shariah law in a
manner that is different from Saudi Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused?
However, this issue is left for future research because investigating such issue is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Created 24 Different Types of Portfolios
Panel A:
Overall Sample Period
(July 2004-Janurary 2010)
Local

Panel B:
The Bull Period
(July 2004-Feberuary 2006)
Local

Islamic portfolio 1
non- Islamic portfolio1
Arab

Islamic portfolio 4
non- Islamic portfolio4
Arab

Islamic portfolio 2
non-Islamic portfolio 2
International

Islamic portfolio 5
non-Islamic portfolio 5
International

Islamic portfolio 3
non-Islamic portfolio 3
Panel C:
The Bear Period
(March 2006-January2010)
Local

Islamic portfolio 6
non-Islamic portfolio 6
Panel D:
The Financial Crisis Period
(September 2008-January2010)
Local

Islamic portfolio 7
non- Islamic portfolio7
Arab

Islamic portfolio 10
non- Islamic portfolio10
Arab

Islamic portfolio 8
non-Islamic portfolio 8
International

Islamic portfolio 11
non-Islamic portfolio 11
International

Islamic portfolio 9
non-Islamic portfolio 9

Islamic portfolio 12
non-Islamic portfolio 12
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